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# AFRICA QUARTERLY

Role of the U. N. Council for Namibia

D. C. Stavropoulos

Problems to the 1971  
Nineteen Sessions of KNU

C. N. Udo

Kenya: The Colonial Experience and Development  
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And the Africa

Book Reviews

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## Role of the U.N. Council for Namibia

The three advisory opinions delivered by the International Court of Justice on the question of Namibia (then called South-West Africa) in 1950, 1955 and 1956 failed to help the General Assembly to make a dent into the problem of Namibia because the South African Government refused to modify her stand in the light of those Opinions. In fact that Government rejected the three Advisory Opinions with utmost contempt. The United Nations could not take any enforcement action against South Africa on the basis of the advisory opinions only because they, being merely *advisory* and being merely *opinions*, were of non-binding character. This is why the Charter contains no provision for their enforcement. An enforcement action can, however, be taken by the Security Council under Article 94(2) of the Charter if a judgement in a contentious case is flouted by the judgement-debtor. Hence an effort was launched to obtain a binding judgement from the World Court when Ethiopia and Liberia filed a contentious case with it against the Union of South Africa in 1960. The Central issue in their complaint was whether South Africa had violated the terms of the mandate conferred up on her.<sup>1</sup> The Court's affirmative answer to this question would have meant that the South African Government had forfeited the right to act as the Mandatory of the Territory and, therefore, could be expelled from there in pursuance of the Court's judgement under Article 94(2) of the Charter. However, be that as it may, when the world court delivered its much-awaited judgement on 18 July 1966,<sup>2</sup> the whole world, particularly African, Asian and Latin American States, was disappointed because instead of pronouncing its verdict on the merits of the complaints made, the Court merely said that the appellants had no *locus standi* in the matter since the enforcement of the terms of the mandate was the collective responsibility of the international organization and not of individual Member States.<sup>3</sup>

In sheer frustration and as a sequel to the Court's afore-said judgement the General Assembly terminated the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa, *vide* Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966. The General Assembly, by the same Resolution, placed Namibia under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. In order to exercise this responsibility the General Assembly, during its fifth special session, adopted Resolution 2248 (S-V) on 19 May, 1967, establishing thereby a United Nations Council for South West Africa (later designated as U.N. Council for Namibia) comprising of eleven Member States and entrusting it with the following functions :—

- (a) To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible participation of the people of the Territory ;
- (b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage ;
- (c) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly for drawing up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government ;
- (d) To take all necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in the Territory ; and
- (e) To transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of independence.

This Council was to function under the control and guidance of the General Assembly. A United Nations Commissioner for Namibia was also appointed to perform such executive and administrative tasks as the Council might deem necessary.<sup>4</sup> The General Assembly also decided, *vide* Resolution 2248 (S-V), that South West

Africa would become independent on a date to be fixed in accordance with the wishes of the people and instructed the Council at the same time *to do all in its power* to enable independence to be attained by June 1968. The Council was specifically instructed to take over the administration of South-West Africa, ensure the withdrawal of South African police and military forces and replace South African personnel by indigenous personnel as far as possible.

Thus the Council was given a long list of functions to perform but the General Assembly had not provided it with necessary means in the form of an international police force to enable it to establish its presence in the Territory. The performance of all other functions assigned to the Council was contingent upon the ability of the Council to establish itself firmly in South-West Africa as its administering authority. The General Assembly did not want that this substitution of South African authority by that of the Council should take place through violent means and this is why it provided that the Council should *enter into negotiations* with the South African authorities to lay down the procedure for the peaceful transfer of the administration of the Territory to itself. A display of this degree of cooperation from South Africa was hardly expected by anyone. It was, therefore, not surprising that in its very first report the Council reported to the General Assembly that it had met with no success in its efforts to establish itself in the Territory through peaceful means because South African Government had categorically stated that she had "no intention of abdicating her responsibility towards the people of South-West Africa"<sup>5</sup> Considering that the presence of South African administration in South-West Africa constituted an illegal act, a usurpation of power and a foreign occupation of the Territory, the Council recommended that the General Assembly should request the Security Council to take appropriate action to enable it to discharge its functions and responsibilities effectively.<sup>6</sup> This was a clear hint for the application of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter but the Security Council did not apply, and has not, to this day, applied those provisions. Hence the Council had no opportunity to undertake in South-West Africa the administrative responsibilities entrusted to it.

In 1967 the General Assembly, *vide* its Resolution 2325 (XXII), requested the Council "to fulfil by every available means the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly". Hence in March 1968 the Council, being determined to enter Namibia in any case, decided to proceed to the Territory accompanied by the Acting Commissioner. While the Council was still in Lusaka, it received message from Windhoek, capital of Namibia, to the effect that landing clearance to the plane carrying the Council members had been denied by the South African Government. The Council then tried to enter Namibia by land route but the Zambian Government advised it against doing so because the adjacent areas were flooded by the Zambesi River. Thus the Council had to return to headquarters without being able to comply with the requirements of Resolution 2325 (XXII) of the General Assembly.

#### **Organization of the Council**

Though not being able to perform its functions, the Council was still a *de jure* government of South-West Africa and a claim to this effect was made by its President, while speaking before the Security Council.<sup>7</sup> In accordance with this claim the Council addressed itself to such tasks as it could perform from outside the Territory. In order to perform various tasks the Council has created three standing committees and entrusted to each one of them specific functions. The composition and functions of these committees is as follows :—

- (a) Standing Committee I—It is composed of China, Colombia, Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland, Turkey, USSR and Zambia.
- (b) Standing Committee II—It is composed of Chile, Guyana, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania and USSR.
- (c) Standing Committee III—It is composed of Brundi, Egypt, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

The work allocated to these committees is as follows :—

Standing Committee I attends to the following work :

- (i) Representation of Namibia in international organizations, at conferences and, on any other occasion as may be required.

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- (ii) Continuing consultations at the United Nations Headquarters, in Africa or elsewhere, with representatives of the Namibian people.
- (iii) Consultations with governments of Member States.
- (iv) Relation with specialized agencies and other organizations within the U.N. system.
- (v) Cooperation with O.A.U.
- (vi) Relations with non-governmental organizations.

Standing Committee II has been entrusted with the following functions :

- (1) A study on the compliance of Member States with the relevant United Nations' resolutions, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971.
- (2) A study of foreign economic interests operating in Namibia with a view to recommending effective means for regulating such activities.
- (3) Examination of the questions of bilateral and multilateral treaties which, explicitly or implicitly, include Namibia, with a view to replacing South Africa as the party empowered to represent Namibia in all relevant bilateral and multilateral treaties.

Standing Committee III performs the following functions :

- (i) Participation in an appropriate capacity of the representatives of the Namibian people in the activities of the Council.
- (ii) A study of short-term and long-term coordinated programmes of technical and financial assistance to Namibia in the light of the relevant provisions of General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) and taking into consideration provisions of the General Assembly Resolution 2872 (XXVI).
- (iii) Questions relating to the issuance of travel and identity documents to Namibians.

- (iv) Ways and means of increasing the dissemination of information relating to Namibia and of assisting the Secretary General in the discharge of the tasks entrusted to him under the terms of Section III, para 1, of General Assembly Resolution 3111 (XXVIII).

Besides the three Standing Committees, there is a separate Committee to operate the U.N. Fund for Namibia. This Committee comprises of representatives of India, Nigeria, Turkey and Yugoslavia with the President of the Council as Chairman and the Commissioner for Namibia as its ex-officio member.

### **Issuance of Passports and Visas**

The United Nations Council for Namibia has been engaged in a variety of activities ever since its formation. We have to refer only to some of them in order to be able to form an idea of the dimensions of United Nations' involvement with the Namibian problem. Among the tasks to which the Council gave priority was the issuance of travel documents to Namibians in exile. The necessity to take this step arose from the fact that the South African Government was, as a matter of policy, deliberately denying passports to Namibians in order to prevent them from acquiring higher education abroad or from submitting oral petitions to the U.N. Organs. The official reason given by that Government was that the students who went abroad for education often came under Communist influence. Nobody was convinced by this reason because the real reason for the denial of passport was apparent to all. That Government had been consistently following the policy of keeping the Namibians in a state of utter backwardness by denying them education. That Government also did not want the Namibians to go abroad and expose her misdeeds and acts of atrocities upon the Namibians. The Council was determined to put an end to this state of affairs by issuing passports to Namibians who wished to go abroad for acquiring higher education or for presenting petitions to the United Nations.

However, the question of issuance of passports was by no means an easy task for the Council. It had to make sure that the passports issued by it would be accepted as valid by the States otherwise there

was no point in issuing them. Therefore, a mission of the Council was deputed to several African capitals to hold negotiations with the Governments of those countries and to obtain their acceptance for the travel documents of the Council, and also to settle the modalities for their issuance. These negotiations led to the signing of agreements with the several Governments by October 1970 with the result that the scheme was finally launched in December 1970 when the first of such documents was issued by the regional office of the Council set up in Lusaka (Zambia). Till the time of the inauguration of the scheme 76 countries had agreed to accept the validity of the Council's travel documents. This figure had gone up to 88 by the end of 1975. The travel documents of the Council have proved to be very popular and useful since they have enabled Namibia to travel abroad for education and training as well as for presenting petitions to the United Nations. By the end of 1975 about 150 travel and identity documents had been issued by the Council.

In 1971 the Council decided to enlarge its Counsellor services by issuing visas also for entry into Namibia. In 1972 the Council launched this scheme when it issued its first visa to Mr George M. Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa.

### **Education and Training Programme for Namibians**

Conscious of the need to prepare a cadre of civil servants and of technical and professional personnel who might be required to undertake duties of administrative and technical nature when Namibia becomes independent, the General Assembly established a Special Educational & Training Programme for South-West Africa in 1961<sup>8</sup>. A year later this Programme was combined with similar other programmes already in existence for dependent countries of southern Africa.<sup>9</sup> The assistance to Namibians under this combined programme is not much since it caters to the needs of inhabitants of several southern African countries. In 1968 the General Assembly, conscious of the fact that Namibians needed special attention and assistance because the South African administration had provided poor quality of education and thus ignored their educational advancement, created a Special Programme exclusively for Namibians also.<sup>10</sup>



Thus Namibians are at present receiving assistance for their educational development under two aforesaid programmes.

Towards the close of 1975 an estimated 150 Namibians were reported to have been receiving assistance for educational advancement provided by the Council.<sup>11</sup> Most of the assistance given by the Council is in the field of remedial training, technical and vocational training, primary and secondary education, as well as college and University education. However, rapid progress of this programme has not been possible due to three reasons. Firstly, the African States where education to Namibians can be provided in more congenial atmosphere are themselves deficient in sufficient schooling facilities with the result that they are not in a position to admit all such Namibians as are eager to be educated. Secondly, most of the Namibians seeking admission are considerably older than other students and cannot on this account be normally admitted to schools in most African countries. Thirdly, the funds available with the Council are not sufficient with the result that it is not able to satisfy fully the special needs of many Namibians who, owing to the poor quality of the education provided to Africans in Namibia, require remedial education before they can qualify for academic studies at the secondary or higher levels.<sup>12</sup>

To meet the financial needs of the Council, the General Assembly has established a United Nations Fund for Namibia which would finance comprehensive educational and training programme for Namibians with particular regard to the future administrative responsibilities in the territory. Even before the creation of the Fund, the General Assembly, in 1970, had authorised the Secretary General to make interim grant of \$ 50,000 over and above the assistance that was already being provided at that time to the Council. This resulted in the immediate improvement in the financial position of the Council.<sup>13</sup>

The Council, as the administering authority of the Fund, is concentrating on the establishment and operation of a farm complex in Zambia for the benefit of Namibians settled in that country. This project envisages the setting up of an agricultural school, a primary

school and a health clinic. The Council has sought assistance from FAO, UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and UNHCR as well as from Governments to complete this project. The Council has also established an Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, capital of Zambia, to impart higher education to Namibians in various disciplines. This Institute is also being financed by the United Nations Fund for Namibia from which a sum of \$ US 300,000 towards the establishment of the Institute was granted as a first instalment of the contribution.

In view of the improved financial situation of the U.N. Fund for Namibia it has proved possible for the Council to concentrate on larger projects located in Zambia and Botswana, while smaller country projects are already in operation or projected in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. The country programmes are designed to provide vocational and other training to the deserving Namibians.<sup>14</sup> Agreement has also been reached by the Council with the Government of Botswana on the financing of a health clinic at Makunda in northern Botswana where significant number of Namibian refugees are residing.<sup>15</sup>

These efforts of the U.N. Council for Namibia, are, indeed, commendable considering the magnitude of the problem involved. The Council has had to start almost from a scratch because the South African Government, in order to keep the Namibians utterly backward and absolutely unfit to shoulder the administrative responsibilities, has provided them so far with no opportunities whatsoever for their educational advancement beyond the primary level.

However, it must be mentioned that the assistance out of the Fund is not provided by the Council for educational purposes only but for various other purposes also in accordance with the Guidelines<sup>16</sup> prepared by the Council for Namibia for the utilization of the resources of the Fund.

In accordance with the Guidelines the funds will be provided —

- (a) to make provision of scholarships and of a comprehensive educational and training programme for Namibians with

particular regard to the present struggle for independence and to their future administrative responsibilities in Namibia;

- (b) to provide, where necessary, medical and other social services to Namibians in need of assistance;
- (c) to provide fund for legal defence of Namibians who are undergoing persecution;
- (d) to provide for the legal defence of Namibian interests, the protection of the natural resources of Namibia and the assertion of Namibian sovereignty;
- (e) for the publication and dissemination of material and radio and television programme to further the cause of Namibian liberation;
- (f) to facilitate the attendance of Namibian representatives, at various international conferences, seminars and meetings to the extent not otherwise provided for from U.N. Funds; and
- (g) to ensure the proper and adequate representation of the people of Namibia at the U.N.

These guidelines enable the Council to make the best possible use of its meagre resources.

#### **Representation of Namibian Interests at International Conferences**

In accordance with the relevant provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) as well as the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, the Council for Namibia has sought to have the responsibility for Namibia recognized in various international bodies, and, when necessary, challenge in those same bodies pretensions by South Africa to represent Namibia. The Council's actions were intended to achieve three principal objectives; firstly, to establish that South Africa's claim to represent the Territory was illegal ; secondly, to establish that the Council for Namibia was the legal authority appointed by the General

Assembly to represent Namibia ; and, thirdly, to secure and protect all rights.<sup>17</sup>

To start with, the Council decided to contest South Africa's claim to represent Namibia at the organizational meeting of the International Commission on South East Atlantic Fisheries. Though the request of the Council to be allowed to represent Namibia at the said Commission was not accepted, yet its consequence was that the F.A.O. withdrew, in protest, the services of its Executive Secretary that had been made available to the Commission. The Council, on behalf of Namibia, also tried to be a member of several specialized agencies of U.N.O. The initial response of ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO seemed to be favourable because they all expressed the view that application for Council's membership was receivable under the terms of their basic instruments but that the decision for admission in each case could be taken only by the General Conference of each organization.<sup>18</sup> The WHO suggested that, following the practice of UNHCR, UNICEF and others, the Council could be invited by the Director-General to participate on an operational level.<sup>19</sup> The Council, in its 9th Report, had the pleasure to inform that it had succeeded in acquiring associate membership in WHO under Resolution WHA 27.23 adopted by that body in conformity with article 8 of its constitution.<sup>20</sup> The U.N. Commissioner described this decision of WHO as "historic", marking as it did an important step in the international acceptance of the decisions of the world court and of the decisions of the United Nations<sup>21</sup> as well as the recognition, of the Council as the administering authority of Namibia.

The Council, as the administering authority of Namibia, also participated in (a) Fifth African-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation meeting held in Uganda from 11 October to 3 November 1972, (b) Meetings of the Council of Ministers and Heads of States and Governments of OAU in 1973, (c) The OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa held in Accra from 10 January to 2 February 1973, (d) Fifth African-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation meeting of ICAO held at Rome from 10 January to 2 February 1973, (e) World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow from 25 to 31 October 1973, (f) Fourth African Regional Conference held in

Nairobi from 20 November to 6 December 1973, (g) Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea from 3 to 14 December 1973 at U.N. Headquarter and from 20 June to 29 August 1974 at Caracas, Venezuela, (h) U.N. Conference on Prescription (Limitation) in International Sale of Goods held at U.N. Headquarter from 20 May to 14 June 1974, (i) Meeting of World Peace Council held at Sofia from 16 to 19 February 1974, (j) Meeting of Non-Governmental organizations, Sub-Committee on Decolonization and Against Racism, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination held at Geneva on 23 and 24 February 1974, (k) Meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization held at Baghdad from 24 to 27 March 1974, (l) 23rd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of OAU held at Mogadiscio from 6 to 11 June 1974, (m) Conference of Heads of States and Governments of OAU held at Mogadiscio from 12 to 15 June 1974, (n) Meeting of the Special Committee on Apartheid from 18 May to 21 May 1974, (o) 24th Session of the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa held at Dar-es-Salaam from 8 to 14 January 1975, (p) First and Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva from 17 March—10 May 1975, (q) Ninth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers held at Dar-es-Salaam from 7-10 April 1975, (r) World Meteorological Conference of WMO, held at Geneva on 23 May 1975, (s) 25th Session of the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa held at Rabat from 9-13 June 1975, (t) 20th Session of the Governing Council of the U.N. Development Programme held at Geneva from 9 to 27 June 1975, (u) 16th ILO Conference held at Geneva from 14 to 26 June 1975, (v) 25th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of OAU held at Kampala from 18 to 25 July 1975, (w) 20th session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU held at Kampala from 28 July to 3 August 1975, (x) Diplomatic Conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) held at Montreal from 3 to 25 September 1975.

Participation in so many conferences on behalf of Namibia indicated the growing recognition of the right of the Council to represent Namibia to the exclusion of South Africa.

### **Participation of the People of Namibia**

If the Council was a *de jure* government of Namibia as it often claimed to be, it was necessary that, with its work, Namibians should be associated as far as possible. That would give the Namibians some training in administrative duties and also impart realism to the decisions taken by the Council besides making them more broadbased. The problem in this regard, however, was that Namibian nationalists lacked unity inasmuch as they belonged to different political groups. Besides SWAPO and SWANU which were the largest political parties in Namibia, there were many other organized political groups with sizeable following. It was obvious that it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the Council to associate all of them with its work. At the same time it could not afford to do anything which would give the impression that it was showing special favours to any one political group, thereby helping it to assume ascendancy over others. Hence the Council engaged itself in discussions and consultations with Namibians belonging to various political groups with a view to evolving a satisfactory way in which Namibians could participate in the work of the Council. These discussions finally proved fruitless, since no agreement could be reached among the principal political parties—SWAPO and SWANU. SWAPO's attitude was particularly causing hindrance to an agreement because it wanted that, being the largest political party, it should have exclusive representation on the Council.<sup>22</sup> It was not prepared to collaborate with SWANU or SWANUF.

The Council, in its discretion, however, allowed SWAPO to attend meetings of the Council only as observers. Later, the General Assembly, *vide* Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), allowed SWAPO representatives to participate in the work of the Council and also agreed to defray the expenses of its representative when it accompanied the missions of the Council.

### **Consultation and Cooperation with the Specialized Agencies and other Organs of the U.N.**

Although the Council had not been able to establish itself physically in the territory of Namibia as its administering authority,

yet the question of all-round development of the Territory was seriously considered by the General Assembly at its fifth special session. During that session the General Assembly, *vide* Resolution 2248 (S-V), Section III, para 2, and again by Resolution 2372(XXII), para 4, requested the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render to Namibia technical and financial assistance through a coordinated emergency programme. The Council was authorized to assume responsibility for establishing such a programme. Acting on these directives, the Council has considered two main aspects of the question, namely, the preparation of a long term plan for the economic and social development of the Territory to be implemented when the Council is able to discharge its powers and functions from within the Territory, and, secondly, the short term emergency programme for rendering technical assistance to Namibians—a programme limited to meeting the exigencies of the present situation. The Council has decided that the long term programme would include (a) the collection and assessment of existing economic data on the resources of the Territory including a survey of possible mineral deposits as well as data on the available trained manpower outside the Territory ; (b) the preparation of a survey of foreign investments in Namibia ; (c) the compilation of a list of facilities for technical training available outside the Territory. The Council has taken up the matter with various specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations and has been assured by them in return that they are willing to consider specific requests from the Council both on long term and short term basis. The details of the assistance are still in the process of being worked out.

### **Review of Laws**

One of the important tasks entrusted to the Council was the review of a large number of laws of Namibia with the idea of repealing such of them as were of discriminatory nature or were in any way harmful or damaging to the interests of Namibians. In view of the complexity of the legal issues involved the Council entrusted the work of a detailed study of the laws, practices and conventions of Namibia to its Standing Committee II besides utilizing the services of a legal expert. Initially the study was restricted to those laws and

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practices which were so blatantly and totally repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations that the Council might deem it appropriate to repeal or abolish them immediately even in the absence of any substitute legislation covering the same subject matter. The study revealed that there were three categories of laws which warranted immediate repeal:

- (a) The so-called "constitutional" laws, many of them enacted after the termination of the Mandate, which establish the fundamental relationship between Namibia and South Africa, create the governmental structure of Namibia, and define citizenship, the franchise etc.
- (b) Repressive laws, most of them South African statutes extended to the Territory, which deprive the inhabitants of Namibia of their fundamental human rights, such as those dealing with the police, prisons, and criminal law and procedure.
- (c) Other laws repugnant to the Charter by reason of provisions which either explicitly or implicitly, impose or sanction racial discrimination. These laws are those which are directed at non-whites only, such as the pass laws, influx control laws, native administration laws, laws relating to the area north of the "Police Zone", native location regulations and legislation relating exclusively to 'coloured' people.

The detailed study of the Council is still continuing since it involves a study of a large number of laws.

### **Efforts to Protect the Natural Resources of the Territory**

Reports of several committees appointed by the General Assembly from time to time as well as the reports of the United Nations Council for Namibia itself are full of account of the ruthless exploitation of the irreplaceable natural resources found in abundance in Namibia. Practically all the western countries and Japan are sharing in the international plundering



of the Namibian resources. Hundreds of companies, all foreign owned, are cooperating in this massive loot of the Territory. The number of these companies is increasing every year due to the encouragement and facilities offered to them by the South African Government. The following table shows the increase in the number of foreign-owned companies within a period of one year:

**Foreign Companies Operating in Namibia<sup>23</sup>**

Sr. No.	Operational fields of Companies	Number of Companies in	
		1974	1975
1.	Mining: Base Metals, Diamonds and Uranium	93	97
2.	Prospecting for Base Metals	51	55
3.	Petroleum: prospecting and marketing	31	30
4.	Hydro-electric power: Cunene River Basin Scheme	7	10
5.	Fishing	23	27
6.	Agriculture	11	10
7.	Construction and Manufacturing	15	24
8.	Banking, services and others	11	15

Of these the operation of those companies is a matter of concern which are not only exporting the invaluable minerals but are also remitting the major portion of profits earned by them with the result that Namibia, one of the richest countries in Africa, is becoming poorer and poorer day by day. This exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia by foreign companies has been condemned a number of times by the United Nations. One of the latest resolutions that can be cited in this connection is Resolution 3399 (XXX) adopted by the General Assembly on 26 November 1975 which, *inter alia*, condemned "the exploitation of uranium and of all other natural resources of Namibia by organizations under private governmental control".

## Role of the U.N. Council for Namibia

The greater the delay in the liberation of Namibia, the greater will be its exploitation. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the South African Government is trying to linger on in Namibia as long as it can. The U.N. Council for Namibia, as the administering authority of Namibia, could not ignore this large scale exploitation of the Territory. In order to check this exploitation it issued a Decree<sup>24</sup> dated 27 September 1974, the first and the only one issued by it so far. It was entitled to do so under the terms of reference granted to it *vide* Resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. This Decree runs as follows:

### Decree No. I of 27 September 1974

Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural resources of the people of Namibia and of ensuring that these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of Namibia, its people or environmental assets, the United Nations Council for Namibia enacts the following Decree.

#### Decrees that

1. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export, or distribute any natural resources whether animal or mineral, situated or found to be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent and permission of the U.N. Council for Namibia or any person authorized to act on its behalf for the purpose of giving such permission or such consent;
2. Any permission, concession or licence for all or any of the purpose specified in para 1 above whenever granted by any person or entity, including any body purporting to act under the authority of the Government of the Republic of South Africa or the "Administration of South-West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void and of no force or effect; .

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3. No animal resource, mineral, or other natural resource produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia may be taken from the said Territory by any means whatsoever outside the territorial limits of Namibia by any person or body whether corporate or unincorporated, without the consent and permission of the U.N. Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council;
4. Any animal, mineral, or other natural resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said Territory without the consent and written authority of the U.N. Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council, may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
5. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying animal, mineral or other natural resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also be subject to seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the U.N. Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
6. Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect of Namibia may be held liable for damages by the future Government of an independent Namibia;
7. For the purpose of paragraph 1 to 5 above and in order to give effect to this decree, the U.N. Council for Namibia hereby authorizes the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V), to take necessary steps after consultations with the President.

## Role of the U.N. Council for Namibia

The above Decree was approved by the General Assembly *vide* Resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974. The General Assembly, *vide* Resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975 requested once again all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure the full application of, and compliance with, the provisions of the foregoing Decree.

A Decree of the type promulgated by the U.N. Council for Namibia has no value unless it can be enforced, particularly when it provides for the seizure and forfeiture of certain types of cargo along with the ships that are found to be carrying such cargo. The officials of the Council themselves recognized the problems involved in the enforcement of the Decree. In the first place, they recognized that a detailed research would have to be done to find out the destinations of all exports from Namibia, whether such exports left the Territory by sea or by land. Unless the movement of ships carrying the cargo mentioned in the Decree is known well in advance, their seizure can neither be planned nor materialized. In the second place, the enforcement of the Decree involves a considerable amount of legal research and preparation to ensure that when Namibian natural resources illegally taken out from Namibia are traced to any jurisdiction, the necessary legal modalities and formalities to enable seizures to take place will have to be ascertained and it would have to be made sure that they will operate swiftly and effectively as and when the occasion arises. The legal formalities and modalities vary from one legal system to another. Hence the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia undertook a series of consultations with lawyers in different areas of the world where Namibian natural resources were known to have been imported. In many cases, it was also necessary for the Council to discuss some of the issues involved with the Governments concerned. After these consultations the Council has reported that some governments have already taken positive steps to facilitate the enforcement of the Decree. In particular, EEC has notified the Decree to all its Member States. The Japanese Government has published the text of the Decree in the official bulletin of the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Japan and also in the Trade and Commerce Bulletin of the Japanese External Trade Recovery Organization. The State Department of the United States has notified U.S. shipping

companies of the existence of the Decree. The Government of Netherlands has also stated that it is prepared to cooperate in the application of the Decree.<sup>25</sup> The U.N. Commissioner for Namibia has already taken steps to inform legal, judicial and trading organizations of the full legal implications of the Decree under international law.<sup>26</sup>

So far the Decree has remained unenforced. However, preparations to enforce it are under way. It remains to be seen how far the Council will actually be able to effect seizures of the cargo mentioned in the Decree. The Council has, however, reported that so far the Decree has already had a great impact on foreign companies that are considering making investments in Namibia. Some companies have even sought advice from their Governments and have been told that the said Decree is regarded as legally binding.<sup>27</sup>

### **Publicity**

In a problem like that of Namibia publicity assumes special significance. There are two aspects of this problem. In the first place, there should be adequate publicity of what the United Nations is doing for the cause of Namibia so that the people of the world, particularly Namibians, may not fall victim to false propaganda being carried on by the South African Government. The Council, therefore, to counteract such a propaganda, issues its own statements and press releases on its activities from time to time. It has also requested the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to intensify their information efforts in the cause of Namibia in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 3111 (XXVIII). The Council also utilizes all opportunities to explain its position in various international conferences to which it is invited, raises the matter during direct negotiations with the governments of the countries visited by its representatives and uses all the possibilities offered by the mass media whenever such opportunities present themselves. In its information activities, the Council stresses upon such themes as the urgency of bringing to a conclusion the United Nations' efforts aimed at helping the people of Namibia to fulfil their right to self-determination and independence, the illegality of continuing South African occupation of the Territory, the regime of

repression, exploitation, *apartheid* lack of fundamental human rights and brute force imposed by South Africa upon the people of Namibia; the increasing struggle of the people of Namibia conducted largely through its national liberation movement, SWAPO. In the second place, the Council has taken great pains to expose the exploitative and discriminatory nature of the South African regime and the efforts constantly being made by it to assimilate Namibia more closely with the Union of South Africa through various legislative enactments.

The Council is also assisting the Secretary-General in the setting up of a United Nations transmitter in an African country close to the borders of Namibia in order to inform the Namibians of the United Nations policies in regard to the liberation of Namibia, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the fight against racism, and the steps being taken to achieve decolonization in Namibia and throughout the world. The authorization to instal the transmitter was given by the General Assembly *vide* Resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975.

### **The Lusaka Declaration**

The U.N. Council for Namibia held a special session at Lusaka from 12 to 14 June 1973. The decision to hold the special session in Lusaka was motivated by a number of considerations. First and foremost was the need which had become increasingly evident to the Council for a general reappraisal of the situation arising from the most recent attempts by the South African regime to consolidate its illegal presence in Namibia, and for the formulation of a plan of action by the international community on the basis of that reappraisal. On 14 June the Council adopted the "Lusaka Declaration of the U.N. Council for Namibia".<sup>28</sup> Its main points were as follows :

(a) The United Nations Council for Namibia has assessed the existing situation concerning the struggle to liberate Namibia and has concluded that this struggle has now reached a decisive stage.

(b) The Council reaffirms its former decision that the contacts with South Africa are detrimental to the interests of the people of Namibia and must be terminated.

(c) The Council has come to the conclusion that the time has come for the international community to recognize that South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia cannot continue without serious danger to international peace and security.

(d) The Council specifically enjoins upon those countries which are still giving political, military, economic and financial support, either directly or indirectly, to the regime of the occupying Power to discontinue such aid and support immediately.

(e) The Council is determined to give all the support it can muster to the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO which is leading the legitimate armed struggle for the freedom and independence of Namibia. The Council will, therefore, intensify its collaboration with SWAPO in pursuing its objectives. The Council will also continue to cooperate closely with OAU.

(f) The Council will ask the United Nations to take effective action to compel South Africa to withdraw immediately from Namibia.

(g) The Council, as the only legal authority responsible for administering the affairs of Namibia until independence, will intensify its efforts to represent Namibia in inter-governmental organizations and at international conferences.

(h) The Council undertakes to ensure that resources of the Fund for Namibia will be used to build up cadres of well-trained Namibians who will be able to assume responsibilities in the liberation struggle and in the life of an independent Namibia.

This Declaration, adopted after extensive discussions in which representatives of SWAPO participated in an observer capacity, marked the opening of a new chapter in the international community's approach to the problem of Namibia and laid the basis for programme of active support and solidarity with the people of Namibia in their legitimate struggle to liberate themselves from illegal occupation.

## Evaluation

It is easy to criticize the U.N. Council for Namibia because one can point out a number of things which it was asked by the General Assembly to do but which it could not do on account of circumstances beyond its control. For example, it could not establish its presence in the territory of Namibia as its administering authority. Naturally, when it could not perform this basic function, it could not perform rest of the tasks entrusted to it ; for example, it could not promulgate such laws and administrative regulations as were necessary for the administration of the Territory till the convening of a legislative assembly ; it could not take necessary measures for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly for drawing up a constitution ; it could not take necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in Namibia ; and it could not transfer all powers to the people of the Territory. However, for the non-performance of these functions the Council cannot be blamed because all of them depended upon its being able to substitute itself in place of the South African Government as the administering authority of Namibia. This was an impossible task for the Council, for the United Nations had not placed at its disposal any international police force with the help of which alone an unwilling South African Government could be expelled from Namibia. Peaceful transfer of power was unthinkable in the light of South African intransigence over the issue. The Council repeatedly, in its communications, urged the Security Council to take measures, particularly those available under Chapter VII of the Charter but the Security Council made no move in this direction. Hence the U.N. Council for Namibia cannot be blamed for not being able to perform most of the functions originally entrusted to it.

This, however, does not mean that the Council had no useful functions to serve or had no justification for its very existence. In the first place, it should be observed that when the Council was set up, there was for the first time an United Nations organ to devote its whole time attention to the problem of Namibia, and to keep a watch on the day-to-day developments in regard to Namibia, even during the period when the General Assembly was not in session. This



task was performed by the Council most admirably, for it regularly furnished to the General Assembly reports containing detailed accounts of the atrocities committed, and repressive measures taken by the South African Government, the measures taken by her to suppress the freedom movement, the imprisonment of SWAPO members, together with many legislative enactments passed by the South African parliament to integrate Namibia more closely with the Union of South Africa. It can be forcefully asserted that the United Nations was better informed about the Namibian affairs after the setting up of the Council than it was before. The Council was able to collect lot of useful first-hand information regarding Namibia through its missions that visited various African countries from time to time. These missions, besides meeting the government leaders of the countries it visited, also met hundreds of Namibians and SWAPO activists and leaders residing there and ascertained their views and reactions. Many of the United Nations' resolutions were subsequently based on the reports of the Council.

In the second place, the Council missions, in their meetings with the Namibians living in exile in African countries, were able to apprise them correctly of the efforts that the United Nations was making for the cause of Namibia thus removing from their minds many of their misgivings about the role and activities of the United Nations regarding Namibia. The Namibians were feeling somewhat disillusioned with the United Nations for its failure to deliver them from the yoke of South Africa. The Council tried to stem the tide of this disillusionment by putting the United Nations position regarding Namibia before the Namibians in its proper perspective. The intense publicity carried out by the U.N. Council for Namibia also helped to counteract the mischievous propaganda of the South African Government about the United Nations and also about the freedom struggle being waged by the Namibians.

In the third place, the Council should get the credit for starting the practice of issuing United Nations passports to Namibians desiring to visit any country, and visas to such persons as wanted to visit Namibia. The former proved very popular as well as useful particularly because they enabled Namibians to visit various coun-

tries for presenting oral or written petitions to the United Nations or for prosecuting their studies abroad. The Namibians were finding it very difficult to visit abroad since the South African Government was denying passports to Namibians even if the purpose of the visit was purely educational. The United Nations passports have enabled the Namibians to acquire education abroad, and the cadre of educated Namibians thus being slowly built up would be useful in manning important and responsible positions in Namibia when it becomes free and the white officers withdraw from there either voluntarily or under compulsions from the United Nations. The reason why the South African Government has been consistently preventing Namibians from acquiring higher education and various technical skills is that it wants to keep Namibia in a state of total dependency upon herself and for keeping it unfit for shouldering the responsibilities to be brought in its train by independence. The passports issued by the Council have served to thwart this design to some extent. The visas issued by it have not proved to be as useful as its passports because the South African Government does not let anyone enter Namibia if he carries a visa issued by Council. However, the visas of the Council have a value of their own in that they serve to back up the claim that the U.N. Council for Namibia is the *de jure* government of Namibia. Both visas and the passports also help to remind the South African Government that her presence in Namibia is illegal in the eyes of international law.

Fourthly, the Council must also get due credit for having worked assiduously to enable the deserving Namibians to acquire scholarships for higher education abroad. It has worked ceaselessly and tirelessly in this field, process as it has had to a very large number of applications for higher education. The importance of the availability of highly educated Namibians in various disciplines when, in future, Namibia becomes free, has already been alluded to above.

Fifthly, the Council has made some important preparations which may be useful when Namibia becomes free such as the preparation of long-term and short-term development plans and preparation

of a list of laws that will require to be repealed and substituted by other laws. When Namibia becomes free, no time will have to be wasted in making these preliminary preparations.

Sixthly and finally, the Council has started issuing decrees also. So far it has issued only one decree the purpose of which is to protect the precious natural resources of Namibia which are at present being drained out of the country by foreign companies and multi-national corporations without corresponding benefit to the people of the Territory. The Council is now busy with preparations necessary to give effect to this Decree. If and when it succeeds in giving effect to it and is able to capture and confiscate, on high seas, the prohibited minerals listed in the Decree, its achievement will have to be written in letters of gold in the history of the United Nations.

In the end, it must be emphasized that the setting up of the Council by the General Assembly was the logical next step after the revocation of the mandate of South Africa. If the Council had not been created as the administering authority of Namibia substituting the South African Government after the revocation of the mandate, there would have been a vacuum so much so that the revocation of the mandate would have sounded more hollow than it otherwise did to many persons.

### FOOTNOTES

1. For the details of the complaint refer to I.C.J. Year Book : 1961-62, Folio Nos. 46 and 47, p. 72.

2. *South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgement of 18 July 1966, I.C.J. Reports, 1966.*

3. *Ibid.*, para 33, p. 29.

4. Mr. MacBridge was the first incumbent of this office. He has recently been succeeded by Mr. Marrti Ahtisaari.

5. *Report of the U.N. Council for South West Africa, U.N. Doc. A/6897, Annex II.*

6. *Ibid.*, para 18.

7. *Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia, U.N. Doc. A/8424, para 190.*

8. *Vide Resolution 1705 (XVI) of 19 December 1961.*

## Role of the U.N. Council for Namibia

9. *Vide* Resolution 2349 (XXII) of 19 December 1967. This consolidated programme for Southern Africa is known as United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. Since Namibia is part of Southern Africa, Namibians are entitled to receive and, in fact, are receiving financial assistance under this programme.

10. *Vide* Resolution 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968.

11. *Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia*, U.N. Doc. A/10024, para 224.

12. *Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia*, U.N. Doc. A/8024, para 71.

13. The financial position of the Fund improved further at the 27th session of the General Assembly when it appropriated a sum of \$ US 100,000 as against \$ US 50,000 in each of the two previous years. By August 1974 there was further improvement in the financial position of the Fund as a result of contribution totalling \$ US 166,000 from 25 Member States in addition to annual contribution made by the General Assembly from its regular budget. In 1974 the General Assembly further helped the UN Fund for Namibia by increasing the annual grant to \$ US 200,000 from the regular budget of the United Nations *Vide* Resolution 3296 (XXIX). A grant of the like amount was made by the General Assembly in 1975 for the year 1976 *vide* Resolution 3400 (XXX) of 26 November 1975.

14. U.N. Doc. A/10024, *op. cit.*, para 227.

15. *Ibid.*, para 229.

16. *Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia*, U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1, p. 26.

17. *Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia*, U.N. Doc. A/8724, Vol. I, para 123.

18. *Ibid.*, U.N. Doc. A/9024, para 211.

19. *Ibid.*, para 212.

20. *Ibid.*, U.N. Doc. A/9624, para 214.

21. *Ibid.*, para 215.

22. U.N. Doc. A/8024, *op. cit.*, para 30.

23. Sources : U.N. Doc. A/9624 *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Annex VII; U.N. Doc. A/10024, *op. cit.*, Vol. II.

24. U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1, *op. cit.*, paras 82-84, pp. 27-28.

25. U.N. Doc. A/10024, Vol. II, Annex VIII, para 109.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. U.N. Doc. A/9024, *op. cit.*, para 157.

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## Preliminaries to the 1951 'Indirect' Elections at Kano

In 1951 the British colonial regime in Nigeria made the first attempt to hold parliamentary elections throughout the country, using what was known as the 'Indirect' method. The elections were an outcome of various issues and controversies which engaged the attention of colonial officials and politically conscious Nigerians since the promulgation of Sir Arthur Richards Constitution in 1946. As is well known, opposition to this Constitution was spearheaded by the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). This party, which constituted the vanguard of Nigerian nationalism at the time, not only organized a nationwide tour to explain and denounce some of its provisions to the general public but also led a protest delegation to the British Colonial Office. By 1948 the inadequacies of the Constitution had become obvious to colonial officials. Talks of further constitutional review were in the air, and in 1951 the Macpherson Constitution was produced. This Constitution provided for elections to select parliamentarians for various Houses of Assembly set up under Richards constitution. The period between 1949 and the date of the elections in 1951 was one of vigorous countrywide political activities. Bearing past experience in mind, colonial officials considered it necessary to collect the views of the people as a guide to the framing of the new Constitution. And after the Constitution had come into being it was again considered wise to take it to the people and explain its provisions.

These two developments occurred at a time when Nigerian nationalism had lost much of its militancy, with such phenomena as the rise and growth of ethnic unions, the failure of the National Emergency Committee, and the proscription of the Zikist Movement. No study of these developments with reference to any particular part of the country at present exists. The existant literature on

Nigerian political and constitutional history makes no more than a sketchy reference to both developments, and it leaves certain questions unanswered. For example, what issues did these exercises generate in different parts of the country, given the heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian society? What rôle did political parties, ethnic and trade unions, or some other organized bodies play in them, and with what implications?

Answers to questions such as these could lead to an appreciation, to a degree not yet possible, of the mood of the country at the time and the socio-political consequences of both developments. This paper aims at filling part of the existing gaps by focusing attention on a major administrative division within what was then the Northern Provinces. Our unit of study is the Muslim emirate of Kano, which was by far the biggest of the four Native Administrations in what was then known as Kano province.<sup>1</sup> Developments in Kano during this period command a good deal of interest because of the existence in this emirate, more than elsewhere in the Northern Provinces, of a small but vocal minority which was a disturbing factor to the authorities, both colonial and traditional.

This minority was not a homogeneous whole. It was made up in the main of Southern Nigerians, particularly the Igbo and the Yoruba, who had settled in Kano in considerable numbers either as traders or as workers in the various commercial houses and government establishments. The Yoruba had a fairly long history of settlement in Kano, and their numbers considerably increased with the coming of the British, especially after the arrival of the railway in 1911. Substantial Igbo settlement in Kano did not begin until much later, but by 1951 the number of the Igbo in Kano had apparently grown beyond that of any other ethnic group from the South. There were also small numbers of settlers from other parts of West Africa—Sierra Leone, Cameroon, and the Gold Coast. Search for new economic and commercial opportunities had also brought all these people to Kano at various times since British occupation. Nigerians of Northern origin—both Muslims and non-Muslims—but who were not natives of Kano were also part of its

growing population. Most of these people were alienated from the main stream of Kano Society for cultural reasons. Finally, there were a few natives of Kano who earned the wrath of the authorities for the simple reason that they advocated a reform of the existing institutions of government. By far the majority of these alienated elements were settled in *Waje*, that is, the urban area lying outside the city walls, especially the township and the *sabon gari*. Until a few years earlier, all these settlements lay outside the jurisdiction of the Kano Native Administration.<sup>2</sup>

By the first half of 1949 solid steps towards further constitutional advance were being taken throughout Nigeria. A major criticism of the Richards Constitution was that it was framed without consulting the wishes of the governed.<sup>3</sup> This time the government in Lagos did not want to face similar charges. The Legislative Council directed that provincial conferences should be held to obtain local views on the issue of new constitutional proposals; the provincial conferences were to be held after opinions had been ascertained at the village and district levels.<sup>4</sup> One issue which caused bitter controversy at Kano was the question of whose views were to be ascertained. The opinion of the local branch of the NCNC—by that time the only political party in the area—was that anybody who had definite opinions to express with regard to the Constitution should be given the opportunity to do so as a matter of right. As early as May the Council alleged that the District Officers had already proceeded with the collection of views from ‘mallams’<sup>5</sup> who, it was argued, did not represent the entire Kano Community. It therefore appealed to the Resident to ensure that the people living in *sabon gari* were invited to future meetings and promised its co-operation in the whole exercise.<sup>6</sup>

It is clear that what bothered the NCNC was not that the views of the indigenous inhabitants of Kano were being collected but that the colonial officials were not interested in ascertaining the opinions of people who, though not natives of Kano, were one of the key factors in the social and economic life of the town. The Resident of Kano Mr. E.K. Featherstone, accused the council of being ‘too hasty in its criticisms’. Neither he nor his District Officers, he claimed,

had had anything to do with the collection of opinions from anybody in connection with the review of the Constitution. He emphasized that the collection of views was the function of the Provincial Conference, and when the conference was summoned the Council would have an opportunity of expressing its views.<sup>7</sup> But this assurance was not consistent with the facts. Consultations had already been going on as the NCNC alleged, and when the Resident referred the Council's letter to the District Officer for his comments he minuted that he was under the impression that 'these discussions were to be held primarily with local people in order to obtain Northern opinion'.<sup>8</sup> By denying a truth that was no secret the Resident had done something which was patently incapable of promoting confidence and understanding between him and the so-called stranger elements in *sabon gari*.

Meanwhile, the NCNC wanted to back up its views in the letter of 4 May by some display of mass action aimed at bringing home to the Resident's office that the opinions expressed were not just those of a few party officials. On 7 May it organized a rally allegedly attended by all the tribal unions of the *sabon gari* society at which a unanimous decision was said to have been taken to send a petition to the Resident asking him 'to arrange a conference of all sections of Kano Community in order to ascertain their views on the proposed review of the Richards Constitution'.<sup>9</sup> The resolution must have been extravagant in its claims when it stated that all the tribal Unions of Nigeria and the Cameroons resident in *sabon gari* were represented at the meeting and that the decision taken was unanimous. There were only three signatories to the resolution, and they did not represent all the tribal unions that were then known to exist.<sup>10</sup> But the evidence available strongly suggests that the NCNC made serious but not quite successful efforts to bring the various tribal unions to play an effective role as a pressure group. The result of this endeavour was a measure of the declining fortunes of the party.

Copies of the resolution were sent not only to the Resident but also to the Emir of Kano and his Council, the Chief Commissioner, Northern Provinces, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nigeria, and, of course, to all sections of the Nigerian press. The



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organizers of the rally evidently wanted to score some political points and, in the process, embarrass the local representatives of the colonial regime. But there appears to be no reason to doubt their conviction that all citizens of Nigeria and the Cameroons, irrespective of the place of residence, should not be discriminated against in the discussion of issues of crucial national interest.

Featherstone surprisingly saw the call for a conference of all sections of the Kano Community not as an honest attempt to help him ascertain all shades of opinions on the subject in question but as an arrogant and unwarranted attack on his authority. Anxious to demonstrate that he was prepared for a showdown with NCNC if necessary, the Resident warned :

I cannot accept the premises of the first paragraph of the Resolution that "Mass Meeting", which I understand comprised about 100 people, can be regarded as representative of Kano, or that your Branch of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons is the only "All-embracing Organisation in Kano" which is authorized to instruct the NA and myself as to the steps to be taken for consulting public opinion about the review of the Constitution.<sup>11</sup>

Both the Resolution and Featherstone's reply were each in its own way a propaganda material. The NCNC wanted to show that it was truly a national organization out to fight for what it saw as the political rights of all the colonized peoples of Nigeria and the Cameroons. The Resident's letter, on the other hand, seems to have been primarily designed not only to frustrate the NCNC but also to denounce it to the Kano Native Administration.<sup>12</sup> The latter had never got on well with the inhabitants of *sabon gari* most of whom detested control and orders emanating from Kano city.<sup>13</sup> But it is only fair to point out that the Council's letter to the Resident made no reference to the emir, Alhaji Abdullahi Bayero, or to the Kano Native Administration. By giving the erroneous impression that the NCNC mentioned the NA disrespectfully in the letter the Resident probably wanted to strengthen the growing feelings against members of the party.

The fight for an effective voice in the discussion of Nigeria's constitutional future was not confined to the NCNC. Another important group which was involved in the struggle was the 'Kano Committee of Trade Unionists'. Like some of the tribal unions, sections of Kano's working class appear to have come under NCNC influence. The Committee waded into the matter following the selection of a certain Alhaji Abubakar to represent Kano employees at the provincial conference. The Committee which included representatives from several departments—Posts and Telegraphs, the Railways etc. and Commercial firms (UAC, John Holt etc.)—were highly enraged at the selection of Alhaji Abubakar. In a letter to the Resident, the Unionists protested against 'the undemocratic way in which the election of the said Alhaji Abubakar was made' and asked for an interview with the Resident on the matter.<sup>14</sup> The meeting at which five officials were selected to attend the interview, was convened at the instance of the Union of Railway Men. Not all the unions invited to the meeting sent representatives, but those which accepted the invitation and attended represented, on the estimate of a colonial official, some 2,000 workers.<sup>15</sup>

However, the meeting was destined not to take place. The Committee had asked to be allowed to see the Resident on 23 June, but the latter said he was not prepared to see them until 2 July. The significant point here was not that an interview was to be granted nine days after the date the Committee asked for it but that the provincial conference in which it was seeking direct representation had met in the interlude, on 26 June. The Resident thus demonstrated that he was not even interested in dealing fairly with the Unionists. The Committee's reaction was natural: it wrote to say that it no longer had any faith in the interview since it would not serve any useful purpose.<sup>16</sup> This letter was surprisingly restrained in its language, but the Unionists turned their anger, quite unjustifiably on the *Wakilin Fuskar Ma'aikata*, the emir's Councillor for works. They deprecated the choice of Alhaji Abubakar to represent the workers, a proceeding which, in their opinion, savoured of 'official meddlesomeness'. Reiterating their view that Alhaji Abubakar had no right to speak for the workers of Kano, the Unionists said that

they would have nothing to do with any opinions expressed by him on the vexed question of constitutional review.<sup>17</sup>

One problem which the Committee shared with the NCNC was that both were not well informed on some crucial issues such as those which dealt with the collection of opinions and representation at the provincial conference. One such issue was that the views to be ascertained were *Northern* view points. Another, closely connected with it, was that membership of the conference was restricted to persons of Northern origin, by which were meant persons whose fathers and grand-fathers were born in the Northern Provinces.<sup>18</sup> The question which this raises is whether adequate publicity was given to some of the measures the British wanted to take and to the explanations underlying such measures. Were the rules of the game clear to all concerned the NCNC and the Committee of Trade Unionists would probably not have wasted their time on the kind of sterile arguments they put forward to the authorities. For instance, there was probably nothing 'un-democratic' or which savoured of 'official meddlesomeness' about the choice of Alhaji Abubakar. Given that Southern views and representation were out of the question, there was no case for consulting the Kano Trade Unions on the issue of selecting a delegate to represent the employees at the provincial conference, since they were virtually, if not totally, made up of Southerners.<sup>19</sup> A formal meeting of the representatives of those workers who were considered eligible was planned for June,<sup>20</sup> not known to the Committee until much later. The letter inviting the provincial staff to send two of their members to join the representatives of other departments (that is, NA departments) in Kano city to elect a representative emphasized that the man to be chosen should be a Northerner. This emphasis appears to have been necessary to avoid their sending men of Southern origin, not a few of whom had also found employment at the provincial office. It must have been at that meeting that Alhaji Abubakar was selected to represent Kano, that is NA, workers.

The decision to restrict membership of the conference to Northerners was not locally taken at Kano. It was the policy of the Nigerian government, enthusiastically implemented by the Northern

Provinces Administration.<sup>21</sup> Colonial officials at Kano advanced two reasons for the exclusion of Southerners. The first was that the non-Northern inhabitants of Kano represented less than half per cent of the total population of the territory. The second was that the people of the Northern provinces should be allowed to present to a subsequent regional conference at Kaduna views which were *Northern*.<sup>22</sup> The attempt to keep the Northern and Southern Communities apart in this matter was an object of a considerable amount of resentment on the part of members of the Kano Committee of Trade Unionists who in a protest letter asserted that

Every Nigerian be he from the North or South, East or West should be regarded as a citizen and such terms as Northern or Southern applied to issues affecting the whole country tends (*sic*) more to disintegrate our national solidarity, and promote the theory of regionalization, than it makes it possible to unite Nigeria and the Cameroons into a big whole.<sup>23</sup>

These views bear NCNC marks, and as is well known, were later in the fifties and sixties bitterly re-echoed by many professional politicians of Southern origin.

We now come to the composition of the provincial conference, which met in Kano on 26 June, 1949. Apart from the emir, Alhaji Abdullahi Bayero, three Kano members of the House of Assembly—Mallam Bello, the *Chiroma*, and the *Sarkin Shanu*—were members by virtue of their positions, and all were members of the ruling families of Kano.<sup>24</sup> Mallam Bello was at the time an education officer; a foundation member of the Katsina Training College, he had had a successful teaching career in Kano city.<sup>25</sup> The four wards of Kano city were each represented, as was also the *Waje* area. The twenty-four rural districts had a total of nine representatives. Two special interests were given representation: the employees, as already noted, were represented by Alhaji Abubakar, while business was represented by a Mallam Ibrahim Musa Ghashash.

On this showing, one might say that colonial officials in Kano strove to feel the pulse of public opinion on the issue of constitutional

review. But as a matter of fact very few of these delegates were interested in national issues, and fewer still were in a position to contribute meaningfully to the discussions on a new Constitution. What the British actually wanted to produce was a Constitution that suited the interests of the NAs as much as possible. This explains why informed opinions outside these establishments were ignored, 'Northern' though they were. For instance, two prominent members of the *Jamiyyar Mutanem Arewa*,<sup>26</sup> Mallam Maitama Sule and Mallam Aminu Kano were excluded from the conference, apparently because they were regarded as radicals. As the General Vice President of the *Jamiyyar Mutanem Arewa* and local Secretary of the 'Northern Teachers' Association' Mallam Maitama Sule requested that the branches of these bodies at Kano be allowed to elect their own delegates.<sup>27</sup> The D.O.'s reply was that the application had come too late because the Provincial Conference had already held its final session. This was a convenient reply, but it did not explain why such men were left out in the first place.

Before the delegates began deliberations on the questions which had been presented before them, opportunity of expressing their views was given to those groups and individuals who were by regulation excluded from membership. In his opening address the Resident had stated that there was nothing wrong if, in forming their opinions on various issues, people of Northern provinces received help from Southern individuals and organizations.<sup>28</sup> Two representations were made when the conference reconvened on 27 August. The first was by R. D. Nyamsi, a Cameroonian and local president of the NCNC.<sup>29</sup> He criticized the exclusion of the NCNC from the conference and claimed that the review of the Richards Constitution was a victory for his party which had earlier sent a protest delegation to London. He stressed that the decision on a new form of government was a matter for the Nigerian public, and he laid before the conference a copy of his party's 'Freedom Charter' which, he said, fully explained the party's position. The other speaker was one Mr. Oduko of the Zikist Movement<sup>30</sup> who also bitterly resented the exclusion of the Movement from the conference table. He called for the division of Nigeria into eight states based on linguistic criteria, and the Nigeriani- zation of certain key positions such as Residents and District Officers.

Some of the issues raised by the NCNC leaders had nothing to do with the questions designed for the Provincial Conference. If anything, they emphasized the difficulty, perhaps the utter impossibility, of obtaining *Nigerian* view points on a wide range of matters. Certain opinions expressed by some Southern Nigerians were clearly antagonistic to the colonial regime and would not have been endorsed by the delegates chosen from the Native Administration. On the other hand, when the Conference settled down on its business it voted in a manner which would have embittered NCNC delegates had they been members.

For example, on certain burning issues the Conference voted as follows :

1. The Regional Council should retain all revenue collected in the form of general tax and *jangali* (cattle tax), and the Region's share of the non-declared revenue should be computed according to the population of the region ;
2. There should be no changes in the geographical boundaries of the twelve provinces making up Northern Nigeria ;
3. The prevailing system of election to the Regional Council should continue ; and
4. A federal structure, in which the regions would enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy.<sup>31</sup>

Since the NCNC had advocated the creation of eight states in the country in its 'Freedom Charter' of 1948,<sup>32</sup> its adherents, had they secured seats as members of the Kano Provincial Conference, would have opposed those resolutions which, directly or by implication, sought to maintain the existing regions in tact. Certainly, they would not have voted for the maintenance of the existing electoral system which left so much power in the hands of Native Authorities, since the NCNC had always regarded the Native Authorities as a vicious obstacle in the way of the proper governance of the country. Although the NCNC would have been outvoted in every case, an atmosphere free from bitterness and rancour, such as the colonial

authorities required, would have eluded the conference hall. The opinions expressed at Kano were in several respects representative of Muslim North's standpoint on some of the crucial political questions of the time. For example, when the regional conferences met at Ibadan in 1950 members of the Northern delegation insisted among other imperatives, that federal funds be divided on a *per capita* basis and that there should be no changes in the provincial boundaries.<sup>33</sup>

The major political task in Kano during the few months following the publication of the Macpherson Constitution in 1951 was how to bring the provisions of the new Constitution home to the masses. Publicity was the policy of the government at Kaduna, but the question of the precise forms it would take in each province was in some ways left to local initiatives.<sup>34</sup> The basic principle adopted by European officials at Kano was that the work of publicizing the Constitution should be undertaken by Africans to avoid any suspicion that the elections were being 'managed' by the government. It was also considered that the Kano Native Administration should be protected against similar charges through the involvement in the campaigns also of a non-NA machineries such as the firms and the Northern People's Congress.<sup>35</sup> The authorities in Kano, both Europeans and Africans, had thus become sensitive, to a degree apparently unknown before, to criticisms mounted by those who regarded them as the enemies of the democratic process.

One of the principal mechanisms employed in the public enlightenment exercise was public lectures organized in major population centres. Some of these lectures were held in market places and addressed by leading public figures, whether they were Northerners or not. Special lectures were also recommended for delivery to district and villages heads, the *alkalai* or Muslim judges, and so forth who could impart their knowledge to others. The presence of European officials at the lectures was considered necessary to ensure consistence and accuracy. Posters were also called to the services of the campaign, but far more important and effective was the use of pamphlets. The publicity campaign gave rise in the Northern provinces to the circulation of a wide range of pamphlets

in both English and Hausa, instructing people on the subject and implications of the new Constitution.<sup>36</sup> A Regional Public Relations Office was set up in Kaduna for the purpose of producing the propaganda materials. Thousands of these, especially those in the Hausa language, were issued by Kaduna to the Kano Provincial office. The Kano Native Administration was the principal agency for the distribution of the documents. The central administrations in Kano city regularly sent out these pamphlets to the district heads in the countryside with instruction to have them read out and explained to the general public. Local teachers, scribes, and all others who could read and write were employed in the exercise.<sup>37</sup>

Two other media were utilized for the dissemination of information. One was the press. In 1951 the only newspaper in Kano was the privately owned *Daily Comet*, which belonged to Zik's group of papers and was the principal vehicle for the propagation of nationalist ideas. Important news items, regarding the delimitation of electoral areas, the meeting of electors and other electoral arrangements were announced in the press in advance. The other medium was the wireless. Radio announcements were often made, and on at least one occasion the Resident of Kano himself went to the radio diffusion station to explain how the elections under the revised Constitution were to be conducted.<sup>38</sup>

But the situation in Kano should not be seen in terms of North-South polarization. It is clear from what has been said that there was nothing which could be called a 'Southern front' since the agitations against colonial policy were mounted by members and sympathisers of a political party that did not seem to have enjoyed overwhelming support among the Southerners in Kano. On the other hand, discrimination by colonial officials was extended to some Northerners, that is those with unapproved political views. It was not until 1950 that the latter formed a political party of their own—the 'Northern Elements Progressive Union'—and not until the approach of the elections did they engage in joint political actions with the NCNC.

### CONCLUSION

The following points emerge from the foregoing discussion. The preliminaries to the 'indirect' elections at Kano generated or deepen-



ed a number of controversies which left enduring marks on Kano society. The whole question of ascertaining the views of the governed as to the provisions of the constitution created a cleavage between those who thought that every Nigerian had the right to be consulted and those who considered that being a Nigerian was not enough. The problems of the colonial and Native Administration officials were made less serious by the fact that the opposition was not backed by all the 'stranger' elements in Kano. This was the result of the internal rift among the immigrant communities which made some ethnic groups indifferent even hostile to NCNC propaganda. In other words, the rancour in the Nigerian nationalist movement at that time had its practical expression among the immigrant communities in the emirate.

Another point to note is that the preliminaries were significant to the political socialization in Kano. The various publicity exercises undertaken during the period served as a training for future politicians in this area in the art of mobilizing the masses. It is true that the NCNC during its tour of 1946 to denounce the Richards Constitution set a precedent in this process but the facilities at the disposal of the party were then severely limited. This time a full scale propaganda was mounted with the full resources of the colonial regime and the Native Administration. In course of time when the NA assigned to itself the task of helping the Northern Peoples Congress to electoral victories it had no difficulty in organizing the necessary support.

This paper has dealt with an area where the educated classes were part of the machinery of the administration and did not constitute a problem to the government. It will be interesting if other researchers can bring to light the state of affairs in other major centres where the bulk of the opposition or pressure group was not made up of settlers and where anti-colonial elements had better chances of manoeuvre in dealing with local government agents and colonial policy.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The present Kano State is co-terminous with the old Kano province. Other distinct entities are : Hadejia, Kazaure and Gumel. The population of

## Preliminaries to the 1951 'Indirect' Elections at Kano

Kano emirate was more than five times those of other units put together.

2. There is at present no detailed study of these three settlements. For some outline see C.N. Ubah, *Administration of Kano Emirate under the British, 1900-1930* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 1973), especially 11.173-178.

3. See Kalu Ezera, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria* (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1964), p. 76; J.S. Coleman, *Nigeria, Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 275-6.

4. National Archives Kaduna (NAK) Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 3, 'Political and Constitutional Future of Nigeria'. All references to 'Kano Prof.' are to be found at the National Archives, Kaduna.

5. By 'Mallams' the Council obviously was referring to the Muslim inhabitants of Kano, especially those living within the old city walls.

6. Kano Prof. 5/1 No. 6661/S. 1, J.O. Okeiyi Hon. Secretary NCNC to Resident, Kano Province, 4 May 1949.

7. *Ibid.*, Resident Kano Province, to Hon. Secretary NCNC 11 May, 1949.

8. Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 1, D.O.'s minute to the Resident, 6 May, 1949.

9. *Ibid.*, Secretary NCNC to the Senior Resident, Kano Province, 11 May, 1949.

10. Of the three signatories one was Igbo, another Isoko, while the third came from Ogoja Province.

11. Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 1, Resident, Kano Province to Secretary, NCNC, 19 May, 1949.

12. The Resident's letter could hardly have been unknown to the office of the *Chiroma*, the emir's favourite son and heir-apparent, who closely liaised with the colonial officials.

13. In a personal discussion with the writer in August 1972, the first *Wakilin Waje*, Alhaji Shehu Ahmad who had administered *sabon gari* on behalf of the emir, emphasized the difficulties of ruling that enclave.

14. NAK Kano Prof. 5/1. No. 666/S. 1, Kano Committee of Trade Unionists to Resident of Kano, 21, June, 1949.

15. *Ibid.* See the minute of 28, June, 1949.

16. *Ibid.* C.A. Agu Secretary, Kano Committee of Trade Unionists, to Resident, 30 June, 1949.

17. Same to *Wakilin Fuskar Ma'aikata*, 24 June, 1949.

18. NAK Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 1. *Vide* especially the *Sarkin Shanu's* letter to the provincial administration staff, Kano.

19. The five representatives of the trade unions who were to have discussed with the Resident were all southerners, four of them Igbo.

20. NAK Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 1, *Sarkin Shanu* to the provincial staff.

21. This matter was discussed by the Northern Regional Council, that is the Northern House of Assembly and the Northern House of Chiefs established under Sir Arthur Richards Constitution.

22. NAK Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 3, Resident's address at the first meeting of the provincial conference.

23. NAK Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 1, Kano Committee of Trade Unionists to *Wakilin Fuskar Ma'aikata*. 24 June, 1949.

24. Of these, only Mallam Bello was appointed to the House right from the beginning.

25. Mallam (now Alhaji) Bello, is currently the head of Kano's largest district of Dawakin Tofa where he was kind enough to grant the writer interview on 9 August, 1972. His present title of *Makama* is traditionally one of the key offices in the emirate.

26. Which later became known as the 'Northern Peoples Congress'.

27. NAK Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S.1. No. 6661/S. a, Yusuf Maitama Sule to D.O., 8 August, 1949.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Mr. Nyamsi, now aged 69, came to Kano in 1928 and was elected President of the local branch of the NCNC in 1947 (interviewed at Kano, 26, August 1974).

30. The Zikist Movement was formed in 1946 to give political and moral support to the then National Secretary of the NCNC, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

31. For the Minutes of the meetings of 27 and 28 August on which these decisions were taken see NAK Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 1.

32. For this provision in the 'Freedom Charter' see Coleman, *Nigeria*..... p. 390.

33. Ezera, *Constitutional Developments*.....p. 115.

34. NAK Kano Prof, 5/1, No. 6661/S. 6, Secretary Northern Provinces (SNP) to all Residents, 8 March, 1951.

35. *Ibid.* See the D.O.'s minute to the Resident, 22 March 1951. See also Resident of Kano to SNP, 31 March 1951. Up to this time the NPC had not declared itself a political party.

36. See, for instance : *The New Constitution* (Zaria, 1951), *The New Constitution : How you would vote if you live in a Registration Area* (Zaria, 1951), *The New Constitution : Electoral Procedure in the North* (Zaria, 1951), and *Nigeria's New Constitution : Do you know ?—50 Questions and Answers* (Lagos, 1951).

37. For instance, a circular letter of 31 July 1951 from the office of the *Chiroma*, the emir's right hand man, to the district heads emphasized the need to make use of the local literate class to publicize the Constitution.

38. This talk was well documented. *Vide* Kano Prof. 5/1, No. 6661/S. 6.

Sunil K. Sahu

## Tanzania : The Colonial Experience and Dependent Development/ Underdevelopment

There is a general concern—both among Marxists and those who reject the Marxist categories of social and historical analysis—about the existence or peaceful co-existence of a few nations who are very rich and consume the most of world's products as against a large number of poor or underdeveloped nations who remain (or at least the vast majority of their population) in stark poverty.<sup>1</sup> What has come to be known as the Third World seems to have one thing in common i.e. 'poverty' or the stage of 'underdevelopment' despite their divergence.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it is not a matter of mere coincidence that most of the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have had a colonial past and were economically exploited.

In the wake of decolonization process of the fifties and early sixties, there was a general hope that the newly independent states would also become economically independent once they attain political independence. The experience of the past two decades has clearly shown that political independence was not the forerunner of economic independence. Slowly the leaders of most of the Third World countries, the intellectuals and many others started questioning the wisdom of developmentalists who viewed the economic backwardness of Third World as a 'natural' and an 'early' stage in the process of development.

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The international economic structure that emerged in the post-war era did anything but help the poor countries keep up with their economic aspirations. The pattern of economic aid, trade, and the international organization have proved by and large, to be biased, against the developing countries. By the late sixties the crises were apparent. The failure of political institutions in many of the Afro-Asian countries ; the army coups ; the crisis of 'rising expectations' of the masses ; the growing inequalities within most of these societies resulting in growing tensions, violence, and political instability were indicators to the fact that all was not well. These underdeveloped countries needed much different kind of development processes than what the modernization theorists had made them believe.

Most of the modernization theorists/neo-classical economists posit that the present stage of underdevelopment of the Third World is comparable to the pre-industrial stage of Western states and, therefore, they prescribe that the underdeveloped countries could develop only through a) the transfer of advanced technology, b) penetration of direct foreign investment, and c) foreign aid.<sup>3</sup>

Sharply criticizing the modernization theory, the dependency theorists, hold that the international economic dependence produces the 'development of underdevelopment' in peripheral areas of the world economy. The basic hypothesis of the theory is that development and underdevelopment are partial, interdependent structures of one global system and, therefore, the underdevelopment of one country can only be understood as part of the world capitalist system.

Dependency Theory could be traced back to the works of Paul Baran (1952, 1962) who argued that dependence produces a real flow of resources away from the less developed countries and consequently in underdevelopment of the less developed countries. Baran's argument is a serious revision of the classical Marxists who generally argued that as capitalism develops there is a tendency of capital flow from more industrialized capitalist societies to the underdeveloped

regions of the world. Lenin's theory of Imperialism and Rosa Luxemburg's theory of "the Accumulation of Capital" are two important works of the early twentieth century in the classical Marxist tradition.

Not discounting other merits of Lenin's theory of Imperialism, his theory was not able to provide a framework for explaining the kind of capitalist development that took place in the West which encompassed the entire world in its fold after the Great Depression and, particularly, after the Second World War. Lenin was not found correct in his assertion that there would be a greater tendency of capital flow from the advanced capitalist countries to the less developed countries. Lenin had perhaps taken into consideration only the nature of finance capital in Germany around the turn of this century.<sup>4</sup> His theoretical construction, therefore, lacked a broad empirical basis due to which his model was not able to explain the nature of capitalist development that followed.

Rosa Luxemburg argued that the flight of capital was not the only feature of imperialism. The specific feature of imperialism was the perpetual need to extract values from pre-capitalist modes to the capitalist mode : i.e. accumulation on a world scale.<sup>5</sup>

Modifying the theories of both Lenin and Luxemburg, dependency theorists argue that the dependence of the underdeveloped countries (peripheries) on the developed (core/centres) countries produces a real flow of resources away from the peripheries which results in the "development of underdevelopment". This happens primarily because of the monopoly structure of the world market, which acts to channel surplus values to the 'core' countries. In other words, the central argument of the dependency theorists is the hypothesis that "dependency distorts development" in the peripheries of the world economic system. It does not, however, mean that there is no development taking place in the peripheries, rather that development is non-autonomous and exogenous factors dominate over indigenous factors like natural endowment.

An enormous body of literature has appeared in the past decade and half which takes Baran's central argument that "penetration of the periphery by the core-capitalism actually created obstacles to development", as a reference point. This theory was further developed in the sixties particularly in the context of analysing the political economy of Latin American countries but in recent years this theory has been advanced to investigate the socio-economic and political problems of Asian and African countries as well. Among the theoretical works on Africa most important are Samir Amin (1974, 1976) and Wallerstein (1974, 1976). In general they emphasize 1) exploitation of the peripheries by the core, 2) structural distortion of the peripheral economy, and 3) suppression of autonomous policies in the periphery.

According to most of the dependency theorists the post-colonial states of the Third World are independent only politically (in some cases, particularly in Latin America, they doubt even their political independence) and economically they remain dependent on the metropolises. They argue that the "monopoly of force" and "legal monopolies" on the part of the colonial powers during the colonial period have been replaced by "monopoly in industrial technology" and the "monopoly in international commodity market" in the post-colonial era. The mechanism of international trade and international organizations are viewed as agencies of perpetuating this dependence relations between the centre and the peripheries.<sup>6</sup>

The main arguments of the dependency theorists could be broken down into two phases: colonial and post-colonial. During the colonial period, they argue, not only the colonial powers exploited the natural resources of colonies, which were needed by the newly emergent European industries, (Wallerstein, 1974b) but the pattern of economic development that was set in motion during that period did not produce conditions for sustained economic growth in those areas. Rather the colonial rule resulted in a) labour migration, b) forced labour in many countries, c) uneven economic growth within colonies, and d) the emergence of a native middle class or at least some kind of a rudimentary class formation.

It was the urban/semi-urban, educated/semi-educated natives ; who were more articulate and were on the forefront of the nationalist movements throughout Asia and Africa. After attaining political independence these groups, by and large, replaced the former colonial administrators and a new "ruling elite" emerged all over the Third World. These ruling elites are viewed by the dependency theorists as non-autonomous, since, they are considered to be nominally independent. Economically they remain completely/partially dependent on the metropolises and this is reflected even in the processes of their internal policy making ; a particular class which appropriates most of the surplus generated in that society ; the interests of most of the ruling classes remain quite contrary to the interests of the masses ; and ultimately it results in the development of underdevelopment in the peripheries and the 'development of development' in the centres (Frank, 1967). This also explains why national liberation movements were accomplished with greater ease than social reform movements in most of these societies.

The agencies which reinforce, reproduce, or perpetuate these dependency relations are trade, aid, and investment. This, in short, is the dependency syndrome.

## II

This paper is an attempt to apply dependency theory to the analysis of problems of underdevelopment in Tanzania. Tanzania has had a colonial past. She was first a German colony for less than twenty years and then a British Mandate and Trust territory for about forty years. The country is poor and underdeveloped even by African standards. But what makes the case study of Tanzania most interesting is not her colonial past alone but also her declared socialist goals which she has been pursuing since 1967 under the 'dynamic' and 'enlightened' leadership of Julius K. Nyerere.

In the Third World, Tanzania has been a country of some attraction to the Western academics, particularly in the past decade, for a variety of reasons. Some scholars are fascinated by the new institutional experiments of Tanzania—one Party Democracy, role of



the TANU—particularly after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, while others are still in the process of comparing and contrasting Tanzanian's success, particularly in the economic field, with neighbouring Kenya. The Tanzanian experiment of peaceful transition to socialism gave ground for much theoretical debate among social scientists. For some of the dependency theorists her declared policy to move towards socialism is the ideal blueprint for the poor and underdeveloped countries of the Third World to follow (Saul, 1975). The conservative social scientists, on the other hand, raised doubts about the efficacy of the Tanzanian new policies. For our purpose what is interesting in this debate is to investigate how far a poor country like Tanzania with her limited natural endowments and her 'backward economy' could offset dependency relations and with what degree of success?

For the dependency theorists the only viable alternative to the present dependency relation is 'socialism' and Tanzania does provide an interesting case to test empirically the viability of this theory. Tanzania has been pursuing her socialist goals for a decade now. Still she remains far from being a socialist state. Her policy of Ujamaa Vijijini has had a limited success and the emergence of an equitable and just society is no where in sight despite the dedication of leadership. The Tanzanian leaders, particularly Nyerere, have behaved much differently, since 1967, than the ruling elites of most of the Third World countries with the exception of communist states.<sup>7</sup> In other words Tanzania remaining within a 'bourgeois democratic framework' has been consciously trying to move away from the necessary evils of 'Western Democracy' by deliberately raising the consciousness of the leaders first, then of the masses, by pursuing certain socialist policies.

In this paper we will not go into the analysis of the current debate whether Tanzania is a 'truly socialist state' or whether her socialist policies are best suited for her needs. We shall try to focus particularly on two issues : 1) how far the colonial experience is responsible for the underdevelopment of Tanzania by looking at the development of railways and introduction of cash-crops in particular, and 2) how far the development of structural underdevelopment

during the colonial period has been reproducing itself.

It is argued in this paper that the infrastructure of the Tanzanian economy which was developed during the colonial period was primarily geared towards the production of primary commodities in accordance with the needs of the metropolises. Consequently the regions which did not contribute in this process, for geographical and other reasons, were relatively neglected and left behind in the process of economic development. This resulted in uneven development and labour migration affecting the traditional economy of the country. This regional imbalance, which is the legacy of the colonial past, seems to be reproducing itself and the Tanzanian government has been hard put to deal with this problem.

This regional imbalance has also been an important reason why Tanzania has not been fully successful in implementing her policy of 'rural socialism'. Reference, however, would be made to other factors which contributed to Tanzanian underdevelopment: viz., a) her geography, b) comparative advantage that Kenya had within East Africa particularly over Tanzania and c) the international status of Tanzania since the First World War hindering foreign investment within her territory.

### III

Any analysis of Tanzanian<sup>8</sup> economy must begin with an understanding of her geography. Tanzania (only mainland) with an area of approximately 343,000 square miles is larger than France and the British Isles together or almost as large as the whole of Pakistan or Venezuela or nearly 30 percent larger than Texas. Yet her population in 1945 was estimated a mere 7 million and by 1967 it increased to 11,763,150 (1967 census). Much of the center of the Tanzanian territory is arid bush country, and a considerable part of population and economic activity is concentrated in various areas around the periphery (I.B.R.D.:11).

Tanzania has an average population density of 26 people per square mile (in 1957) with the regional variation of 2 per square mile in the Masai District to 136 in Moshi. By the time of her indepen-

dence about two-third of the country was virtually uninhabited. This distribution of population is because of her oppressive physical environment. 'A notable example of this was human subservience to the tsetse fly which, as a result rather than cause of underpopulation, infected some 60 percent of the land'. (Ehrlich, 1976:293) Because of the climatic variation the problems of Tanzania differ widely from one area to another. 'The problems of Wasukuma, peasant cotton growers to the South of Lake Victoria, are very different from those of Wagogo in the center of the territory, a people under constant threat of famine caused by failure of the rains'. (I.B.R.D.:11)

Rainfall has been irregular and inadequate in its geographical distribution and prolonged periods of drought have been common everywhere within Tanzania excepting the vicinity of Lake Victoria and Nyasa. Her economy is basically agrarian with over 90 percent of population depending on land for subsistence. Mineral resources of Tanzania are not significant<sup>9</sup> and has not contributed much to her economy.

Having reviewed her natural setting let us turn to Tanzanian history. The history of Tanzania prior to 1800 is very scanty. There does not exist much historical account of the pre-colonial Tanzania. Kimambo (1969:14-33) has rightly argued that very little is known about the interior of Tanzania prior to 1800. Alpers (1969:56), in an effort to trace the pre-colonial history of Tanzania, has emphasized the significance of the long distance trade routes between the coast and the interior. The principal contact of the inland parts of the country with the outside world had been with the Arab trading caravans who had been trading—mainly in slaves and ivory—for a good many years before the arrival of the Germans. Although 'these trade routes linked the people of the Tanzanian interior with those of the coast,...Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Angola, Congo (Zaire), Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya' (ibid), much of Tanzanian territory was not penetrated until it became a German colony.

In the pre-colonial Tanzania slaves from the mainland, mainly Nyamwezi and Sukumas, were taken to Zanzibar to work on the

clove plantation and some of them were also sent to Muscat, the Middle East, Europe and America. (Rwayemamu:9). But the degree to which the slave trade affected economy of the mainland has not been ascertained so far by the economic historians of Africa.<sup>10</sup>

The economic organization of pre-colonial Tanzania was primarily communal which had, by and large, the following characteristics: 1) every individual had the right to productive use of some land by virtue of being a member of a tribe; 2) absence of classes; 3) no serious competition over land; 4) the primary factors of production were never traded; and 5) the distribution of production surplus rested on an institutionalized system of socially obligatory duties of making, receiving and returning gifts.<sup>11</sup> (Rweyemamu: 5-7)

The political history of pre-colonial Tanzania is also far from being satisfactory. On the basis of the available historical accounts we find that there existed three main types of political systems before the arrival of Germans in Tanzania. They were : *ntemi* (kingly) political system among Wahaya, Wasukuma, Wanyamwezi, Waha, and Wagogo, the development of a military state in north Kimweri, and among Masai a political system based on age-set organization (Gwassa, 1969:87-89). But none of them was a viable political system. Therefore, by the time the German explorers, geographers, missionaries and traders arrived, Tanzania was politically and economically very weak.

Carl Peters, having founded his "Society for German Colonization", started penetrating the interior of the mainland towards the end of 1884. By February 1885 he had entered into about a dozen treaties, allegedly forged ones, with the local chiefs and on the basis of this he wanted an imperial charter—*schutzbrief*. He was granted a charter by Bismarck, the German Chancellor. Why Bismarck adopted a colonial policy despite the general assertion of the historians and his biographers that he was emphatically opposed to colonialism] in any form has been answered at great length by Townsend (1966:54-91) and other historians. We would like to underscore only one point: the need of Germany's growing industries

for tropical raw materials was an important input in changing Bismarck's policy. This argument could be supported by the subsequent German policy in Tanzania which stressed economic production. (Gwassa, 1969:100)

Carl Peters' actual occupation started in May 1887 and it was because of his inability to integrate the coastal areas into his system that the German government stepped in. As Gwassa (102) puts it:

"...Coastal resistance which threatened German existence in East Africa promoted the German Government to send forces to save the name of Germany. Von Wissmann was sent out in May 1889 as Imperial Commissioner of German East Africa to suppress resistance. The Germans decided that company rule should end."

In January 1891 the Imperial German Government took over the administration of Tanzania. With the beginning of the German rule imperialism in Africa (Tanzania) as in Asia began to fulfil a "double mission...one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic [and African] society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia and Africa]" (Karl Marx). This was the beginning of the process of Tanzania's incorporation in the world capitalist system, phase two of Wallerstein's (1976) three stages of African involvement in the world-economy. It has been argued by Iliffe (1969) and others that this incorporation faced much resistance from the Tanzanians. Rweyemamu (1973:13) has listed as many as eleven recorded resistance between 1888-1906 when the Germans began to systematically colonize the country. Most important among them was Maji of 1905-7.

#### IV

From the very beginning Carl Peters was interested in opening up the hinterland of the coast. The development of a railway, therefore, was of great importance to the colonial administration. To get rid of head-porterage as a mode of transportation, plans for railway construction began to appear. Head porterage was economical so long

as the trade was confined to items like ivory and rubber. The introduction of cash-crops necessitated the development of a more efficient transportation system.

In theory, the colonies could not be economically beneficial to Germany unless they were developed. In other words development that could complement the domestic needs of Germany, industrial as well as migrational, was essential. For Tanzania it meant the development of a railway along the trading and cash-crop areas, the introduction of cash-crops, wage labour and taxation.

As early as 1887 a first commission was given for a preliminary survey for a railway between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro. In 1891 the construction of the Tanga (northern) line had begun which finally reached Moshi in 1911. This line covered the areas of large population i.e. Usambara and Kilimanjaro which could provide production labour. The development of Central Railway, which connected Dar-es-Salaam with Kigoma through Tabora, was very much along the old caravan route and areas along the central trade route such as Mpwapwa, Tabora and Ujiji which became German centers. The Central Railway was the main axis for the penetration of the interior.

The Northern line served the sisal estates of the Tanga region, reaching Muheza in 1896, and was later extended to the North coffee areas, reaching Moshi in 1911. The Central line reached Morogoro, another sisal area, in 1907 and Tabora was reached in 1912. "It was also a strategic line to lake Tanganyika: Kigoma was reached in 1914, offering links to Rwanda and Burundi to the north, which at that time were relatively rich provinces of German East Africa, and over to the Congo." (Yaffey, 1970:46)

Thus the railways were the making of the ports of Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam. In order to open up the south of their colony, the Germans finally considered running a track from Kilwa to lake Nyasa; but they lacked the time to bring the project to fruition. Though the Germans never had an opportunity of fully utilizing the economic potential of their new railways, the pattern of developing transportation infrastructure clearly indicates that it was for commercial purposes and not to integrate the Tanzanian economy.

The Germans viewed the colony chiefly as source of raw materials and Tanzania could also act as a market for German industrial goods. The introduction of cash-crops—particularly sisal, cotton and rubber—does reflect the industrial needs of Germany more than

TABLE 1

**Principal total exports and exports sent to Germany, 1911**  
(in thousands of Marks)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Exports (1911)</i>	<i>Exports sent to Germany (1911)</i>
Non-plantation rubber	4781	3511*
Plantation rubber	3610	2539*
Sisal fibre	4532	4423*
Hides and skin	3035	237
Copra and coconut	1848	185
Cotton	1332	1267*
Coffee	1266	561
Gold	1023	1013*
Beeswax	817	452
Timber	515	460
Groundnuts	490	128
Ivory	485	14
Sesame	404	141
Mica	348	348*
Rice	120	nil
Gum copal	107	13
Wattle and bark	96	27
Total exports	22438	13207

\*Asterisks indicate 'strategic' raw material to Germany.

Source : Justinian Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 15.

anything else. Although in theory Tanzania was free to export her commodities to any country, in practice Germany was the major trading partner. Table 1 indicates that in 1911 about 60 percent of the total Tanzanian export and almost all of the strategic raw commodities, especially cotton, sisal, rubber and gold was exported to Germany. It is, however, true that it was not cheaper for Germany to get these 'strategic' raw materials from Tanzania. Quite the contrary, cotton was cheaper for Germany to import from America. The main consideration was a long term strategy to have an independent source of cotton which Germany could effectively control (Austen: 73). According to Illife, although cotton was not in short supply, the quasi-monopolists manipulated prices without reference to supply. To quote him:

Between 1897 and 1906, the average price of American raw cotton in Hamburg was 70 Pf. per kg. In February 1904 it was 170 Pf.; in December 1904, 70 Pf.; in September 1907, after an especially heavy crop, 120 Pf. Angry textile manufacturers sought an alternative source of supply sufficient to stabilise the Hamburg commodity market.

The German business interest in Tanzania is very well summed up in the statement of Dernburg, the Colonial Secretary, on his return to Germany after a visit to the colony in 1907, that "it (German East Africa) is a tough country, and it is difficult to treat it properly. A good land for merchants; a poor land for farmers".

In the early years of colonization there was a considerable inflow of capital, but it did not continue even for a decade. The first public accounts in 1891-92 showed a revenue of Mk. 1,48,000 and an expenditure of Mk. 3,409,000. The balance was met by a subsidy from Germany which was equivalent to 100,000 pounds. Besides, there was presumed to be capital inflow in form of inventories by importers and plantations as they expanded their operations (Yaffey, 1970:43).

By 1912 the private capital inflow had reached the astonishing level of over 40% of imports. (see Table 2) The profit outflow by



1913 was so high that the economic editor of the *Quarterly Review* commented:

The viability of many colonial enterprises is prejudiced right from the outset, in that the enterprise is burdened with excessive founder's profits. The proof of this was given by the collapse of the 'Süd-kuste' company, the 'Cotton company', the German 'Rufiji Cotton Company' and in disappointments in the concern of Mertens and Co. A further source of problem is the fact that most of the enterprises are burdened with excessive cost in the home country; that the boards of directors over here receive much too high fees, while in the protectorate itself, essential expenditure is subjected to economies" (Quoted in Yaffey, 1970:43-44).

TABLE 2  
Balance of Payment in Tanzania  
(in thousands of Marks)

	Cr.	Dr.
Exports	31,418	—
Imports	—	50,309
International Investment		
Income	—	3,712
Other Head Office Expenses	—	1,881
Military Grant from		
Germany	3,618	—
Capital inflow, plus net		
errors and omissions		
(balancing items)	20,869	—
Total	55,902	55,902

Source : M.J.H. Yaffey, *Balance of Payment problems of a Developing country : Tanzania*, Munchen, 1970, p. 44.

There is always a tendency to compare the performance of the Germans in the colonies with the British. Compared to British East Africa, Germany seems to have paid more attention to the economic development of Tanzania. Whereas Britain devoted all the attention to the construction of the Uganda Railway, Charles Eliot (Eliot, 1966) remarked in 1905 that Germans "devoted themselves to the methodical development of the colony with a systematic thoroughness (or scientific colonialism).....and a lavishness due to the determination to establish a colonial empire at any cost". The revenue of British East African Protectorate in 1905 was 110,000 pounds as against 150,000 pounds in Tanzania (ibid).

This view of Charles Eliot, Governor of the East African Protectorate, does not seem to be accurate. It is true that the revenue of Tanzania was higher than the British East African Protectorate, but the Germans, in general, were slow to create a modern transport system. When Dernberg took over colonial affairs in 1906, the German railway system in the colonies was negligible in every territory except South West Africa (Gann, 1975 : 219). The Tanzanian interior at first depended to a considerable extent on the British Uganda Railway. In 1911 Tanzania was contributing 23% to the Uganda railroad's earnings, while 48% earnings came from the East African Protectorate and 27% from Uganda. (Hickman : 189)

However, the trend in the development of Tanzanian economy, as indicated in Table 2, clearly shows that her economy would have developed characteristics not of the 'maturity' which was anticipated, but of those enormous debt burdens which are associated with some of the Latin American countries (Yaffey) but for the First World War.

To make the colony economically beneficial the Germans had to resort to forced labour, at least until the outbreak of the Maji Maji rebellion. In Western Usambara, for instance, each *Shambala* was given a labour card which 'required him to spend 30 days within four months for a European or coloured to be exempted from public road construction. (Illife, 1969a : 136) Another example is Governor Gotzen's system of 'Collective Village Plots' on which 'all inhabitants of certain districts would be compelled to work for 12 days per year,

with the resulting income going into the public treasury. (Austen : 74) Thousands of men from Nyamwezi and Sukuma were forced-settled on the coast where they were bound to work for at least 90 days a year on the plantations. (ibid) This system, however, did not succeed because most of them moved to Kenya across the border for better wages. Thus Nyamwezi and Sukuma, which had participated in pre-German trade to the coast and the Zanzibar clove economy, got involved in labour migration to the plantation areas and the construction of the central railway.

The extension of central railway from Tabora to Kigoma involved the recruitment of 15-20,000 people from Ujiji (Egoro, 1974 : 8) presumably affecting the traditional economy of the area.<sup>12</sup> The removal of increasing number of peasants from this area, which was infected by sleeping sickness, to work in the colonial economy did affect the native economy.

Another area which was drawn into the labour migration was the Ngoni in South West Tanzania. To pay the taxes they had to engage in portage for colonialists. In 1899 the number of Ngoni portage labour was 2,500 and grew to 8,300 in 1903 (Egoro : 7) and they were recruited for trade between Songea and the coast. This region was hit hard by Maji Maji rebellion because in its aftermath most of their leaders were killed and Ngoni were left without any leadership. Their traditional economy was affected so badly that they had no choice but to join the labour force for plantations. It is important to note that this region is still one among the most backward regions of Tanzania. There are no statistics available about the labour migration from various regions during this period, but the example of Ngoni, Nyamwezi, and Sukuma do indicate that forced labour and labour migration, partly because of taxation, adversely affected the native economy.

The process of Tanzanian colonization or her incorporation in the world capitalist system was met with much resistance right from the beginning. This culminated into the Maji Maji rebellion, which was suppressed by the superior German force with an estimated loss

of 75,000 African lives. It has been argued by historians in recent years that Maji Maji was not primarily a religious movement as perceived by the Germans, rather the main reason was economic, i.e., the unpopular economic policies pursued by Gotzen. After the failure of cotton in the North, Gotzen ordered that on the South coast "a plot be established at the headquarters of each headman in the experimental area, on which each of the headman's adult male subjects would work for 28 days a year". (Illife, 1969a) This scheme threatened African economies far more seriously than any demand by the European settlers in the North. It not only interfered with subsistence farming of the natives in this area but the sums paid to the workers were so small that cotton became a major grievance. Later it was discovered that several rebel leaders were those who had suffered from the new cotton scheme.

The German claims of 'scientific colonialism'<sup>13</sup> in Tanzania seems to be partly correct when we look at the expansion of her trade between 1901 to 1912. In these six years exports multiplied by almost three times. Where did these cash-crops for export come from ?

TABLE 3  
Tanzania's Imports and Exports  
(in million marks)

	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
Imports	22.2	23.8	25.8	33.9	38.7	45.9	50.3
Exports	11.0	12.5	10.9	13.1	20.8	22.4	31.4
Total	33.2	36.3	36.7	47.0	59.5	68.3	81.7

Source : W.O. Henderson, German East Africa 1884-1918 in V. Harlow and A. Smith (eds.) *History of East Africa*, Vol. II, Oxford, 1965, p. 153.

These came from the sisal, rubber, and cotton plantations, which were owned solely by the settlers. In 1912 the production of cotton on 17 plantations amounted to 1,844 tons valued at 2,000,000 marks. (Henderson : 153) The export of rubber in 1911 was worth 4,700,000 marks, of which  $\frac{3}{4}$  came from 250 rubber estates. These rubber estates were established only after 1905 when the world price of rubber was soaring. The production of sisal, which amounted for only 1,368 Marks in 1906 rose to 7,359,000 in 1912. (Yaffey : 45).<sup>14</sup>

Tanzania, however, was unique in terms of the production of cash-crops by the native agricultural farmers who grew various cash-crops on their agricultural plots. Most of the coffee exported during this period was grown by the Africans in the Bukoba District. In the coastal regions the native farmers were responsible for most of Tanzania's export of copra, which amounted to 1,600,000 marks in 1912. The natives of Mwanza district produced  $\frac{3}{4}$  of ground-nuts which were exported (ibid).

Among the Tanzanian imports from Germany textiles were most important in the beginning, but fell to under a third after 1908. Instead, beginning with 1904 there was a heavy import of rice engineering equipment, iron rails and other railway equipment.

Looking at these trade relations and the development of railways in Tanzania during the German period we might argue that this is a classic example of dependency relations. The production of sisal, cotton, rubber etc., was very much oriented towards the needs of the German industries and the output of some of them had a secure market in the colony.

### **German Colonialism : a balance-sheet**

Colonialism develops inner contradictions and the contradictions of the German colonialism were apparent with the passage of time. For example, investment abroad (in the colonies) was conceived to sustain the rate of profit at home, aid the production of raw materials, and create a market for home industrial products directly or indirectly. This led to the infrastructural investment in

developing the railway system, though on a selected regional basis. Simultaneously taxation<sup>15</sup> was introduced to bring the natives into the wage-labour force away from their subsistence farming. Taxation, however, did not have the desired effect of creating an agricultural proletariat<sup>16</sup> since the natives, by and large, preferred to produce cash-crops on their agricultural plots rather than joining the plantation labour force. The development of the railway had an unanticipated effect. It helped the subsistence farmers to stay at their land and still be able to pay the taxes.

To preserve colonial rule on a permanent basis it was necessary for the Imperial Government to attract metropolitan capital to the colony and to provide it security. We have already noted the increase in private capital inflow into Tanzania by 1912-13. The Railways in Tanzania, were owned by German companies but the colonial state provided them all the necessary concessions. It should, however, be noted that the role of Tanzania at this stage was more that of the hope or the potential that motivated than that of the actual.

"The age of improvement" could be seen as the culmination of the contradictions of German colonialism. As Prof. Gann puts it :

Africans (were) encouraged to enter the market economy as workmen, and above all as producers of cash-crops. Government stimulate(d) peasant farming by creating a more adequate system of transport, by promoting education and research, by improving the administration and by protecting the rights of African employees. Coercion, whether direct or indirect, must give way to economic incentives. Only the government, not the settlers, could be expected to promote black advancement. (Gann, 1975 : 234-35)

Thus the natives were encouraged to grow cash-crops mainly in response to the growing difficulty of labour recruitment in plantations and the resistance that the Germans faced until 1905. The ideology of the colonial power, therefore, had a definite economic base.

The involvement of the natives in the production and export of

the cash-crops was considerable between 1910 and 1914. But it was to the comparative disadvantage of the natives since they were not only required to pay the export duty because of the existence of a preferential tariff for the benefit of the European planters, but also bore the burden of duties on the imported commodities.

Thus the Germans viewed Tanzania chiefly as the source of raw materials and an exclusive spheres of influence. One point needs to be emphasized to understand Tanzanian underdevelopment: the colonial authorities did not deliberately set out to underdevelop the colony. Quite the contrary, their entire effort was to develop it so that it could complement, though in a subordinate position, the metropolitan economy and society. "Under development was not the desired but the inevitable consequence of the inexorable working of colonialism of trade and its inner contradictions. For the same reasons, there was no imperialist theory of underdevelopment—underdevelopment was the result of the practice of particular theories of development". (Chandra, 1977 : 15)

Our discussion of the Tanzanian economy clearly indicate that the Germans did virtually nothing to integrate the economy of the territory, rather it was developed into a primary product export economy. This is exemplified in the fact that most parts of Southern Tanzania remained almost unapproachable, even for administrative purposes, at least for a few months a year due to the bad weather. Hardly any effort was made to interconnect the main east-west axes of the transportation system either through railways or feeder roads. The colonial policies created enclaves of cash-crop and food-producing regions, and the rest of the territory was left at the mercy of nature, which was hardly kind to the Tanzanians.

The growth of towns was not due to the industrialization but trade and administration. Trade within the country did not exist at any meaningful level since the economy was not geared towards the needs of the national market. Strange as it might sound, some parts of Tanzania were better linked with the international

nal market than the national market.

Peripheralization of Tanzania and the process of her integration in the world capitalist system, which was started by the Germans, was completed during the forty year British administration.

## V

The first world war seriously affected the economy of Tanzania. German East Africa was the sole territory in Africa where military operations lasted more than four years, 'thanks to the extraordinary personality of General Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck and to his decision to keep the greatest possible number of enemy troops occupied on African soil in order to prevent them from taking part in the war in Europe'. (Cornevin, 1969 : 415) The war left unforgettable memories on the mind of the Tanzanians, who gave this war the name of 'the last gentleman's war'.

During the war most of the German settlers left their plantations to join the Defence Force and a growing number of Africans were recruited for portage. Consequently, both the plantation and agricultural production suffered. Seven years after the end of the war the East African Commission reported that the 'task of reconstruction or restoring the wreckage of war has now been largely completed, but in such matters as education, medical work and scientific research the pre-war standard has not yet been reached'. (Henderson : 162) The disadvantage of developing a cash-crop economy was felt during the war years when, owing to the German inability to import food either from Europe or India, resulted not only in a shortage of food for Europeans but also starvation for thousands of Africans.

After the war the international status of the territory changed. This became clear only in 1920 when British administration in Tanzania was formally established. With the British administration begins a phase in Tanzanian economy which was marked by a) the low level of infrastructural investment and b) the development of



an economy which could be called a 'peripheral periphery', with Kenya as the peripheral centre. The Tanzanian economy of the inter-war and pre-independence era could be better understood by looking at the Customs Union between Kenya-Uganda and Tanzania that came into existence in August 1927 and the relative advantages that Kenya came to have over Tanzania. This ultimately shaped their respective economies.

The Germans had heavily relied for their income upon custom dues and hut and poll taxes. Indeed no economic improvement of the territory was possible until the productivity of the country had been stored. The production of sisal was at an all time low during 1918-20. Byatt's laissez-faire attitude towards native administration did not win him much popularity from the Europeans who were anxious to buy the extensive sisal plantations abandoned by the Germans. On the other hand, Byatt restored to Africans some land (30,000 acres) which had been alienated by the Germans.

The Tanganyika Land Ordinance of 1923 declared all the land to be public which was placed under the control of the Governor 'to be used for the common benefit of the indigenous population of the territory, having regard to native laws and customs'. (Ingham, 1965 : 555) The non-Africans, however, had the right to occupy up to 5,000 acres of land. In Kilimanjaro region the Chaggas were not dispossessed of their valuable coffee plots. In 1924 they formed a union of coffee growers named Kilimanjaro Planter's Association, much to the dissatisfaction of the Europeans. This began the process of further differentiation among the Tanzanians. The Kenyan Africans at this time were debarred from growing coffee.

On the positive side, Byatt's administration does not seem to have much to its credit. For the reconstruction of the territory only 316,000 pounds in 1920 and 92,109 pounds in 1921 were secured from the Imperial Treasury as a grant-in-aid (see Statistical Appendix 1). The extension of the Central Railway northward to reach the prosperous Lake Victoria region, the Tabora-Mwanza line, was not initiated until the arrival of Cameron as Governor.

Although Byatt is known for his pro-African policies, the terms of Land Ordinance of 1923 of which Byatt was the architect, appear to be contradictory. All land, whether occupied or not, was declared to be public land; yet this did not invalidate existing titles and interests which had been lawfully obtained, and it was specifically stated that existing customary rights should be protected.

Donald Cameron, the successor of Byatt, was ambivalent towards the settlers. He also lacked any positive economic policy for the territory. His ambivalence is quite explicit in the following two statements :

It has always occurred to me as a very strange thing that the material well-being was put before the moral well-being. In Tanganyika .....we are putting the moral and social progress first, the material well-being to follow afterwards. There is no reason why it should not follow just a few steps behind. (PRO 691/86)

In localities in which Natives cannot grow economic crops owing to lack of transport facilities, administrative officers can best serve the State by exhorting the Natives, through their chiefs, to adopt some form of active work, pointing out that, situated as they are, they can do so profitably by engaging to work for the Government or on the farms which are seeking their labour. (Cameron as Quoted in Egero, 1974 : 10)

During the inter-war period the British administrative policy was supposedly biased in favour of the Africans. Although the settler's contribution to the export economy was always significant, it was never overwhelming, as the following figures suggest :

TABLE 4  
Tanzania : Source of Agricultural Export, 1923-37(%)

	1923	1925	1927	1929	1931	1933	1935	1937
Africans	61	55	48	45	42	49	49	44
Sisal	25	26	40	45	49	40	40	50
Other non- African	14	19	12	10	9	11	11	6

Source : E A, Brett, <sup>1</sup>*Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, 1973, p. 222.



This should not lead us to believe that Tanzania was doing better as a mandated territory than a German colony. The reverse was the case. It was for the following reasons. 1) The war damages were repaired not before 1925 and when the Tanzanian economy started showing signs of improvement, the Great Depression took place; 2) despite the declared pro-African bias of the colonial administration the natives did not gain much because of the lack of any positive programme; 3) the doubts about the permanence of the British rule prejudiced the investment of capital and the undertaking of commercial enterprise; and 4) with the joining of the Customs Union in 1927 Tanzania's future economic development was sacrificed in favour of Kenya.

### **Customs Union**

From the very start of colonial administration, Kenya and Uganda formed parts of the customs administration.<sup>17</sup> In 1922 the Kenyan settlers were successful in persuading the administration to accept a policy of protection for locally produced temperate-climate foodstuffs. (Brett : 99) In common market the settlers saw another means of extracting a surplus from their neighbours. In 1923 an agreement was reached and the free interchange of the local products started.

The agreement was reached when Sir Robert Corydon, Governor of Kenya, visited Horace Byatt in November, 1922. Byatt, under great pressure, since the new Kenyan tariff had stopped the export of ghee and rice, stocks of which were accumulated at Mwanza, and Kenya was able to make the duty-free acceptance of these perishable goods conditional upon the whole package deal. (Yaffey : 231) Despite Byatt's resistance, a customs Union agreement was eventually brought into force on the orders of the British Secretary of State for the Colonies on 7th August, 1927. Then the free interchange of imported products started between Tanzania and Kenya-Uganda. In retrospect, we find that this customs Union was detrimental to the indigenous economic development and industrialization of Tanzania.

Within East Africa Kenya had certain natural advantages. Her ports, particularly Mombasa, had geological, if not climatic, superiority over the Tanzanian ports. (Uganda is land-locked.) Mombasa with two harbours, the Old Harbour and the Kilindini Harbour, was capable of taking modern vessels.<sup>18</sup> (Hoyles, 1967) This geological superiority of the Mombasa harbour coupled with the indifference of Tanzanian administration to the white settlers and their business interests resulted in the rapid development of Kenya. Thus Kenya became a trade centre within East Africa and various commercial and financial services relating to trade set up their headquarters in Nairobi and Mombasa. This process was further accelerated by the presence of a good number of white settlers in Kenya.

It is interesting to note that the British—the London, Manchester and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce—and the Joint East African Board strongly supported the creation of a full Customs Union. This was prejudicial to the interests of Tanzania because in drawing up the tariff and fixing the rates of import duties at a high level, the interests of Kenya were paramount. The free interchange of local goods between the three territories also favoured the two other partners at the expense of Tanzania. (Leubuscher : 102)<sup>19</sup>

Leubuscher (107) has calculated that in 1931 alone Tanzania suffered a loss in revenue of over 58,000 pounds owing to the free imports from Kenya and Uganda of the principal protected articles. The value of the customs Union to Tanzania was in finding a ready market in the adjoining territories for her produce, mainly rice, ghee and dried-fish. By 1933 the exports of ghee and rice, the Hirschman-linkage of which are relatively limited, amounted to about half of Tanzania's export to Kenya-Uganda. But the Tanzanian loss far outweighed her gains.

Between 1928 and 1931, for example, she lost 1,000 pounds per annum in custom revenue from bacon and ham owing to the customs union and the custom revenue from sugar declined within these three years to 1/9 of its former amount. This is indicated in Table 5.

TABLE 5  
Imports into Tanganyika  
Bacon and Ham

Year	Total Imports		From Kenya and Uganda		Customs Revenue	
	Cwts.	£	Cwts.	£	£	
1928	520	4,644	261	1,914	1,107	
1931	527	3,399	455	2,807	155	
1938	866	5,662	675	4,474	Negligible	
						<i>Revenue from Consump- tion Tax</i>
			<b>Sugar</b>			
1928	63,739	67,436	16,796	25,016	29,728	—
1931	68,741	70,661	63,320	67,233	3,322	—
1938	124,600	72,983	124,160	72,666	Negligible	20,685

*Source* : Charlotte Leubuscher, *Tanganyika Territory : a Study of Economic Policy under Mandate*, (Oxford University Press,) 1944, p. 108.

The export of domestic products from Kenya and Uganda was always higher than Tanzanian export to Kenya and Uganda. In case of some goods, the price set by Kenya was more than double the price in foreign markets. Because of this trade imbalance between Kenya and Tanzania the former was able to import more consumer goods from abroad which was at the cost of the latter. In the 1930s about 20-25% of Tanzania's imports were handled by Kenya. (see Statistical Appendix 2) The main beneficiaries of the union were the producers of protected products were mostly settlers in Kenya. Since they were being paid a subsidy by consumers in neighbouring territories, Tanzania was consistently disadvantaged. (Brett : 104)

Kenya's service exports were given a further artificial boost when the British Government started a War Risks Insurance Scheme to cover losses of stocks of merchandise through enemy action. This was first introduced for Kenya and Uganda and later for Tanzania but with higher premia. These circumstances gave merchants an incentive to stock their wares in Kenya rather than Tanzania. It is hard, however, to determine its effect on the economy of either Kenya or Tanzania.

In 1932 a postal union between Tanzania and her two neighbours in the north was established. By this time Germany had re-emerged under Hitler's leadership and the postal union provided Germany with an opportunity to criticize British policy. There was a general concern about the status of Tanzania around this time and it was apprehended by many British residents that the Territory might be transferred to Germany. This kind of a political situation was hardly encouraging to the European investors to set up an enterprise in Tanzania.

At the end of the Second World War the three territories were associated with one another in a number of ways. In the first place they constituted a common market. The second form of association was the common currency and the common participation in the East African Currency Board. Thirdly, the three territories shared a number of common services which came to be administered by the newly created East African High Commission. The creation of these new institutions further peripheralized Tanzania within East Africa.

It has been observed by Elkan and Nulty (1976 : 334) that between 1948 and 1961 Tanzania developed more slowly than Kenya or Uganda partly because of her economic ties with them. The volume of intercountry trade in domestic produce and manufactures increased very fast after World War II. Tanzania's intercountry trade between 1954 and 1958 rose from 1.22 million pounds to 2.59 million pounds as against Kenya's 5.53 and 10.75 million pounds and Uganda's 5.76 and 4.83 million pounds. Inter-country trade in foreign imported goods was also to Tanzania's disadvantage.

TABLE 6.1  
Direct Imports, Net Imports and Net Transfers, 1956-63

					KENYA		
					(£ thousand)		
					<i>Direct Imports</i>	<i>Net Imports</i>	<i>Net Transfers</i>
1956	...	...	...	...	84,615	69,823	+14,792
1957	...	...	...	...	87,995	72,003	+15,992
1958	...	...	...	...	77,029	60,869	+16,160
1959	...	...	...	...	78,820	61,508	+17,312
1960	...	...	...	...	89,971	70,069	+19,902
1961	...	...	...	...	88,672	68,937	+19,735
1962	...	...	...	...	91,254	69,494	+21,760
1963	...	...	...	...	96,398	73,688	+22,710
					UGANDA		
1956	...	...	...	...	16,185	28,106	-11,921
1957	...	...	...	...	17,603	28,869	-11,266
1958	...	...	...	...	15,782	27,002	-11,220
1959	...	...	...	...	14,338	25,534	-11,196
1960	...	...	...	...	14,422	26,030	-11,608
1961	...	...	...	...	14,850	26,546	-11,696
1962	...	...	...	...	14,164	26,206	-12,042
1963	...	...	...	...	18,213	30,922	-12,709
					TANGANYIKA		
1956	...	...	...	...	33,013	35,885	-2,872
1957	...	...	...	...	34,548	39,275	-4,727
1958	...	...	...	...	28,630	33,568	-4,938
1959	...	...	...	...	28,339	34,455	-6,116
1960	...	...	...	...	29,523	37,817	-8,294
1961	...	...	...	...	31,648	39,686	-8,038

					<i>Direct Imports</i>	<i>Net Imports</i>	<i>Net Transfers</i>
1962	...	...	...	...	30,099	39,817	-9,718
1963	...	...	...	...	30,418	40,418	-10,000

Source : *Annual Trade Reports*.

TABLE 6.2

## Net Transfers as % of Direct or Net Imports, 1956-63

					KENYA <sup>a</sup>	UGANDA <sup>b</sup>	TANGA- NYIKA <sup>b</sup>
1956	...	...	...	...	-17.7	+42.4	+ 8.0
1957	...	...	...	...	-18.2	+39.0	+12.0
1958	...	...	...	...	-21.0	+41.6	+14.7
1959	...	...	...	...	-22.0	+43.8	+17.8
1960	...	...	...	...	-22.1	+44.6	+21.9
1961	...	...	...	...	-22.3	+44.1	+20.3
1962	...	...	...	...	-23.8	+46.0	+24.4
1963	...	...	...	...	-23.6	+41.1	+24.7

a.—Per cent of direct imports.

b.—Per cent of net imports.

Source : *Annual Trade Reports*.

As Table 6.1 indicates, the flow of these transfers was mainly in one direction—from Kenya to Tanzania and Uganda. (Ndegwa : 32) In 1963 nearly 24% of Kenya's direct imports were subsequently transferred to Tanzania and Uganda. Again, the volume and relative importance of the trade have been increasing steadily over these years. Thus whereas in 1956 the net transfer from Kenya to Tanzania was only 2.9 million pounds or 8% of Kenya's net imports by 1963 these figures were 10.0 million pounds and 24.7% respectively. (Table 6.1) The trade balance of Tanzania with both Kenya and Uganda had always been in deficit. (see Statistical Appendix 2, Table 2.4)



We can only speculate how Tanzania might have done without the closer union with Kenya-Uganda. But the picture that emerges out of our discussion is rather unfavourable to her economic development. The popular notion among the economists—Hirschman's linkage theory—that a poor country could gain more by being closely integrated with the economy of neighbouring countries does not hold good in the case of Tanzania and her economic development.

### **Infrastructural and Agricultural Change**

Unlike Germany, Britain did not use Tanzania as an outlet for capital investment and they were not very interested in selling manufactured goods, but were mostly interested in taking out certain raw materials. During the German period, the infrastructural developments, especially railways, the expansion of agriculture, and the provision of some training to produce the clerks needed, were all as advanced as in Kenya and Uganda.

During both German and British administrations' the major portion of the capital raised by loan was spent on railway construction. But the British administration during the inter-war period added only 350 miles of railway to the existing 996 miles when the mandate was established. The total Tanzanian debt upto 1938 amounted to 8.8 million pounds, which was almost exactly the debt of the German colony in 1914. Under the British administration Tanzania had two additional disadvantages : 1) the annual debt charges were considerably higher under the mandate (436,000 pounds compared to German 317,500 pounds) and 2) the infrastructural development was much lower.

From the very beginning of the British administration, the plans for the development of Tanzanian railways met with opposition from the Kenyan settlers and the administration. For example, the proposal of a branch line connecting Tabora to Mwanza was strongly opposed by the Kenyan administration because of the likely decline of the Tanzanian traffic and even the fear that Uganda might be able to force competition through Mwanza.<sup>20</sup> Although this branch line was completed in 1928 no independent lake steamer services were deve-

loped. Hence Kenya's system continued to carry more than 2/3 of Tanzania's Lake Province exports. (Brett : 98) This continued to be against the economic interests of Tanzania. For instance, in 1939 the Tanzanian administration paid to Kenya 93,200 pounds after covering out-of-pocket costs. (ibid.)

During the inter-war period the Northern Line was extended from Moshi to Arusha, a predominantly settler's region. There was also an effort to extend the central line southward, but it never came through. The development of the railway system was largely based on : 1) consideration for the interests of export-oriented sectors of economy and 2) the distribution of the overwhelming consumer and manufactured goods from overseas, mainly Britain, which was carried out in the reverse direction from the ports to the consumption centres in the interior.

Internal trade in the country was insignificant since the whole economy was not geared towards the needs of the national market. Hofmeier (1973 : 88-100) has rightly argued that until the last decade of the colonial period no attempts for closer economic links between different parts of the country were made. This could be seen in the fact that necessary prerequisites in the transport sector were not created on which a closer economic integration could have been based. Therefore, if Bukoba and Kilimanjaro developed into regions of cash-crop or African commercial agriculture, it was mainly due to the transport facilities they had. All these developments had the necessary consequence of unbalanced regional development. The regions which developed during the colonial period had better transport system. In 1967, for example, only 12 districts were above the national average of GDP per capita and only one out of them is not situated along either Tanga or Central Line (Hofmeier : 93). This was Mtwara District which forms the immediate hinterland of an ocean port.

In 1934 a branch of Central Line was opened between Manyoni and Kinyangiri. This was a failure and the whole project was aban-

done after the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War the railway system in Tanzania was no better than what it was in German days. Ehrlich (1976 : 325) has argued that the British were not able to improve the railway system because of the phenomenal increase in the cost of construction after the Great Depression. This argument, however, obscures the benign neglect of the British administration for economic development of Tanzania all those years.

In the early post-war years an attempt was made to construct a new branch of the Central Line from Maluwa to Mpanda where lead was being mined. This line, being economically not viable, was closed in 1961 since it was discovered that the lead deposit was smaller than had been estimated. Two other railway projects, which were undertaken as part of the Groundnut Scheme were also to be abandoned in due course. These were : (a) a short branch from the central line at Msagali to Hogoro through Kongwa and (b) the construction of the Southern Province Railway from the new port of Mtwara to Nachingwea.

Virtually no effort was made to interconnect the country through feeder roads. Beginning in 1950 attention was paid to the improvement of road transport, but the government concentrated on building first class roads. Their cost per mile was quite high and was not very functional given the transportation needs of the country. It was close to independence that the government decided to encourage the improvement and expansion of feeder roads at much lower unit costs. (Ehrlich, 1976 : 325).

The dependence on the colonial metropolis was one major indicator of Tanzania's underdevelopment. The term 'underdevelopment' is used here in a specific sense i.e. structural underdevelopment—the evolution of certain social and economic structures characteristic of underdeveloped areas, which tend to be self-perpetuating. (Illife, 1971 : 28).

As we have noted, Tanzania's economy was controlled from outside and was developed into a primary producing economy. The

prices of commodities always depended on the fluctuations in the international market. Therefore, the Great Depression affected the price of Tanzanian sisal, coffee, and cotton drastically. The value of Bukoba coffee exports between 1929 and 1933 fell from 59 to 20 pounds per ton ; the price of sisal dropped from 32 pounds in 1929 to 11 pounds in 1932. The price of sisal rose to 23 pounds a ton during a temporary recovery in 1937, but fell to 14 pounds when a renewed depression shook America in 1938 (ibid).

The introduction of certain cash-crops in various regions was subject to many factors. Both the Germans and British used compulsion to grow cotton in Sukumaland which they needed. On the other hand, in 1930 the government decided to encourage tobacco in Songea as a cash-crop to replace the income from migrant labour which was no longer available to the Ngoni owing to a depression in the sisal industry. Yet in another region—Pangani Valley—the government discouraged cotton production in order to insure the sisal estates a supply of food and labour. (Illife, 1971 : 20) Even today Pangani valley is one of the few fertile areas where no major cash-crop is grown. By the 1930s, (Illife 1971 : 30) writes :

Tanganyika was divided into three types of economic regions. First, there were regions which specialized in production for export : the sisal estates, the main cash crop areas, and the towns. These were surrounded by a second category of regions which supplied the export-producing regions with food and other services : Uzaramo, Uluguru, and Ruvuji supplying food to Dar-es-Salaam ; Bonde, Ukeguru, and Ulunga supplying cattle for the Tanga and Korogwe markets ; and so on. Finally, spreading out beyond the export and food producing regions were peripheral regions which either supplied migrant labour or stagnated in near-isolation from the territorial economy. This pattern of regional specialization—all of it focussed ultimately on export production—is one of the main characteristics of an underdeveloped economy.

TABLE 7  
Per Capita Monetary Gross Farm Output by Region (1967)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Monetary Gross Farm Output (Marketed agricultural production and livestock sales) Per Capita 1967</i>
Arusha	167
Coast	86
Dodoma	34
Iringa	105
Kigoma	35
Kilimanjaro	277
Mara	64
Mbeya	70
Morogoro	158
Mtwara	67
Mwanza	101
Ruvuma	57
Shinyanga	97
Singida	28
Tabora	84
Tanga	212
West Lake	75

*Source : Tanzania : Second Five Year Plan for Economic and  
Social Development, Vol. III : Regional Perspective in  
Strategy of Planning for Regions, p. 9.*

This pattern of regional variation, as outlined by Iliffe, has been reproducing itself. The regions which were neglected during the colonial period still remain among the most underdeveloped areas. This could be further illustrated by the regional variation in the economic condition of the rural population in 1967 in terms of per capita Monetary Gross Farm Output in Table 7.

We find that the regions of high monetary output are along the major communication line. The differential between Kilimanjaro

(Shs. 277) and Singida (Shs. 28) is mainly because of an unbalanced export-oriented development of the economy during the colonial period. It is for the same reason that *Ujamaa* has been relatively successful in the under-developed regions like Kigoma, Singida, and Ruvuma but not so successful in the prosperous regions like Kilimanjaro or Morogoro.

Because of the monopoly of certain foreign firms (mostly British, like Ralli Bros. with a large number of subsidiaries) the price paid to the African farmers for their cash crops has always been much less than the international price. Ehrlich (1976 : 300) has estimated that between 1940 and 1948 the Tanzanian sisal producers lost 11,000,000 pounds by being forced to accept prices which were consistently below world levels. To quote him, "this loss to the industry and, by implication, to the Tanzania government revenue, appears to be a fairly clear example of 'exploitation' by the metropolitan power, and the erosion of its profits seriously weakened the sisal industry's ability to replace and develop capacity". (ibid.)

Therefore, the argument that colonialism brought home 'development' and 'modernization' tends to ignore the economic exploitation that went along with colonial rule, not to mention the moral and psychological degradation. Bauer (1975 : 633) has gone as far to argue that the African colonies in East, West and Central Africa developed rapidly over the colonial period and he posits that "it is untrue that the colonial status as such produced economic progress". In an attempt to substantiate this point he compares the conditions in colonial Africa with those of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand while 'they were colonies in their early history', and concludes that colonial status and economic development are not necessarily contradictory. Needless to say, this kind of argument is very superficial since it does not take into consideration (a) the social effect of colonialism on a particular society, (b) the development of structural underdevelopment and (c) the nature and form of exploitation by the metropolitan power.

Although Tanzania was not a battle field in the Second World War, she suffered the necessary consequences of being governed by Britain. Her contribution to the war lay mainly in supplying man-

power and raw materials. During the war years, the natives tended to move away from the cash economy towards a subsistence way of life. Tanzanian imports fell severely from a level which had already been low even by the standards of tropical Africa,<sup>21</sup> resulting in a falling standard of living.

Fall in imports also led to depreciation of the country's exiguous capital assets. In 1940 the introduction of a tax on income over 350 pounds per annum further discouraged any private investment within Tanzania. At the end of the war the government lacked not only revenue to undertake any developmental plan, but also staff and supplies.

Immediately before World War II, problems of land exhaustion, overgrazing and soil erosion had become increasingly apparent. After the war, the government pursued two new agricultural policies : (a) the policy of compulsory rehabilitation and balanced land usage between 1945 and 1955 ; and (b) changing the customary land tenure to individual free hold in 'appropriate areas' beginning in 1955. The rationale for the individual free-hold put forward by the government was that "communal land tenure no longer facilitated development because cash-cropping and population growth were reducing soil fertility, since individuals would not adequately safeguard land unless they personally owned it." (Illife; 1971 : 38)

The Groundnut Scheme of 1946 was a 'desperate' attempt at mechanized farming in Tanzania. This scheme, which was supposed to play an important role in the economic development of Tanzania, was primarily conceived to earn scarce dollars to help revive the war-torn British economy. From the very beginning the whole plan was ill-conceived and unsuited to the Tanzanian natural conditions. Because of the shortage of oils and fats in the domestic market of Britain it was planned that eighty units, 30,000 acres each, would be producing groundnut through mechanised farming. The failure of the scheme discredited massive capital investment in agriculture. Although the plan was not formally abandoned, 36 million pounds was written off in 1951. This amount was a little less than the total expenditure of Tanzania's government between 1946-1950. (Ehrlich, 1964 : 270) The failure of the Groundnut Scheme, therefore, had a

considerable strain on the Tanzanian economy and it did hamper her economic development.

The economy of Tanzania remained very much a classical open economy, at least in theory. In practice it was always dominated by the British commercial interests, if not directly then through Kenya. There was very little development in the import substituting industries. This was partly because of the industrial development taking place in Kenya and the existence of a common market between Kenya and Tanzania. Thus by 1961 manufacturing industry was responsible for only 3% of the GNP in Tanzania, as opposed to 12% in Kenya. (Cliffe, 1975 : 168).

Education was completely neglected. According to the British Government estimates, 15.5% of the Tanzanian children went to school in 1947 and 30% in 1953. (Samoff, 1976 : 2) The effect of this education policy could be seen in the statistics of school attendance in the recent year. For instance, in 1970, less than half of the children of school age had the opportunity to attend even primary grades, as opposed to almost 2/3 in Kenya. (ibid.)

#### **British Administration : a Balance-Sheet :**

The contradictions in the British administration in Tanzania became manifest with the decline in Britain's economy resulting from the Second World War. The changes in land policy after 1945 were a total negation of the earlier British policy pursued by Byatt and Cameron. Now economic development took priority over the needs and the consent of the Africans. Land could be alienated as long as it would 'benefit the country' and as long as 'it was utilized to the maximum' by its occupier. The Meruland case, in which about 3,000 Wameru were evicted from their land to make room for European settlement, resembles quite closely the German policy of land alienation around the turn of this century.

There was no attempt whatsoever to diversify the Tanzanian economy. She remained dependent on the three crops : sisal, coffee, and cotton, the prices of which fluctuated mostly to Tanzania's disadvantage. Tanzania looks to be a classic case of metropole-neglect in economic affairs. Her peripheralization, was for



the following reasons : (1) Agricultural development was neglected and nothing was done to improve the irrigation system ; (2) the level of transport infrastructural development was very low ; (3) there was no independent Banking system ;<sup>22</sup> (4) the creation of customs Union was eventually to her disadvantage ; (5) despite the U.N. discussions, little was done to build an educational system ;<sup>23</sup> (6) no reliance was placed upon the market's ability to stimulate food production and adjust supply to demand ; (7) taxation law of 1940 further discouraged investments and (8) rarely was nature kind to Tanzania.


### **Post-Colonial Tanzania : Colonial Legacy**

In 1961 Tanzania inherited its basic position within the international community from the colonial relationship. In the immediate post-independence years the control over decision-making in the national economy was in the hands of experts and expatriates. The colonial institutional framework reinforced these dependency relations : (a) import bias towards the U.K., (2) Commonwealth preferences on sisal and other products tended to attract Tanzania's major exports to Britain and (3) all foreign aid was accepted, whatever the terms. Nor did Tanzania attract any significant foreign capital because her economy lacked any industrial structure, developed capitalist relations of production, a wide consumer market and important minerals—most of which was the result of the colonial period.

On the eve of Tanzania's independence in 1961 the East African High Commission was replaced by the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO). The structure of EACSO was not substantially different from that of its predecessor and Kenya remained its headquarters. Nyerere was quite enthusiastic about greater integration of the three East African countries. But the abortive Kampala Agreement, which attempted to allocate new industries to each country and never ratified by Kenya, was an eye-opener to the Tanzanians about the realities of closer economic links with the neighbouring countries. However, a new treaty was concluded in 1967 between the three partners, which redistributed

the headquarters of the institutions of the East African Community. Meanwhile Tanzania's trade balance continued to be in favour of Kenya and Uganda (see Statistical Appendix 2) and she had to stay at the receiving end within the Community.

In 1969 a Free Trade Agreement was concluded between the EEC and East African Community. This gave preferential treatment



Source : Timothy M. Shaw, "African States and International Stratification : the adaptive foreign policy of Tanzania" in K. Ingham (ed.), *Foreign Relations of African States*, (London : Butterworths, 1974).

to consumer goods (e.g. cigarettes, sugar, paper, film, malt, toilet goods etc.) imported from the EEC countries, and, in return, Community member's primary products (like coffee, pineapples and cloves) received preferential treatment in the market of EEC countries. (Mbiliyi, 1973) Considering Tanzania, and not the Community itself, we find that the new institutional arrangement of international trade has worked contrary to her interests. This is indicated in Diagrams 1 and 2 that Tanzania's imports from the EEC countries increased quite rapidly, while her exports show a very small increase. If we

include Britain among the EEC countries for our analysis (after the latter's enlargement Tanzania's dependence for trade on the EEC will appear to be of a much higher degree. This situation reminds us of Nkrumah's description of the EEC as a "new system of collective colonialism, which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils". (Nkrumah, 1965) His fear that Africa would be balkanized and would be reduced to the position of producing raw materials for and importing Europe's manufactured goods seems to be partly true in case of Tanzania.

In early 1975 a new agreement was signed between the members of the European Community and 46 ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, Tanzania being one of the signatories. This agreement—the Lome Convention—is a successor to the Yaounde Convention which lapsed in 1975. Galtung (1976) has argued that poor countries like Tanzania will have nothing to gain out of such international trade agreements. The present state of the Tanzanian economy proves the wisdom of such an analysis. Tanzania had her worst balance of payments deficits in the past couple of years. This has been mainly due to the steep rise in the oil price since 1974 and her poor performance in exports.

Despite her socialist policies and her closer economic ties with China the performance of the Tanzanian economy in the recent years has been far from satisfactory. Her dependence on the West is quite prominent. Othman (1976 : 13-14) sums up the Tanzanian economy saying that "48% of Tanzania's imports in 1972 came from the developed capitalist countries, while 61% of her exports in 1971 went to them (Britain alone takes 24% of the country's trade with the outside world) ; consumer goods accounted for 27% of the value of all imports in 1971 ; five primary products—coffee, sisal, cloves, tea and diamonds—accounted for 59% of the value of exports in 1972 ; services have grown more quickly than industries and construction, so that in 1972, 43% of the GDP were accounted for by services, the equivalent figures for industries and construction were 25% and 20½ respectively ; foreign company still have large holdings in public corporations ; and under agreements whereby multinational corporations provide management services to parastatal organizations,

the MNCs get commission fees, percentages of turnover and profits, royalties on patents as well as purchase of machinery and equipment from their subsidiaries".

It is not within the scope of this paper to go into details of Tanzania's post-Arusha<sup>24</sup> policies and their merit. But we would like to underscore that Tanzania, despite her declared principles, remains very much dependent on the international structure of trade and economic aid. This seriously undermines the efforts of the Tanzanian leadership to move towards socialism or build a more just, equitable and egalitarian society. Because of the obvious limitation of her resources, Tanzania cannot profess autarky and her options, consequently, are quite limited.

### Conclusion

From the above discussion it follows that during both the German and British periods the development of Tanzanian economic infrastructure was dependent on the needs of the metropolises. In the development of transport infrastructure particularly, only those transport axes were improved that enabled transportation of the export crops from the main production area to the ocean ports since during all these years the whole economic policy was oriented towards supporting and encouraging the production of exportable primary products. This specialization of Tanzania in a primary producing economy has been reproducing itself.

In order to be able to develop, a poor country must trade. The only trading commodity that Tanzania could produce is cash crop. The existing international trade, therefore, has been reinforcing this dependency relation of importing technology, consumer goods, and skilled man-power and exporting primary commodities, at very unfavourable terms of trade, to earn foreign exchange.

The Customs Union since the early 1920s was aimed at protecting and fostering the white-settler economy of central Kenya, and the infant industrial base that was to be created in Kenya's capital, Nairobi. Those who only look at the level of present economic development in Kenya and compare that

with Tanzania tend to ignore the historical development of their respective economy. Indicators like average per capita income conceal the inner differentials within a particular society. Even in the case of Kenya, with a 33 pound average per capita income as against a 26 pound in Tanzania, the real gains of industrialization and economic development have not gone to the native population but to the foreign private investors. The actual per capita income of the black Kenyans would be as much as in Tanzania.

The regional imbalance and the low level of infrastructural development in Tanzania is a legacy of the colonial past. The strategy of development followed by Tanzania since 1967 may not bring material prosperity to the Tanzanians in the short-run, but in the long-run this seems to be the only viable alternative to minimize extreme dependence on the West and build a just, equitable, and egalitarian society.

**Statistical Appendix 1**  
*Total Revenue and Expenditure*

(in Pounds)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>
1917-18	337,325	167,698
1918-19	461,842	383,097
1919-20	669,097	790,026
1920-21	1,262,844*	1,389,354
1921-22	1,070,301**	1,807,890
1922-23	1,228,586	1,811,872
1923-24	1,315,188	1,901,158
1924-25	1,558,982	1,747,578
1925-26	1,975,400	2,235,624
1926-27	2,202,908	2,629,411
1927-28	2,535,237	3,229,679
1928-29	1,972,858	2,425,439
1929-30	1,992,675	2,548,178
1930-31	1,749,478	2,347,028

(Contd.)

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<i>Years</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>
1931-32	1,522,368	1,820,928
1933	1,564,116	1,655,163
1934	1,720,285	1,871,496
1935	1,973,863	1,750,068
1936	2,206,416	2,029,823
1937	2,345,004	2,201,127
1938	2,113,298	2,223,896
1939	2,133,345	2,388,821
1940	2,308,108	2,555,915
1941	2,674,558	2,550,190
1942	3,146,939	3,132,026
1943	3,729,766	3,725,042
1944	4,207,397	4,180,939
1945	4,768,465	4,756,258
1946	5,147,000	5,140,000

\*Includes grant-in-aid by Imperial Treasury of 316,000 pounds.

\*\*Includes grant-in-aid of 92,109 pounds.

**Tanzania's Revenue and Expenditure (continued)**

(in thousands of pounds)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Territorial Budget</i>		<i>Developmental Budget</i>	
	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>
1947	5,777	5,665	236	424
1948	6,965	6,382	923	996
1949	5,856	7,772	1,742	1,687
1950	10,397	10,123	2,927	3,439
1951	11,931	12,305	4,348	3,830
1952	16,430	15,878	4,896	4,989
1953	14,728	14,724	3,518	3,726
1954	9,133	9,005	1,588	1,601
(half-year)				

<i>Years</i>	<i>Territorial Budget</i>		<i>Developmental Budget</i>	
	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>
1954-55	19,277	17,700	3,688	3,711
1955-56	18,680	19,532	4,214	4,084
1956-57	17,492	18,157	5,282	5,282
1957-58	18,834	18,697	5,454	5,454
1958-59	19,412	19,527	5,159	3,939
1959-60	22,066	21,154	3,939	5,613
1960-61	21,355	21,267	5,672	7,341
1961-62	21,885	24,710	3,448	5,674
1962-63	25,028	31,082	6,054	7,263

*Source :* The South and East African Year Book and Guide, (London, 1933, 1947, 1949), and D.A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, Vol. III, (Oxford, 1976).

TABLE 2.1

## Statistical Appendix 2

Tanganyika : Trade with Kenya and Uganda, 1926-38 (£ 000s)

	<i>Imports from</i>	<i>Exports to</i>	<i>Balance</i>
1926	135	145	+ 10
1927	179	146	—33
1928	140	140	0
1929	195	122	—73
1930	178	119	—57
1931	173	89	—84
1932	164	104	—60
1933*	154	143	—11

1934	251	205	-46
1935	258	181	-77
1936	226	179	-46
1937	300	216	-84
1938	320	227	-94

*Source : Annual Report, 1932 pp. 130, 131, 133; 1935, pp. 179-80; 1936, pp. 203-4; 1938, pp. 205-6.*

\*Figures for 1933 not strictly comparable, drawn from Governors' Conference Memorandum, *Review of position regarding customs tariffs, suspended duties, etc.*, May 1934. This probably underestimates the deficit, since the figures it gives for 1931 and 1932 are lower than those given above.

TABLE 2.2

**Tanganyika : Trade with Kenya and Uganda in Protected Goods  
1934-8 (£000s)**

	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Balance</i>
1934	165	174	+ 9
1935	178	137	-41
1936	149	129	-20
1937	190	158	-32
1938	202	166	-36

*Source : Annual Reports, 1935-8.*

TABLE 2.3

**Tanganyika : Trade with Kenya and Uganda in Locally Processed  
Goods, 1934-8 (£000s)**

	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Balance</i>
1934	86	82	- 4
1935	91	42	- 49
1936	111	20	- 91
1937	141	14	-127
1938	143	10	-133

*Source : Annual Reports, 1935-8.*



TABLE 2.4  
**Statistical Appendix 2 (continued)**  
**Trade Balance of Tanzania with East African Countries**  
*(in Tanzanian million shillings)*

Years	Kenya			Uganda			Total		
	Imp.	Ex.	Bal.	Imp.	Ex.	Bal.	Imp.	Ex.	Bal.
1962	307	56	-151	35	9	-26	65	242	-177
1967	231	62	-163	49	15	-34	83	280	-197
1968	261	74	-187	41	17	-24	91	302	-211
1969	257	80	-177	34	24	-10	104	291	-187
1970	295	119	-176	40	29	-11	148	335	-187
1971	295	159	-136	16	38	+22	197	311	-114
1972	326	118	-208	6	15	+9	133	332	-199
1973	337	152	-185	2	18	+16	170	339	-169
1974	419.0	191.4	-227.6	0.2	26.2	+26.0	419.2	217.6	-201.6

*Source:* Tanzania Hali ya Uchumi Wa Taifa Katika Mwaka 1974-75 (Tanzania Economic survey), Kimepigwa chapa na kiwanda cha vchapaji cha Taifa, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania 1975, p. 20.

### FOOTNOTES

1. In 1970 the United States alone with 7% of world's population-accounted for more than 30% of total mobilized wealth of the world. The other four countries considered major powers (the Soviet Union, China, Japan and India) together with the United States account for 57% of the world's mobilized wealth. If we add Britain, France; the two Germanies, Poland, Canada, Egypt and Indonesia, we discover that the 13 named countries alone account for almost 77% of the world's mobilized wealth. This means that the more than 120 other countries divide among themselves less than 25% of the remainder of the world's wealth. Tanzania had a per capita GNP of \$ 100, whereas Ghana had a per capita GNP of \$ 249.

2. Although poverty is often accompanied by a condition of underdevelopment, the two are not necessarily coterminous. Underdevelopment is a historical conditioning—a structural relationship between the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the metropolises—which may enjoy various degree of poverty (e.g. Upper Volta and Brazil), while poverty is simply a relative term

based on values which can be measured by concepts and categories specific to a particular conjuncture, e.g. poor in terms of doctors/1000 inhabitants, consumption of electricity k.w./per capita. This is the difference between the approach of the dependency theorists and people like Gunnar Myrdal respectively.

3. See : S.N. Eisentadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966; Neil E. Smelser, "Mechanisms of change and adjustment to change" in B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore (eds), *Industrialization and Society*, Paris: UNESCO/Mouton, 1963; Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship*, New York: Wiley, 1964; W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Andrew M. Kamarack has now advanced the hypothesis that the underdevelopment of the Third World is mainly because of their location. Being in the tropics, he argues, has presented the developing countries with a set of complex obstacles that are different in kind and far more difficult to overcome than those which were faced by today's industrialized countries in the course of their economic development. See Andrew M. Kamarack, *The Tropics and Development. A provocative inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

4. The characteristic feature of imperialism, according to Lenin, is not industrial capital, but finance capital.

5. According to Samir Amin, relations between the formations of the centre and periphery are affected by transfers of value, and these constitute the essence of the problem on accumulation on a world scale. The transfer of values takes place whenever the capitalist mode of production enters into relations with precapitalist modes of production, and subjects these to itself. The transfers of value takes place from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist formation as a result of the mechanism of primitive accumulation. These mechanisms do not belong only to the pre-history of capitalism, they are contemporary as well. It is these forms of primitive accumulation, modified but persistent, to the advantage of the center, that form the domain of the theory of accumulation on the world scale. Emmanuel contends that exploitation is hidden in the prices at which commodities from the periphery are exchanged for commodities from the core. This unequal exchange stems from the different wage structures in the core and the peripheries. For details see the following works: Samir Amin, a) *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, Vols. 1 and 2, Monthly Review Press, 1974; b) *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*, Monthly Review Press, 1976; c) *L' Afrique de l' Ouest bloquee* Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange* MRP, 1972.; Jairus Brnaji, 'Backward Capitalism, Primitive Accumulation and Modes of Production; *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1973.

6. An example of the functioning of the international organization is the I.M.F. and Chile has recently been borrowing from the I.M.F. short-term loans in order to pay the long-term loans. This clearly indicates that the International Organizations serve the interests of the center more than the peripheries.

7. Anti-elitism and austere living of the Tanzanian leaders could not be compared with Amílcar Cabral's notion of the ruling elite committing 'class suicide'.

8. Tanzania has had several names. For the sake of convenience only the name Tanzania has been used in this paper to refer to the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Tanzania. During the German period Tanzania along with Rwanda and Burundi formed German East Africa. After the First World War it was called Tanganyika until 26 April 1964, when as a consequence of the union with Zanzibar it became the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. A year later it became the United Republic of Tanzania.

9. Minerals played a minor role in the economy of Tanzania. Before the First World War, the recovery of gold and mica in small, scattered operations was the principal mining activity. There were subsequent discoveries of various other minerals, but their exploitation was held back by the world economic depression in the 1930s and by the dislocation of the Second World War. After World War II the production of several minerals—diamond and gold in particular—increased. In 1959 diamond accounted for roughly 2/3 and gold 1/6 of the total value of all mineral production. (IBRD: 253) The production of gold and diamond has decreased considerably since then. In the late 40s lead was also being mined near Mpanda. The deposits of lead, however, were found to be so small that it could not sustain the running cost of a branch of the Central line from Maluwa to Mpanda. Recently the Chinese engineers have discovered some coal reserves in southern Tanzania. The exact potentials of the coal reserves have not yet been assessed and those coal deposits are yet to be exploited.

10. For a detailed discussion of the slave trade in East Africa see E. Alpers, *The East African Slave Trade*, Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 3, Nairobi, 1967.

11. There were exceptions to the communal mode of economic organizations. A notable exception was the West Lake, Kilimanjaro and Usambara regions were, because of the introduction of bananas, land became scarce and hence a struggle for its control, which manifested itself in the gradual emergence of feudal oligarchies in these areas. The *nyarubanja* system of land tenure in West Lake is an example of this development. Under this system of land tenure the peasants were deprived of their land by the ruling elite who could extract from the former both produce and services in return for security. This system, however, was not pervasive.

## Tanzania : The Colonial Experience

12. Colonialism also meant for the Ujiji people the establishment of an international border in Lake Tanganyika and the disruption of traditional pattern of trade with the Congo. For details see G.C.K. Gwassa, *Kigoma Region : a Colonial labour reserve*, History Seminar paper, University of Dar-es-Salaam, January 1974; for a discussion of the Fishing industry and the economy of Ujiji and Kigoma see: Dean E. McHenry, Jr., 'The Underdevelopment Theory: a Case Study from Tanzania', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1976.

13. The term 'scientific colonialism' has been mostly used by the Anglo-American scholars e.g. Mary E. Towsend's use of the term 'Scientific Colonization'. The Germans never called their colonial policy to be scientific. What this, however, means is that after the crucial German parliamentary elections in 1906, the German Government decided that the experimental period of mistakes, of graft, of concessions, and of individual license must be left, of concessions, and of individual license must be left behind and an efficient, scientific, and economic rule inaugurated in its stead.

14. Of the 54 sisal plantations in 1910 the largest producers were the *Sisal-Agaven-Gesellschaft* of Dusseldorf and the *Deutsche Agaven Gesellschaft* of Berlin.

15. Under the Germans a native House and Hut Tax had been levied from 1897 to 1912 when it was replaced by a Poll Tax on all male adults.

16. In 1910 the native wage earners numbered 70,000 which rose to 172,000 in 1913.

### Wage-earning labour in 1913

Occupation	Number
Plantations	80,000
Porters	20,000
Employees of railway contractors & railway company	21,000
Employees of Commercial Firms	10,000
Domestic Servants	9,000
Askari serving in the defence forces and police	6,000
Total	172,000

Source : W.O. Henderson, op. cit., p. 152.

17. In fact until 1909 Kenya appropriated all the revenue on Ugandan imports and Uganda was only given a fixed percentage of the revenue.

18. The port of Mombasa can take ships up to 65,000 tons, having an entrance channel with a minimum of 78 feet. Dar-es-Salaam has a minimum of

19 feet (30 feet at high tide); Mtwara, 32 feet; Tanga, 19.25 feet. Analysing defects of these ports with reference to their oceanic location, their water site, their land location and their land site, Hoyle (op. cit.) points out that Tanga is defective in two of these respects, Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara in one, and Mombasa in none.

19. Article 10 of the Mandate for Tanganyika authorised the mandatory 'to constitute the territory into a custom, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his own sovereignty or control; provided always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate'. Therefore, from a purely technical point of view customs union was a legal act.

20. The lake Region was served exclusively by the Kenya-Uganda system by steamer during the German period and the opening years of the twenties.

21. Tanzania was seventh out of eight British African territories in terms of her imports. Only Nyasaland spent less on imported goods.

22. Every time Britain had one of its periodic balance of payment crisis, the East African branches of British Banks were obliged to curtail credit and raise interest rates to borrowers so as to keep them in line with the British bank rates.

23. In 1960 Tanzania had 560 doctors and 10,453 teachers for a population of nine million.

24. Arush Declaration, delivered at the TANU National Executive Committee in 1967, is a statement of socialism and self-reliance. It includes guidelines for: Socialism, nationalization, rural development, an end to elitism, new educational directions, independence in foreign policy, and self-reliance. In the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration, all Banks, Imports-export firms and the (National) Insurance Company were nationalized by the government.

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## India & Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE  
July-September 1977

### **Principled Support to Africa**

Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee gave a detailed exposition of the foreign policy of India, while initiating a debate in the Lok Sabha on the demands for grants for the Ministry of External Affairs and later while winding up the debate.

Mr. Vajpayee said that the policy of non-alignment was not the policy of an individual or a party, but was based on national consensus. What had happened during the past three decades had proved the relevance of the policy of non-alignment in the context of the contemporary international scene.

Referring to Africa, Mr. Vajpayee said that India extended "principled support" for majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia. India is pledged to the eradication of evils of apartheid or institutionalised racialism. He said that India would maintain the momentum of its efforts to become partner in the endeavour of African nations for their national development. With countries like Tanzania, Zambia and Mauritius we had already forged many good economic links. "Our developmental experience is relevant and appears complementary to the needs of Africa in manpower and economic expertise", he added. (July 15, 1977)

### **Legislation Against Apartheid**

The Government of India have decided to accede to the United Nations international convention on suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid. Appropriate legislation will be undertaken to give effect to its provisions. The UN convention declares apartheid as a crime against humanity and the inhuman acts resulting from the

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pursuit of such policies and practices as crimes violating the principles of international law, the UN charter and constituting a serious threat to international peace and security. The term "crime of apartheid" will include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in Southern Africa and shall apply to the inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.

The Ministry of External Affairs, in cooperation with the United Nations Centre against apartheid, has brought out a pamphlet entitled "Programme of action against Apartheid". In his foreword to the pamphlet, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, has stated that India is firmly convinced that in a world where progress and humanitarianism have become the touchstone of human development "we cannot allow such regressive and inhuman practices as apartheid to continue". Mr. Vajpayee pointed out that India was the first nation to bring up the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa at the inaugural session of the UN General Assembly in 1946. Ever since then India's consistent efforts to end this outrage against humanity has continued and in fact received worldwide recognition and appreciation. India waged this battle not to win international plaudits but because it genuinely felt that so long as apartheid and racism remain meshed in the fabric of society progress would remain a hollow concept. The programme of action against apartheid adopted by the General Assembly at its 31st session is an important step in coordinating and organising the world's battle against this social evil. The special meeting of the special committee against apartheid commended India on its contribution to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and Namibia.

The situation in Southern Africa was "excellent" for the national forces fighting for majority rule, according to Mr. Mark Chona, special Assistant of the Zambian President, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda. He told newsmen in New Delhi on 16 August that there was now considerable disaffection among Rhodesian whites, whose flight from the country was being curbed by the government of Mr Ian Smith by imposing constraints on the amount of money they could take out

from the country. The people of Southern Africa, he said, do not want to suffer in instalments. They have undergone considerable hardships. Now they want to get over with it. Mr. Mark Chona called on Prime Minister Morarji Desai and External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee during his stay in New Delhi. He also handed over a letter from President Kaunda to Mr. Morarji Desai. (September 1, 1977)

### **Vajpayee Leads Delegation to UN Assembly**

The Indian Delegation to the 32nd session of the General Assembly of the UN is being led by the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee. This is the first time that the India's voice will be heard in the UN session after the last general elections in India. Mr. Vajpayee will address the Assembly on 4 October.

It is expected that the situation in Southern Africa and West Asia will dominate the current session of the Assembly. Attention will also be focussed on the need to establish a new international economic order. India has always adopted a constructive approach to international issues. Its commitment to human rights would be reaffirmed at the General Assembly.

Before his departure to New York, Mr. Vajpayee said that India wanted the Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia to succeed. South Africa, which had no right to remain in Namibia, should realise the realities of the present situation and take to the right path. But if independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia was not achieved by peaceful means there would be no alternative but to intensify the armed struggle. On West Asia, Mr. Vajpayee said that Israel had not vacated the Arab territories it had occupied forcibly. The establishment of new settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan river by Israel was in violation of the UN resolutions. Mr. Vajpayee also hoped that the developed nations would change their attitude and help in the establishment of a new world economic order which would enable the developing nations, which were struggling to forge ahead, to fulfil the basic needs of their people. (September, 30, 1977)



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### Indian Drugs in Great Demand

Exports of Indian pharmaceuticals have shown "excellent growth" in the last few months. More developing countries are buying India's antibiotic preparations, proprietary and patent medicines and surgical dressings. A Government-sponsored drug exporters consortium, launched last year, has secured export orders for formulations worth Rs. 15 million in one year. It is hopeful of enlarging the export during the current financial year to Rs. 50 million. The consortium has signed a contract to export to Libya this year antibiotic and synthetic drugs worth Rs. 16.8 million. The Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Corporation of India (CPC) hopes to bag some of the global tenders floated recently by Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Iraq and Nigeria. The public sector IDPL sold last year drugs worth Rs. 4.5 million to Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Singapore, Malaysia and surgical instruments valued at Rs. 1.5 million to the Soviet Union.

The consortium, comprising 16 small and medium India-owned companies, proposes to open sales promotion offices in some of these countries. Already an agent has been appointed in Libya. The CPC has offered to make available raw materials and bulk drugs to multinational companies and Indian units in the organised sector on the understanding that they utilise their spare capacity to make the recommended drugs for export. The CPC would market these drugs under their generic names but the manufacturer's name will be printed on the label alongside the CPC as the marketing agency. The CPC is trying to establish a brand image by printing its name and emblem on each exported bottle and packet. Strict pre-shipment inspection will be conducted by an expert committee comprising representatives of the CPC, the Basic Chemicals and Export Promotion Council, the Food and Drug Administration of the Maharashtra State Government and the Haffkine Institute. In some cases, the importing countries have also participated in quality testing. The CPC maintains a buffer stock sufficient to meet the domestic market's demand for three months. Ten per cent of the stock is reserved for exporters who get it at off the shelf international price (not the landed cost) plus one per cent of the c.i.f. price.

(September 30, 1977)

### **Holy Swami Visits Africa**

Swami Bhagawatanand of India who has been touring several African countries, has just completed one month's lecture tour of Zambia and left for Malawi. He visited all major towns delivering lectures arranged under the auspices of Hindu Association of Zambia to well attended meetings on the Ramayana, Mahabharata, Gita and other Hindu scriptures.

### **Asoke Mehta Attends Apartheid Meet**

Mr. Asoke Mehta led the Indian delegation to the United Nations conference on apartheid held in Lagos.

The conference was held in pursuance of the resolution of the UN Special Committee on apartheid. The resolution had suggested that such a conference should be organised in Africa.

The Organisation of African Unity and the Government of Nigeria co-sponsored the conference with the UN.

### **Indian-Naval Vessel Visits Algeria**

The Indian-built INS Udaygiri arrived in the port of Algiers on 23 July marking the first ever official visit to Algeria by an Indian naval vessel. INS Udaygiri was accorded a warm welcome when it berthed at the specially reserved berth in the heart of the port.

### **India's Plea to end Ethiopian Somali War**

External Affairs Minister A. B. Vajpayee expressed deep concern at the serious clashes in the Ogaden region bordering Ethiopia and Somalia.

In separate meetings with Charge d'Affaires of Ethiopia S. A. Denke Berhane and Charge d'Affairs of Somalia Tahir Yusuf Mohamud, the External Affairs Minister stated that India had traditionally friendly ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia and made an appeal for statesmanship and restraint to find a mutually acceptable solution which will restore peace in the region.

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India together with Somalia and Ethiopia belonged to the non-aligned group of nations and it should not be difficult to find an amicable solution to the present conflict in the Horn of Africa, which, if continued, would weaken the entire non-aligned movement.

Mr Vajpayee stated that the attention of the international community was focused on the struggle in the southern part of Africa to end apartheid and white minority rule. It was, therefore, necessary to make maximum efforts to close the ranks, especially by non-aligned group of countries.

Mr. Vajpayee also referred to the efforts of the good offices committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to find a negotiated settlement of the problem and hoped that the effort would succeed. (August 14, 1977)

#### **Vajpayee's Talks with Kenyan Foreign Minister**

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and his Kenyan counterpart, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, in a one-hour cordial meeting hailed the existing friendly relations between the two countries and expressed the hope for further strengthening the Indo-Kenyan relations.

They also reiterated their countries' commitment to world peace.

During the meeting Dr. Waiyaki also informed Mr. Vajpayee of recent developments in Africa. Mr. Vajpayee acquainted the Kenyan minister with the latest developments in the Indian sub-continent.

Mr. Vajpayee also outlined the vast scope of further expansion of technical and economic co-operation between the two countries.

Dr. Waiyaki appreciated India's cooperation in the field of technology and economic projects with his country and hoped that mutual co-operation in these areas would be further increased.

Earlier Mr. Vajpayee told the Press that India would like to see the problems of Namibia and Zimbabwe settled peacefully, but if

the racist regimes there pursued an intransigent attitude, armed struggle would be intensified.

Mr. Vajpayee, who was on his way to Dar-es-Salaam to attend a meeting of the joint Indo-Tanzanian Commission on Economy Co-operation, said that the situation in southern Africa was of concern to all countries, including India.

He added that India had been giving both moral and material support to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Expressing happiness at being back in Kenya, a country he had visited twice before, he recalled his recent meeting with the Kenyan Foreign Minister, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and reiterated the new Indian government's desire to further strengthen relations between the two countries.

#### **Indo-Libyan Relations**

The Indian naval ship "Udaygiri" arrived in Tripoli on 28 July on a four-day goodwill visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriayah. Immediately on arrival of the ship the Commanding Officer Captain K.N. Dubash paid a formal call on the Chief of Naval Staff, Commander Shakshouki who personally returned the call the same day. The Libyan Naval Chief spent 45 minutes on the ship and expressed great satisfaction that a country of the Third World had constructed such a sophisticated warship.

The Government of India has set up a Road Construction Corporation with an authorised capital of Rs. 100 million. It will undertake road and bridge construction, mainly in foreign countries. In the recent past, there has been a spurt in the construction activities in the Gulf and West Asian region, north and west African countries. Works for about five hundred kilometres of roads are estimated to be immediately available on competitive basis in these countries.

#### **India Pledges Support for Namibia Freedom**

India pledged its full support to all measures the United Nations, the South-West African People's Organisation and others

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would take to end the illegal occupation of Namibia.

In a message to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of Namibia Day, External Affairs Minister, A.B. Vajpayee expressed India's hope that the western initiative on Namibia would be able to obtain the compliance of the South African regime to the Security Council resolutions calling for vacation of the illegal occupation of Namibia and holding of free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations for the whole of Namibia as one political entity.

It was on this day 11 years ago that the people of Namibia took up arms against South Africa's illegal occupation of their country and ruthless suppression of its people.

In his message, Mr. Vajpayee said that on this solemn and momentous day, people and Government of India paid their homage to the martyrs of Namibian liberation. He also extended India's sympathy and support to those within Namibia and outside who were carrying on this struggle (August 26, 1977).

### **Vajpayee Pledges Support to Namibia**

Union Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, pledged India's "moral, political and material support" to the people of Namibia in their struggle for liberation from the minority regime of South Africa. The days of the racist regime were numbered, and he described racial discrimination as a crime against humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind.

Mr. Vajpayee was presiding over the Namibia Day celebrations organised by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and the Indian Centre for Africa.

Mr. Vajpayee said the armed struggle should continue as he was doubtful about the outcome of negotiations. Referring to reports of South Africa possessing a nuclear weapon, Mr. Vajpayee said : "No amount of armament can destroy the will of the people to be free."

In a hard-hitting speech, the Dean of African Missions, Mr. A. D. Hassan, expressed his gratitude to India for its support. Indians were, like the people of Africa, a committed people and understood the importance of human rights.

The struggle, Mr. Hassan emphasised, was not for self-determination alone but also for the removal of apartheid and racialism. Viet Nam's victory over a mighty power should have acted as an eye-opener to the world that "might is never right".

M. M. Moola, Chief Representative of the African National Congress of South Africa, said that the question of Namibia and Zimbabwe should not be delinked from the question of South Africa as a whole. (August 31, 1977).

#### **Nigeria to Join Non-aligned News Pool**

The Nigerian Minister for Information, Mr. G.A. Ogunlade, who was in India in July acquainted himself with the working of various news and information organisations in the country. Among the organisations visited by him were the Film and Television Institute at Poona and the Institute of Mass Communications in New Delhi. The Mass Communication Institute has trained over the past nine years a large number of nationals from many developing countries in South-East Asia and Africa. Mr. Ogunlade also visited the office of the news agency Samachar in New Delhi. He told the staff members of Samachar that Nigeria was planning to set up a news agency. It would come into existence within a year. As soon as it was off the ground it would join the news agencies pool of non-aligned nations. The visiting Nigerian Minister called on his Indian counterpart, Mr. L.K. Advani on 18 July.

#### **Indian Books for Somalia**

A set of 71 books on Indian History, Culture, Art and Biographies was presented to Mr. Omer Arteth Ghalib, the Minister of High Education and Culture to the Government of Somalia for the National Library and the Library of the College of Education of Somalia University by the Indian Ambassador on 24 July, in Moga-

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dishu. The Somali Minister said that India and Somalia have close relations in education, commerce and trade etc. and these are developing steadily. The Minister praised the work of Indian experts and professors in Somalia. Somalia will recruit a fresh batch of professors from India.

### **Tanzania lauds Indias' for Support**

Tanzanian Foreign Minister Benjamin Mkapa has praised India's support to the national liberation movements in Africa.

During a meeting with the visiting External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, Mr. Mkapa said colonialism and racialism hampered genuine development and freedom of the people of the world.

The Tanzanian Minister also said that India's aid promoted Tanzania's economic and social development. (July 29, 1977).

### **Rs. 4.2 Million Tanzanian Order**

A trade delegation from Tanzania has placed orders with United General Industries, Mohali, Punjab for export of AAC and ACSR overhead aluminium conductors worth Rs. 4.2 million. The delegation headed by Mr. Yomo, expressed the hope that the recurring orders by his country would involve the purchase of conductors worth Rs. 10 million annually from India.

### **Greater Cooperation with Tanzania**

The Joint Commission, which met in Dar-es-Salaam from 29 July to 2 August in the presence of the two co-chairmen, Mr. Vajpayee and the Tanzanian Minister for Finance and Development Planning, Mr. E.I. Mtei, decided to strengthen cooperation between India and Tanzania in the fields of industry, agriculture, science and technology, health, civil aviation and prospecting for hydro-carbons. Cooperation between India and Tanzania has grown rapidly and ranges from small and medium scale industries to exploration of oil and gas. About 800 Indian experts are working in Tanzania. At Songo Songo, an Indian Ocean island about 200 kilometres south-

east of Dar-es-Salaam, the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Commission has succeeded in locating gas in commercial quantities in cooperation with the Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation. The present estimate of the gas reserves in Songo Songo is placed around 30 billion cubic metres and would be enough to meet a large proportion of the energy requirements of Tanzania. Plans for the exploitation of Songo Songo gas are being prepared by ONGC for consideration by the Tanzanian Government. India looks forward to intensifying cooperation with Tanzania in this field and extending it to other related areas such as fertilisers and petrochemicals.

A major industrial project which India and Tanzania have agreed to implement is the Kagera sugar plant. This will have a cane crushing capacity of 2500 tons per day which can be expanded to 3500 tons per day. The project is expected to be commissioned in 1980. Besides, India and Tanzania are collaborating in a number of projects : industrial estates on the mainland and in Zanzibar, a bicycle plant in Dar-es-Salaam, supply of locomotives, wagons and other railway equipment and development of small scale and rural industries. The Joint Commission discussed the supply of raw cashew to India by Tanzania. The Tanzanian authorities agreed that, after meeting the needs of their own processing industry, they would give priority consideration to India's requirements in view of its traditional position as the largest market for Tanzanian cashew.

The Vice President of Tanzania, Mr. Aboud Jumbe, who opened the Joint Commission meeting, described Indo-Tanzanian co-operation as "a model for third world countries" and "a beacon of hope in the dark and troubled waters of economic exploitation and the rich-poor struggle". Appreciation of India's technical cooperation towards Tanzania was made by President Nyerere when Mr. Vajpayee made a courtesy call on him. Mr. Vajpayee described his talks with President Nyerere as a "stimulating experience" which gave "fresh insights into the situation in Southern Africa".

Speaking at a banquet held in his honour at Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. Vajpayee said that India extended support and solidarity to the liberation movements which "are engaged in a struggle to remove



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the last blots of colonialism and racialism from the fair face of Africa.” Tanzania, he recalled, had played a crucial role in offering sanctuary and support to the liberation movements. Mr. Vajpayee hoped that Zimbabwe and Namibia would soon join the comity of nations as sovereign and independent countries. While India preferred the speedy attainment of the objective by peaceful means, it realised that “the bizarre antics of the illegal Ian Smith regime in Zimbabwe and the dilatory tactics of South Africa in Namibia seem to make a violent struggle unavoidable. He reiterated the moral, political and material support of India to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Mr. Vajpayee had two rounds of discussion with the Foreign Minister of Tanzania Mr. Benjamin Mkapa, on the situation in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Southern Africa generally. He also discussed the situation in Namibia with President Nujoma of SWAPO who was in Dar-es-Salaam during the visit of Mr. Vajpayee. President Nujoma told Mr. Vajpayee about the manoeuvrings which were under way to by-pass the UN in finding a solution to the Namibian problem and of the determination of SWAPO to frustrate these designs. He felt that a special session of the UN General Assembly could help in focussing attention on the urgency of the Namibian problem and help in speeding Namibia’s march towards independence India has agreed to support the idea. Mr. Nujoma expressed appreciation of the moral and material support that India extended to SWAPO when he met Mr. Vajpayee.

On his return to New Delhi, Mr. Vajpayee told newsmen that India has been sounded whether it would like to join a United Nations Force as proposed by the USA and Britain to function on the lines of a peace-keeping force during the transition from the white minority to majority rule in Zimbabwe. India, he said, had sought further information on the countries which would participate in the force and who would command it. Mr. Vajpayee said that India welcomed the formation of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe and whatever assistance to be extended to the liberation struggle would be given to this Front. Mr. Vajpayee said that it was not for

the outside powers to impose any leadership on the people of Zimbabwe after their liberation. Who would lead Zimbabwe after liberation would be decided by the people of the country themselves through free and fair elections.

During his onward journey to Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. Vajpayee made a brief stopover at Nairobi where he called on Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki. On his way back home he visited Addis Ababa and had talks with the Ethiopian Defence Minister. (August 10, 1977).

#### **Kaunda's Aide meets Vajpayee**

Mr Mark Chona, the Zambian President, Mr Kenneth Kaunda's political adviser, is here to have discussions with Indian leaders.

Mr Chona, who is a prominent Presidential aide in Zambia, met the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee. He attended the Independence Day celebrations at Red Fort in Delhi.

It is presumed that Mr Chona gave Mr Vajpayee Zambia's assessment of the latest development in southern Africa. Mr Vajpayee had already had discussions with the Tanzanian President, Mr J. Nyerere, during his recent visit to Africa. (Pre. ref. p. 98.) September 1, 1977.)

#### **India urged not to back U.K., U.S. on Rhodesia**

A meeting of the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation unanimously resolved that India should have nothing to do with the Anglo-American plans on Zimbabwe and the suggestion of a UN peacekeeping force for the area.

The meeting resolved to send its greetings of solidarity to the Patriotic Front and the five "front line African States" fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia.

It characterised the recent reports about South Africa emerging as an atomic power as "nuclear blackmail" of African and Asian countries.

Dr. Vijay Gupta

The meeting wanted the government and the people of India to extend all support to the front line African states including arms, material, medicines and money for the successful "final assault on colonialism and imperialism."

Mr A.C. Chalikulima, High Commissioner for Zambia, speaking as the chief guest, said the people of Zimbabwe, like those in Namibia and South Africa, needed moral, political, diplomatic and material solidarity. They needed all types of arms, medicines and food, blankets, uniforms, boots, money and vehicles.

Mr Romesh Chandra, president of the World Peace Council, said solidarity should be extended to the front line states in the form they needed and said that no discussions on constitutional problems should be entertained or supported. Support should be extended now only to total transfer of power.

## Book Reviews

S.C. Saxena, *Namibia : Challenge to the United Nations*  
(Sundeep Prakashan, 1978) pp. 316. Price : Rs. 65/-

The book under review addresses a thorny problem which has defied solution for more than three decades. The United Nations has adopted more than a hundred resolutions, the International Court of Justice has tendered four advisory opinions and two judgments on different facets of the Namibian problem. Even on the day the review is being written, the newspapers reported the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a set of 14 resolutions with a view to breaking what the author at one place has aptly described this deadlock as the Gordian knot. A silver lining in this cluster of dark clouds is the change in the attitude of the United States Government with the inception of the Carter administration. But as the author realises : "The problem of Namibia is not the problem of pressurizing South Africa

alone to vacate the Territory or to threaten it with dire consequences if it does not. Had the problem been so simple it would have been solved long ago. The problem of Namibia, on the contrary, poses the paradoxical question as to how to pressurize the western powers and Japan so that they, in turn, are able to pressurize Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa..." (pp. 289-290). A change of heart of merely one of the western powers, though significant, therefore, is not going to bring about a tremendous transformation in the situation.

As the author points out in a number of places in the book, South African intransigence is accountable to the monetary investments and interests of the Western world as a whole : "British and United States investors hold a

substantial interest in several South African mining corporations predominant in exploiting the natural resources of the country, and have controlling interest in many of them. These companies, enjoying the support of parent governments, are playing a sinister role in regard to South-West Africa and are the main hindrance to the achievement of freedom by the Territory." (p. 10)

The author deals with the Namibian problem in a systematic fashion. The introduction and the historical background, which constitute the first 35 pages of the book, spell out the demographic and the political backdrop. By reference to authentic records of the Peace Conference after World War I, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the mandate, the author establishes beyond doubt that the Territory was created as an international trust to be administered by South Africa under the supervision of the League. In the subsequent chapters the author examines how the South African Government sought to annex the Territory in flagrant

violation of the letter and spirit of the basic instruments, and how, after its designs were frustrated, the South African Government adopted the policy of piecemeal integration. The author's narration of the negotiations between the United Nations and the South African Government, the hardening attitudes of the parties in the course of time, and the role of the General Assembly and the Security Council in resolving the problem, is sound and instructive.

The author, however, is harsh on the International Court of Justice. After analysing the first advisory opinion of the Court the author categorically states: "No other pronouncement of the Court was more damaging to the efforts of the United Nations in regard to South Africa than this particular one" (p. 59), and that it "seems to have created more problems for the United Nations than it solved them" (p. 69). As respects the Court's judgement in the contentious proceedings between South Africa on the one hand and Ethiopia and Liberia on the other, the author denounces the judgement in strong

terms. The Court's judgement of 1962, which dealt with its own jurisdiction, and the one tendered in 1966, in which the Court declined to pronounce upon the merits of the case, are roundly condemned as inconsistent. The subtle but fine distinction drawn by the Court between the "conduct provisions" and the "special interest provisions" of the mandate goes beyond the comprehension of the author (pp. 165-171). At p. 283, the author chastises the United Nations for posing the problem to the World Court in what in the author's view was a wrong manner. He accuses the United Nations of wrongly framing the question of the *international status* of the Territory: "if the status of the Territory was already *international* as the question stated it to be, then what was there for the Court to decide?" The author shows similar lack of appreciation about the role of the World Court in the settlement of international dispute in general. He charges that the General Assembly's reference to the Court over the legal issues without a prior commitment from South Africa that it

would accept the decision of the Court, was wrong (p. 284). He states further that the General Assembly "went on erring" in its repeated references to the Court when it did not have any assurances of the Security Council's follow-up enforcement action. More surprisingly, the contentious cases before the Court, according to the author, "unnecessarily delayed" the revocation of the mandate (p. 285).

At the same time the author admits: "If the problem of Namibia continues to remain unsolved to this day despite the vigorous involvement of the United Nations, it is entirely because of the attitude of the Western Powers..." (p. 288). The author also goes on to evaluate the UN's role in terms of "exercising utmost moral pressure upon the South African Government and the powers who lend support to her". (p. 290). The role of the United Nations as well as any other international organization in contemporary international relations is largely persuasive and only in exceptional cases could it be coer-



cive. UN's coercive machinery constitutionally cannot be invoked without the concurrence of the five permanent members of the Security Council. It is, therefore, futile to blame the United Nations for its incapacity to employ forcible measures in situations such as Namibia. Given the constitutional restraints, references to the World Court could only be considered as a strategy to bring political and moral pressure to bear on the recalcitrant states. Such references have got to be viewed as one of the many components of this grand strategy. Such a course, if successful, would indeed be helpful. But there is always a risk of such references having a boomerang effect in case the Court fails to oblige.

Despite the lack of understanding of the role of international adjudication and of the specific cases on Namibia, the author arrives at a correct

conclusion :

"The moral pressure of the United Nations has got to be coupled with intense guerrilla activity under the leadership of SWAPO. This activity is still on a low key inspite of the tall claims made about it" (p. 290).

Further on, the author adds a third, very important, dimension to the understanding of the problem when he states that the Namibian tangle could be resolved by bringing about a change in the attitude of the white community within the Territory, by appropriate assurance that self-determination and independence to Namibia would certainly not mean a reversal of the *apartheid*. The author should be congratulated on his competent handling of the Namibian problem. Better production and some editing would have helped in making the book more elegant.

**Rahmatullah Khan**

*Socialism and Participation i Tanzania's 1970 National Elections,*  
by the Election Study Committee of University of Dar-es-Salaam,  
Tanzanian Publishing House Ltd., 1974, pp. 464. (unpriced)

Collaborative works often fail through a lack of coherence—not this work which is a success. The Election Study Committee which has prepared this study included representatives from TANU National Head Quarters, the Electoral Commission and members—both students and staff—from the Department of Political Science, Sociology and Development Studies of the University of Dar-es-Salaam. While the Committee as a whole is to be credited for their work, three contributions of Helge Kjekshus are particularly valuable. The two initial chapters, written by John S. Soul and Jonathan S. Barber, provide theoretical framework to the study and add to the intellectual standard of the book.

Of the fifteen chapters, eleven deal with elections, and four are theoretical pieces discussing the question of participation and control of the people in the affairs of the state for the compliance of the more defined socialist goals. This

work was intended to understand the extent and effectiveness of mass participation in one party system and the impact of the fundamental policy changes introduced since 1965—The Arusha Declaration, education for self-reliance and socialism and rural development (Ujamma). The authors analyse the elections against the political and socio-economic developments since 1965. Apparently the election results show that election response was a vote for Ujamma but, according to their study for those who have come to associate Tanzania's Socialism with the policy of Ujamma Vijjini, the parliamentary election was singularly inclusive.....the candidates tended to split the issue in their campaign speeches and very few of them identified positively with the policy and campaigned specifically for it ...the Ujamma policy tended to emerge only in the statements by the proceeding officers when dealing with the presidential election. Since so few candidates faced up to the Ujamma



challenge, any interpretation of their election in Ujamma terms becomes extremely ... difficult." (pp. 374-75)

In my opinion it is erroneous to conclude that elections, even with a high percentage of participation, can indicate system's capacity to mobilize the people for the implementation of national development goal such as Ujamma. Similarly it would be wrong to accept that election campaign work helps in educating masses on the national policies and goals. However, the elections, particularly in one party multi-candidate systems, serve in maintaining constant touch between the rulers and the ruled. The people, through these elections, get a chance to express their disagreement with the government policy by rejecting those candidates who eliminate themselves with the people. This study rightly reaches the conclusion that election results can not indicate the amount of control and participation of people here in state affairs. The rejection or acceptance of a candidate is no indication of acceptance or rejection of

government policies.

Peoples' participation in their own government and their ultimate control over all the organizations of the state cannot be ensured through electoral system. The maximum possible participation has to be considered in the context of total circumstances of Tanzania ; (1) the participation had to be compatible with the single-party, principal-party being the principal instrument of political recruitment ; (2) the need for wider popular participation had to be reconciled with the need for effective representation, (3) the need for democratic participation and popular choice had to take account of the equally valued need to integrate over 120 constituencies into a single polity and the related need to choose leaders who support national policies rather than promote the divisive micro-nationalism of their parochial loyalties. (pp. 97-8).

Intense participation implies thought, discussion, and shared decision by groups of people on matters which effect their lives. The intensity of parti-

cipation is measured by the quality of popular activity. Participation requires structures with sufficient autonomy to make popular decisions. Participation means effective elections to workers' Councils, local planning committees, party cells and district councils. Decisions resulting from relatively brief bursts of popular participation may effect basic elements in peoples' lives such as organization of productive work.

Participation and control involve the conscious attempt of groups and individuals to affect the ways in which people behave and the kinds of experience they have. Much participation attempts to influence the way leaders exercise control and much control aims to channel participation without destroying the participating machinery. Participation and control are both ways of co-ordinating organizing activity. In the case of control, co-ordination proceeds from a given leadership group. Sharing control implies active and effective policing of a large range of peoples activities by a well-equipped force of centrally

—commanded administrators backed by coercive power.

In most of the multi-party systems the tradition of competition based on social cleavages is considered the *SINE QUA NON* of democratic elections. Such systems, tend to increase the solidarity of sectional interest groups and parties, often at the expense of a wider national consensus on political issues. There is a general tendency amongst political scientists, particularly those who favour multi-party based democracies, to believe that elections in single party system states are sham, i.e. some kind of stage management designed to avoid peoples' involvement in government and politics. In single party states the primary aim is the achievement of an unanimous consensus on major national policies at the expense of narrow interests. The primary function of elections in multi-party systems is interest-articulation, while in single-party system—such as in Tanzania—it is the authority-legitimation. In later systems it is considered essential for national integration and

## Book Reviews

total social mobilization. The authors of the book argue that in Tanzania the integrative and authority-legitimation functions are completely fused within the single party structure and since no extra-party or even intra-party splinter groups are allowed electoral platform, the Tanzania African National Union emerges as the only official articulator of "general interests". The main purpose of Tanzanian electoral rules and procedures is to prevent the emergence of narrow interests and social cleavages. The technical meaning of participation has, throughout this study, been defined as a relationship between voters and the estimated eligible population. The registration of voters has accordingly been regarded as simply

another participatory variable and attention has been drawn to its importance in the participatory relationship. Tanzanian political leadership must understand the role of elections in the functioning of democracy and they should not substitute democratic participation by democratic elections.

The book is not only a study of 1970 elections but provides to us a good source material on trends of thinking on socialism, democracy—one-party state in Tanzania. It is written with a degree of knowledge and insight into the problem of one-party-democracy. This makes it a valuable reading for every student of Tanzanian political institution.

Vijay Gupta

*African Social Studies : A Radical Reader* Peter C W Gutkind  
& Peter Waterman (Eds), London, Heinemann, 1977, pp. 481,  
price £2.90.

Africa's continuous exploitation by the capitalist countries has created its negation in the form of national liberation movements which are led by fiery nationalist leadership. Many campuses in Africa are also part of anti-imperialism and anti-racialism struggle. Thus the awakening created by struggles against imperialism is reflected in the writings of African scholars who are challenging the basic premises of western social science based on concepts like modernisation and political development. A large number of European scholars studies problems of African society, polity and economy from the colonial perspective ; and instead of explaining African reality they explained it away by rationalising the existing exploitative socio-political institutions. The challenge posed by 'status quo' scholars has been accepted by scholars who stand for relevant and fundamental change in African society. *African Social Studies* is an attempt in the right

direction. This book is divided into six parts : Methodology : The Weapon of Theory; History : Historical Stages and Transition ; Economy : The Political Economy of Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism ; Social Structure : The process of Class Formation ; Ideology : Ideas as a Material Force ; and Politics : Rulers, Masses and Political Power. A very exhaustive Bibliography is given at the end.

Problems of African society have been examined in proper historical perspective. Many case studies dealing with specificities of various African societies have been discussed in a framework of social change. The common link among the various writers is their commitment to social transformation. Social Science has been viewed in this book, very appropriately, as an instrument of analysis for change. Not only the contributors to this volume are committed to 'relevant social

## Book Reviews

science'; they are firmly of the view that racialism and exploitation has to be fought. As Waterman states:

"Africanists are increasingly declaring or revealing in their writings an overt moral or political commitment. This is usually phrased in terms of opposition to imperialism (seen as a social system dominating Africa politically and exploiting it economically). And—more positively—in terms of a concern for Africa's masses, and of a preference for socialist

economic and political strategies."

Further, political ideologies move human societies. Western scholars have taken great pains to write against dominant ideologies by emphasizing their irrelevance. A very important feature of this volume is a discussion of both current and past ideologies of the various African countries.

This book is an essential reading for students of African societies.

**C. P. Bhambhri**

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# AFRICA JOURNAL

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Dr. Yash Tandon :

## The Food Question in East Africa : A Partial Case Study of Tanzania

Let us try to understand this food question a little more closely than what it would appear at first sight. How does it appear at first sight ?

The first time people at large became aware of the food problem was when the sudden food shortage hit many parts of the world including Tanzania, in 1973-75. The shortage hit most severely the Sahelian countries where in 1973 alone it is estimated that over 100,000 people died of famine. As Dr. Malentlema of the Tanzanian Food and Nutrition Centre relayed the history of the problem : "When the drought started in 1968, the scientists reassured everyone that all would be well. The following year they started digging wells for water, but these quickly dried out and the rural population began running to the towns only to cause more social and political unrest. By the time the experts gave up (so much for the experts ! Y.T.) and declared a state of emergency, many people were already dying of famine, thirst and disease." Dr. Maletnlema's judgement about the effects of nutrition intervention programme in the Sahelian countries is sharp and to the point : "complete failure".<sup>1</sup>

After that, in the second stage, the famine-threatened areas obtained emergency food transfers (most of these on commercial terms, but some of these as food aid or on concessional terms). Thus in one year alone, 1974/75, the worst year for Tanzania as far as food is concerned, the country imported 446,000 tons of maize, rice and wheat and paid 783.1 million Tsh for it.<sup>2</sup> Smaller quantities of food aid also came from relief organisations such as the Catholic Relief Service (which distributed 17,389,000 lbs of food, worth \$3,442,000 in 1975/76), and the World Food Aid which distributed 8,043 tons of

Dr. Yash Tandon

maize, 552 tons of maize meal, and 182 tons of oil in 1974 alone.<sup>3</sup> The short term crisis was thus alleviated.

The third stage began with emergency measures to improve food stocks for the immediate future. The loss of the badly needed foreign exchange was the most persuasive reason advanced for improving the local food production. But added to this was the question of national pride : How could an agricultural country leave the problem of feeding its population to emergency supplies from outside ? About 3 million hectares of land in Tanzania are under food crops, i.e. about 70 per cent of the total agricultural land under cultivation. Something, therefore, had to be done to ensure that with so much land committed to food production, there should never arise food shortages again. The Party launched a massive mobilisation programme under "Kilimo cha Kufa na Kuona" to increase production. Not only peasants but also parastatals and governmental institutions were mobilised in this direction. The outcome justified the efforts. Maize purchases by the National Milling Corporation during the 1975/76 season reached the level of 92,629 tons compared to 24,735 tons in 1974/75. Output of wheat rose to 26,088 tons in 1975/76 from 14,433 tons in 1974/75. However, although there was a marked increase in domestic food production, total output was still below total domestic requirements, and between January and December 1976, 425.4 million Tsh worth of food had to be imported, of which 147.4 million Tsh were for grain imports.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, coming now to the final stage in the recent history of food in Tanzania, it became clear that what was needed was a long-term strategy for food self-sufficiency. In 1974 the World Bank suggested two national projects aimed at food self-sufficiency. The first was the *National Maize Project* which was actually adopted and started in 1976/77, and whose aim is to increase the annual production level of maize from 880,000 Mt in 1972 to some 1,330,000 Mt by 1980. This increase could be attained by one of two ways : either through expanding the total cultivated maize area by 600,000 ha (a 50 percent increase) at current yields, or by raising average yields from 7.5 to 11.5 quintals per ha. The Bank suggested that the major emphasis should be placed on the latter alternative, that of

raising the yield per hectare by increasing inputs in production. The second national project the Bank recommended is the *National Agricultural Development Project* (NADP), which is a long-term development programme designed to reach out over the whole country over a 20 year period. Essentially its purpose would be to uplift the present level of farming through the introduction of high-yielding varieties, rotational practices, soil conservation measures, the integration of crop and animal production and opening up of new settlement areas. Sub-projects involving some 10,000 farming families at a time would be introduced, and with 10 such sub-projects introduced annually for 20 years it is expected that NADP would have realised its objectives.

This is how matters stand with respect to the food problem in Tanzania at first sight. Having become critically aware of the problem following the food crisis of 1973/75, and having alleviated the problem in the short run through increased imports and emergency measures to increase food production, the government has now settled down to the more long-term strategy of achieving self-sufficiency by 1980, and to increased agricultural productivity in twenty years.

Need we look deeper than this? Is it not enough that the country has now finally launched on to the correct path of national food self-sufficiency, so that we can now hopefully expect, with generous aid from the World Bank and other Western countries to meet the targets set by the planners? We suggest that we do indeed dig deeper into the nature of the food problem, and the suggested strategy for achieving national self-sufficiency in food.

As a means of guiding our discussion from here on, we set out below four theses:

*First Thesis*: The food crisis of 1973/75 in Tanzania was not of national making. It was a crisis created by imperialism. It was indeed a crisis of imperialism itself which took the form of a "national" crisis for Tanzania.

*Second Thesis*: The objective of the new strategy is not national self-sufficiency in food, though this is how it is formally presented,

Dr. Ysah Tandon

and though the domestic requirements of food might be incidentally fulfilled within the framework of a larger objective. The larger objective is to produce food for the world market, of which the Tanzanian market is only a portion, on behalf of imperialist monopolies. The objective is to cheapen the cost of production for the monopolies, and to seek openings for the export of capital.

*Third Thesis* : The food strategy as envisaged by imperialism for Tanzania will intensify, not lessen, the dependent relationship of Tanzania to imperialism. Whatever autonomy the peasants have had so far in food production for subsistence will have been lost by the time, indeed long before, the National Maize Programme and the National Agriculture Development Project have been completed.

*Fourth Thesis* : There is nothing "national" about the Tanzanian strategy for self-reliance in food. It is national only in form. Its content, its strategy and its direction is international in essence. The "national" Tanzanian strategy is only part of a larger international strategy of imperialism itself.

It must be understood that we are not engaging here in prophecies or predictions. Things could change radically during the course of the next twenty years. We are talking here about broad tendencies, based on our understanding of the laws that dictate the movement of capitalism in its present phase of imperialism. These laws operate independently of the will of anybody. There is no "conspiracy" involved here on the part of imperialism. Imperialist monopolies are themselves involved in severe competition with one another for markets for their products, for cheaper raw materials to cut down their cost of production, and for accumulating and centralising capital into fewer and fewer hands, and they have to follow certain dictates of the law of value. Business, after all, is business. You cannot be sentimental about it.

*First Thesis* : *The food crisis in 1973/75 in Tanzania was not of national making but constituted a crisis of imperialism itself.*

The Tanzanian Government blamed the drought for the food crisis. The World Bank, on the other hand, blamed the policy of

Ujamaa Vijijini that the Government had been pursuing since 1967. The one blamed natural causes, the other national causes.

There is no question that the drought was a contributory factor. These drought conditions have periodically hit Tanzanian agriculture, but it is difficult to be precise about the length of the cycle between droughts. The last drought was in 1967/68. As for the World Bank's thesis that the strategy of Ujamaa hampered production, it must be admitted that this too has some basis in reality. There were three reasons given for why the policy of socialism hampered production. One was that it led to larger investments going into infrastructure. This is true. As the Economic and Operations Report of the Bank of Tanzania showed in its June 1976 Report : "Examining the performance sectorwise it will be seen that the directly productive sectors have grown at rates much slower than others with the result that their contribution to the GDP has declined from 58.1 per cent in 1965 to 51.6 per cent in 1975 while that of the services sectors has increased from 41.9 per cent to 48.4 per cent."<sup>6</sup>

The second reason as to why the policy of Ujamaa hampered production was that it blocked the development of "progressive" farmers. Again there is some truth in this. For example, the Ujamaaisation of production in the Ismani region of Iringa and the consequent virtual elimination of "progressive" farmers there led to a serious drop in the production of wheat and maize in the region. And third reason was that the policy of socialism created uncertainty in the area of private transport thus creating serious transport bottlenecks. Again there may be some truth in this. But in giving all these reasons one suspects that the Bank was going out of its way to discredit socialism, and to put it as the chief reason for all the troubles Tanzania faced in its agriculture.

We would submit, however, that while all these were contributory factors, especially in the short run (when, for example, as sometimes happened, villagers would be moved to a new Ujamaa village location at the time of harvesting), these were not the main factors that brought about the food crisis in 1973/75. The main factors lay elsewhere, and the World Bank was trying in vain to hide

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these factors amongst short-term considerations that it put to the fore as the chief factors for the crisis.

These main factors lay in the very character of the economy that imperialism had planned for Tanzania. It may be objected that this is going too far back in history, and that it does not really help in understanding the reason for the famine in more recent years. Also, it would be argued, there is no reason for us to continue blaming imperialism fifteen years after Tanzania had secured independence. Why did not the Government plan in a better way and provide for such eventualities as drought? After all, drought is not a new phenomenon.

What is missed out in this argument is that Tanzania is in no way able to plan "its" economy independently of finance capital. It is true that the Tanzanian government has a certain degree of relative autonomy from imperialism, (which government does not?) especially in the short run and for limited purposes. But the Tanzanian economy is merely a link within the chain of world economy dominated by finance capital, and as long as it remains a link in this chain it cannot stray too far away from its moorings. Governments with bigger and economically stronger economies than Tanzania's, such as that of India and Brazil, have sometimes had "independent" ideas of their own and tried to stray away, but were always whipped back to their senses by the representatives of finance capital, the World Bank and the IMF. This is a hard reality. It is utopian to think that any state or economy which is not controlled by the workers and peasants can hope to break this link with the imperialist chains. Tanzania did try to meander away from its neo-colonial moorings with independent ideas about Ujamaa socialism, but was soon whipped back to line by the World Bank who reprimanded her for violating the law of value. In 1974 the World Bank carried out an extensive survey of the economy and made its recommendations which were timed to coincide with the preparation of Tanzania's Third Five Year Plan. The plan is not yet out, but it is unlikely that the "Planners" would be so reckless as not to heed the advice of the Bank. President Nyerere must have been speaking from bitter



experience when he told his audience in Ibadan, Nigeria in November, 1976 :

“The reality of neo-colonialism quickly becomes obvious to a new African government which tries to act on economic matters in the interest of national development, and for the betterment of its own masses. For such a government immediately discovers that it inherited the power to make laws, to direct the civil service, to treat with foreign governments, and so on, but that it did not inherit effective power over economic developments in its own country. *Indeed, it often discovers that there is no such thing as a national economy at all...* Neo-colonialism is very real”.<sup>7</sup>

(emphasis added)

This is how matters stand with a neo-colony. The function of the neo-colony at least at the economic level is to do its share within the international division of labour determined *historically* from the time it was integrated into the world economy, and *revised* from time to time since then.

But what has this got to do with the food shortage in Tanzania during 1973-75 ? Simply this, that if it was anybody who should have planned beforehand to handle problems of droughts, it should have been the chieftains of finance capital, and not the “national” planners in Tanzania. What the monopolies wanted most from the colonies and neo-colonies were cheap industrial raw materials, and openings for exports of capital, and with their control of credit, markets and seasonal inputs into production they could get from their colonies and neo-colonies pretty much what they wanted. A planned food strategy for the peoples of the exploited and dominated countries was never a part of the imperialist system of production, and hence when the food crisis came in 1973-75 it hit several places in the “third World” at the same time. Tanzania’s was by no means an isolated case. The crisis essentially was a crisis caused by the anarchy was made by the Colonial state in 1949 with the creation of the *Landbank of Tanganyika*. Loans advanced from the Landbank were mainly to large-scale expatriate farmers who grew tea, coffee, tobacco

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and sisal. By 1961 the Landbank had disbursed some 60 million shs, but owing to a very high rate of default in the paying back of the loans by expatriate farmers, the Landbank was dissolved just before independence.<sup>9</sup> In its place was now set up the *Agricultural Credit Agency* (ACA), which was designed for the specific purpose of meeting the credit requirements of African smallholders. The amounts disbursed were smaller than those disbursed by the Landbank (Tshs. 1.2 million as local Development Loan Fund, Tshs 2.0 million as African Productivity Loans Fund, and Tshs. 7.9 million as District Loans to be disbursed through the cooperative movement), but once again the loans were largely used for land improvement, fertilizers, insecticides and improved seeds for export crops. By 1964 bad debts amounted to some 40 per cent of the loans and the ACA gave way to a new credit institution, the *National Development Credit Agency* (NDCA).

The NDCA was itself created on the recommendation of the World Bank, reflecting the change over from direct colonialism to multilateral imperialism,<sup>10</sup> and the biggest part of its financing came from the World Bank's affiliate, the International Development Agency (IDA). In 1966 the Tanzania Government signed an agreement with IDA which, apart from financing, provided a team of experts in order to strengthen the NDCA's capacity to evaluate and supervise credit administration. Although some loans were made to individual farmers, most of the loan administration was done through the co-operative movements, which had proven, in some areas, to have been very successful marketing agencies. With 35 unions supervising some 1,500 primary societies with a registered membership of some 750,000 farmers, the co-operative movement could thus reach anywhere between 35 and 40 per cent of the total farming population. As for the use to which the credit was put, one economist, M. Collinson had this to say: "Almost by origin its role is with cash crops, the key instrument for drawing smallholders into the exchange economy. Research and extension activities both focus on these crops and it is here that credit using technological opportunities are the greatest."<sup>11</sup> Collinson then gives details of how the credit was disbursed by the NDCA through the co-operative movement showing incidentally how the penetration of

finance capital was leading to the process of centralisation of capital.

“From 1966 the IDA credit required centralised purchase by public tender to satisfy World Bank borrowing regulations..... and NDCA became directly involved in public tendering, buying, and in organising transportation. Central buying by direct import reduced prices considerably...By 1969 the copper, dieldrin and fenitrothion needed by eight coffee unions were bought in bulk, by tender through NDCA”.<sup>12</sup>

The centralisation of capital turned all local agencies to service finance capital, and this process effected not only the method of purchasing the inputs (though tendering, which would work in favour of certain monopolies), but also the methods of accounting. As Collinson said, “Societies are being encouraged to set up NDCA loan accounts to parallel their general accounts. While this creates extra administration, it is the only obvious way to record the flow of funds. It is also important, as we shall see, for the recovery of both hard and soft credit”.<sup>12</sup>

But recovery from co-operative societies proved much more difficult than anticipated. By 1971 debts amounted to 40 per cent of the total loans.<sup>13</sup> What does this mean? This means that since the IDA loans had to be paid back somehow from the general fund, those not using NDCA credits (e.g. poor peasants outside the cash crop economy) were subsidizing those, mostly progressive farmers, who used NDCA credit but did not repay the loans. Once again, the solution was to liquidate the accumulated debts by substituting a new credit agency. In May 1971, the *Tanzanian Rural Development Bank* (TRDB) was set up to replace the NDCA.

The responsibilities of the TRDB were defined by the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank Act of 1971 as follows and we summarise :

- (i) to extend long and medium term credit financing for rural development ;
- (ii) to provide technical assistance and advice for the purpose of promoting rural development ;

- (iii) to administer, on behalf of the Government, such special funds as may from time to time be placed at its disposal ;
- (iv) to finance the purchase of agricultural inputs ; and
- (v) to undertake such other activities as may be necessary or advantageous for the purpose of furthering the foregoing objectives.

In order to qualify for TRDB assistance, a project has to be technically, economically and financially viable ; it should have sound management, and its projected operations should be consistent with the "national economic development priorities".

Let us look at one of these "national economic development priorities". The second Five Year Development Plan, at the instance of the Bank, designated Mpanda, in the Rukwa Region, as tobacco area. The agreement with the Bank stipulated that three tobacco complexes were to be established in Mpanda. The idea was to move people out of their farms into nearby forest where they would clear an acre of land for tobacco growing and another for their subsistence food. They would be provided with seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and tractor service, the cost of all of which was deductible from the final payable to the farmers for their tobacco. Tobacco growing, however, is hard work, and requires cultivation and curing to retain the required nicotine content for export. After five months of very hard work that involved the whole family, including children, the average gross income per family came to Tsh. 2,075 in 1973/74. Out of this was deducted Tshs. 770 for the cost of inputs, Tsh. 72 for society levy, and Tshs. 116 for interest on capital, leaving the poor peasant family with shs. 1,117. Spread out over twelve months, an average adult worker thus got shs. 54 per month. In 1972/73, it was even lower—shs. 35 per month. By the beginning of 1974 only 176 families out of the required 1,000 had settled there, leading to complaints by the World Bank that the Government had not fulfilled its obligations under the agreement to settle the required number of people in the area for tobacco growing. People therefore had to be forced to move into the area, and to abandon their usual habitat.<sup>14</sup> As a result, a maize producing area was converted into tobacco production for

export, as the following figures show, and by 1974 the peasants of Mpanda were being fed by imported maize from Zambia.

TABLE

	1969/70	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1974/75
Maize (tons)	1110	778	424	130	138
Tobacco (tons)	184	231	287	233	310

A similar fate afflicted Tabora where tobacco growing was started along the same lines. While tobacco production grew from almost nil to 7,210 tons in 1973/74, the production of maize fell from 62,000 tons in 1970/71 to 12,000 tons in 1973/74. After the 1973/75 food crisis, the peasants refused to grow tobacco and reverted to maize, so that in 1975/76 the production of tobacco fell to 7,887 tons and that of maize increased to 145,000 tons.<sup>15</sup>

This may look like just an isolated bad example, but that is not so. The TRDB is no mean organisation. It is the largest bank for agricultural credit in Tanzania, and it has been expanding very rapidly, mostly with funds from the World Bank and other Western capitalist countries. Its loans increased from Tshs. 35.8 million in 1971/72 to Tshs. 102.7 million in 1972/73, Tshs. 160.7 million in 1973/74, and Tshs. 203.2 million in 1974/75.<sup>16</sup> (Compare this with the Ministry of Agriculture's budget of Tshs. 33.9 million in 1969/70 and Tshs. 91.4 million in 1974/75.)<sup>17</sup> Of the total of Tshs. 203 million that the TRDB disbursed in 1974/75, the largest share, some Tshs. 125.5 million, went for *tobacco* production of which Tshs. 90.5 million went to Tabora and Tshs. 15.0 million went to Iringa. Of the total, Tshs. 18.9 million (this is, less than 10 per cent) went for the production of maize, wheat and paddy.<sup>18</sup> This is insofar as the distribution of TRDB loans as between different *crops* is concerned. If one looked at the *purposes* for which the loans were made, one would see that 70 per cent of the loans in 1974/75 (i.e. Tshs. 141.8 million) went for seasonal inputs alone, that is, for things such as fertilizers, insecticides, and seeds.<sup>19</sup>

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TRDB, in fact, is the single largest buyer of fertilizers in the country. In 1972 it bought 30,966 tons of fertilizers, that is 58.3 per cent of the total ; in 1973 it bought 46,870 tons (or 70.6 per cent) of the total ; and in 1975, 47,863 tons (or 51.1 per cent) of the total.<sup>20</sup> Tobacco uses almost the entire production of NPK, some 21,300 tons in 1975, produced by the only fertilizer plant Tanzania has, the Tanga Fertilizer Company. Some of this fertilizer is used by the Greek tobacco farmers in Iringa but much is used by the World Bank tobacco projects in Tabora and Mpanda. Given the fact that these fertilizers were not given free to the peasants of Tabora and Mpanda, but their cost deducted from the final price, and given, further, the fact that the price of NPK has risen from Tshs. 780 per ton in 1972 to Tshs. 2,434 in 1975, it should be obvious to anybody that the poor peasants were not only paying through their nose to maintaining a high-cost fertilizer factory at Tanga, and to paying back the loans of the World Bank and other capitalist countries, but also to making sure that they were producing tobacco for the world market at the cost of cutting down their own maize production. Such indeed are the "national economic development priorities" that the TRDB has to serve.

The TRDB and the tobacco project are only a part of a whole picture which is essentially a picture of how the technical and social conditions of production in Tanzania, like in any other neo-colony, cannot permit it to produce what it likes and how it likes. The Tanzanian economy must serve the needs of the world economy which is dominated by finance capital, that is, in the Leninist sense of the term. There are thousand and one ways, from the provision of credit to that of seeds and even to prescribing the way the co-operatives should maintain their account books, in which finance capital can tie *all* production in a neo-colony, directly or indirectly, to serve the needs of capitalist accumulation on a world scale. That it incidentally and *partially* serves some of the consumer needs of the local population cannot be denied. But it does so only when it is in consonant with and does not contradict, the demands of finance capital.

It is, therefore, not too surprising that a country which has about 70 per cent of its total agricultural land under food crops

should still periodically suffer from severe food shortages. And why not ? Food production has been the most neglected sector of agriculture. We have already seen where most of the credit, the fertilizers, the insecticides, and other inputs go. How do you fight against droughts producing a crisis in food production when most of science and technology is in the service of export crops ? Not only this, but also extension services, marketing, transport and storage facilities, as well as government policies on pricing of agricultural products are all geared towards the export crops economy. Thus Dr. Maletnlema, whom we have quoted earlier writes : "...to date agricultural extension services could rightly be referred to as the cash crop extension services, for without exception field officers have been trained for coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, and other cash crops, but none for cassava, millet, banana or other food crops. Recently (that is, after the 1974 food crisis, Y.T.) as maize and rice began to find a place among the cash crops, appropriate extension officers also began to appear"<sup>21</sup>

But maize and rice are not staples indigenous to Africa. The most common staples in Africa are sorghum and millet. Apart from being nutritionally superior to maize, sorghum and millet are more resistant to drought conditions and are less susceptible to insect and bird attacks due to tannin content. But during the colonial period, sorghum and millet got replaced by maize, imported from its native South America. To be economically grown maize requires a high rainfall, well-timed fertilizer and insecticides. These "qualities" make maize (just like wheat) the ideal crop for monopolies, for through advanced research on seeds and other inputs, as we shall later see, the monopolies exercise complete control over maize production in third world countries. The following figures show the relative weight of maize in food production compared to sorghum and millet in Tanzania. In 1972, 1,174,500 hectares were under maize, while 256,400 ha. were under millet and 295,000 under sorghum.<sup>22</sup> As for production, we have the following figures : (See Table 2)

Thus it is a situation in which not only do we have unfavourable conditions of production for food crops compared to export

TABLE 2

('000 tons)

	1970/71	1973/74	1975/76
Maize	755	588	1,187
Sorghum	171	211	348
Millet	141	170	208

crops generally, but as between food crops too, the traditional food crops are even less favoured what has now undoubtedly become the ruling staple in Tanzania, namely, maize, which is a crop over which the monopolies can exercise greater control than over sorghum or millet. The following table shows the relative returns to land and labour in smallholder production of the various agricultural crops.<sup>24</sup>

TABLE 3

	<i>Price</i> 1973/74 Tsh/100kg	<i>Yield</i> kg/ha	<i>Gross Return</i> Tsh/Ha	<i>Cost</i> Tsh/Ha
Coffee	450	600	2,700	15
Cotton	141.5	350	495	—
Maize	35	750	263	8
Wheat	40	700	308	15
Sorghum	50	500	250	8

The food crisis of 1973/75 thus had structural causes. The draught and the attempted Ujamaaisation of agricultural production were certainly contributory factors but these were short term factors. The real reasons lay in the structure of the economy itself which was created during the colonial period and sustained, indeed reinforced,



by the control that finance capital commands through its supply of credit and other inputs on all neo-colonial production.

**Second Thesis :** *The objective of the new food strategy is not national self-sufficiency in food, though this is how the matter is presented formally, and though the domestic requirements of food might be incidentally fulfilled within the framework of a larger objective. The larger objective is to produce food for the world market of which the Tanzanian market is only a portion, on behalf of imperialist monopolies. The objective is to cheapen the cost of production for the monopolies and seek openings for the export of capital.*

The new food strategy hinges on the National Maize Project. It was initiated at the suggestion of the World Bank. The argument for the strategy is rather simple, and all simple-minded and honest people would find it most persuasive. Even the most anti-imperialist liberals will accept the argument, especially after the famine of 1973-75, that the third world countries should be self-sufficient in food, that their economies have been dislocated through an over emphasis in the past on the production of raw materials for export, and that therefore this imbalance against food production for home consumption should be redressed.

A book that has just come out in the United States expresses this sentiment in its very title, *'Food First'*.<sup>25</sup> It is an extremely useful book in that it destroys a number of false myths prevalent in the West such as that overpopulation is the cause of hunger in the third world countries, or that the problem is really lack of technology, or that the Green Revolution has "bought us time". The book also suffers from a few myths of its own, such as a simple equation of "capital" with "surplus", or the belief that a "redistribution of income" out of the hands of "landlords, moneylenders, merchants, industrialists, state bureaucrats, and foreign corporations" and into the hands of poor peasants will mobilise "capital" for a food first economy they prescribe.<sup>26</sup> A similar strategy also emerges from a

remarkably identical book called *How The Other Half Dies*<sup>27</sup> which sometimes betrays a somewhat simple-minded faith in the ability of radical third world countries to change the situation through 'internal policies and planning'.<sup>28</sup> The author is taken in by the Monopolies' propaganda at least in the case of the Mumias Sugar complex in Kenya, run jointly by the government and the United Kingdom transnational, Booker McConnell, and cites this example favourably to come to the conclusion that "multinational agri-business must be controlled, for when it is, it has a definite contribution to make".<sup>29</sup> During the course of our discussion the falsity underlying these arguments would hopefully become clear, but there is no question that both the above books have, on balance, made an enormous and positive contribution to our understanding of the nature of agri-business.

But let us get back to the World Bank's argument for the strategy of creating self-sufficiency in maize for Tanzania. The argument is as follows: One, in 1973/74 Tanzania imported 291,000 tons of maize at a cost of about Tshs. 360 million (US \$50 million). Two, the prices of maize in the world market is likely to go up from US \$128/ton in 1975 to US \$154/ton by 1980, and thus the cost of imports will be much higher if another food crisis should hit the economy. Three, the World Bank could with assistance from its soft-loan affiliate IDA, build Tanzania's capacity for domestic maize production to attain self-sufficiency by 1980. Four, no transnational would be involved in the execution of the project, it being the responsibility directly of the Ministry of Agriculture through the agency of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB).

It would be difficult, at first sight, to find fault with such a scheme. It is true that initially Tanzania would have to depend on foreign aid, but so what? Tanzania had already spent about US \$100 million in foreign exchange to purchase maize from large agribusiness transnationals in 1974/75. What was wrong in spending a third of that, i.e. US \$38.1 million, in building up self-sufficiency. Again, of these \$38.1 million, \$18 million would come from the IDA carrying only  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent interest which is sufficient only to cover the cost of its administration, and \$5 million would come from the

Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDIA), at only 2 per cent interest payable over 20 years, with a 5 year grace period. The rest would come from the Government of Tanzania (US \$11.1 million of which \$6.4 million were made available by the USAID), and from the farmers (\$4.0 million). All in all it would appear as if it would be the big US grain dealers, the transnationals which stood to lose from this project for, in effect, assuming the project succeeded, they would lose a lucrative market in Tanzania. They would no longer be able to count on maize shortage in Tanzania to push \$100 or \$200 million of their surplus grains in the United States. After satisfying the local market, US grain monopolies are left over with nearly 60 per cent of wheat and rice, 50 per cent of soyabeans, 25 per cent of sorghum and 20 per cent of maize for export.<sup>31</sup> But if the World Bank sets out to build local production capacity for maize in Tanzania (and wheat in Kenya), and possibly in other countries, will the US grain monopolies sell their surplus? Thus it would appear, the World Bank was working *against* the interests of the Transnationals who made money out of famine conditions in the third world and it was working in favour of the third world countries. Again there would appear to be no particular interest which the Bank was serving for itself, for what can the World Bank itself get out of spending \$18 million of its money at  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent interest? Hence there would appear to be no doubt that this project is well conceived to serve the interests of the people of Tanzania.

Like everything else, this argument must be looked at more closely. There is obviously a catch somewhere.

In the first place let us look at how the \$38.1 million is going to be spent. We have the following figures : (Table 4)

As can be seen, the largest single item of expenditure is farm inputs, 73 per cent of which consist of purchases in foreign exchange. These consist mainly of seeds, fertilizers and insecticides. The important thing about these inputs is that somebody eventually has to pay for them. Under the present arrangement, 25 per cent is paid by the peasants, and 75 per cent by the Government, though it is expected

TABLE 4

	<i>Local</i>	<i>Foreign US \$ mil- lions</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Foreign Exchange per cent</i>
1. Farm Inputs	3·822	10·508	14·332	73
2. Project Service Unit	0·566	0·667	1·223	54
3. Regional Staff and Support	2·237	2·008	4·245	47
4. Storage & Transport	2·989	5·440	8·429	65
5. Training	0·569	0·369	0·938	39
6. Air Transport	0·084	0·221	0·305	72
7. Pilot Ox Utilization	0·069	0·015	0·084	18
8. Project Preparation Studies	0·152	0·527	0·679	78
Sub-total	10·488	19·755	30·243	65
Contingencies	3·254	4·640	7·894	58
Total Project Cost	13·742	24·395	38·137	64

that after 1980 the cost would be borne 40 per cent by the peasants and 60 per cent by the Government, and after 1984, 60 per cent by the peasants and 40 per cent by the Government. Thus over time an increasing portion of the burden of the cost of inputs would be shifted directly over to the peasants.

It is calculated by some expert that at 75 per cent subsidy, the cumulative cost of it to the Government in the first five years of the project (1975-1980) would be US \$36·0 million. In other words, adding now the amount paid by the peasants (25 per cent of the cost), the amount of *inputs* used during the 1975-80 period would be \$48 million. And the cumulative cost to the Government of the subsidy for the inputs over the ten-year period (1975-85) is expected to be US \$99 million. If we add to this the amounts to be paid by the peasants

for the inputs, the total cost of inputs for the ten-year period could be as high as \$162 million.

So here we are. We are now no longer talking about the initial commitment of \$38.1 million. The part of it which is spent on inputs is recovered after every harvest and respent on purchasing new inputs. Leaving aside other costs, the inputs alone now cost \$162 million over a ten year period, 73 per cent of which in foreign exchange (see Table 4).

The following account from the *Daily News* of 19 October, 1976 will make the point clear :

"A report released by the project head office last week said that there has been a 'very, encouraging' response from the peasants in paying back loans given to them in terms of seed, fertilizers and insecticides. Farmers in Kilimanjaro, Morogoro, Dodoma and Iringa had repaid over 70 per cent of their loan commitments by the end of September, the report said. 'Altogether 6,217,575/25 has been paid back to the Project Service Unit (PSU) by last month. And more money was still coming in from peasants eager to (sic!) to pay up their loans, before the onset of the next season', Ndugu Urusa said. Total loan commitments to peasants stand at 14,718,576/95".<sup>32</sup>

The Maize Project has thus converted an *occasional* purchase of maize from overseas during periods of shortage into a *regular* purchase of inputs for the production of that maize at home. The Maize Project, therefore is an example of *import substitution agriculture*. Furthermore, the monopolies are now more directly involved in the very process of *production* of food, formerly their capital input in production was very low (in the form of seeds) while they sold excess grains through the market. Now what does this do to the maize we eat? The maize we eat now has a greater capital input than before. The following table should make the point. We take, for comparison, the maize that was produced before the Maize Project and that which is produced under what is called Package III, the

package that uses the most inputs. From the calculations of experts we get the following :

TABLE 5

	<i>Traditional</i>	<i>Package III</i>
Yield : kg/ha	1,110	2,700
Gross Return at Tsh.750 per ton	825	2,025
<i>Input Costs</i>		
1. Seed at 25 kg/ha	21	115
2. 5 per cent DDT at 10 kg/ha	—	27
3. One bag of TSP	—	186
4. Three gags of S/A	—	398
Total input cost	21	726
Gross Margin	804	1,299

Assuming the price (Gross return) to be equivalent to value of the product, and assuming a hundred per cent rate of exploitation (S/V), we get the following calculations, which we carry out not as measures of precision, but as approximations for helping us to compare the two kinds of maize.

Traditional :  $21(C) + a(V) + a(S) = 825$  (Value)

Maize

$$21 + 2a = 825$$

$$2a = 804$$

$$a = 402$$

Where :

C=Constant capital

V=Variable capital

S=Surplus Value

Package III :  $726(C) + b(V) + b(S) = 2,025$  (Value)

Maize

$$726 + 2b = 2,025$$

$$2b = 1,299 \text{ (say 1300)}$$

$$b = 650$$

In the case of traditional maize, the peasant can be paid up to Shs. 402 per hectare for his labour-power, assuming 100 per cent rate of surplus-value, and for Package III maize up to 650 Shs. In real life, the peasants are likely to be paid much below these levels, especially in the case of Package III maize. The experts have calculated that the Maize project would increase the per capita cash income of the peasant by between Tshs 46 and 68, to something like Tshs. 342. But even if the peasant were to receive the full value of 650/=per ha. for Package III Maize it is clear that the capital component (C : V ratio) of that maize is much higher (726 : 650) than before (21 : 402). In other words, a greater portion of the value of every grain of maize that we now consume goes as return to capital than as return to labour. *The so-called "national" market for maize is, in essence, a part of the world market of finance capital.* To put it crudely, there is more of fertilizers, seed technology, DDT and other insecticides than of labour-power in every grain of maize that we now consume, and as the prices of these inputs go up, as indeed they are likely to, the share of capital is likely to increase even further. For instance, the price of sulphur of Ammonia has risen from Tshs. 425 a ton in 1972 to Tsh. 2,151 a ton in 1975.<sup>33</sup> By contrast, the peasants are not so organised as to fight for a higher share of the value that they help to create, and are likely therefore to suffer from increased exploitation, even if in purely quantitative terms their return to labour increases marginally.

What, then, do we conclude about the role of the World Bank? Its role is what it has always been to act as a bridgehead for finance capital's penetration into the very production process within the neo-colonies. By committing its \$ 18 million at  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent interest "which covers only the cost of its administration", (how charitable!!) the Bank creates openings for the export of capital on a long term basis, and since, in this particular instance, it is the US monopolies which are strongest in seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, the World Bank has, in effect, acted as the forerunner of American finance capital, which in this case, even mobilises Arab money capital to service its interests.

We have not gone into the question of future possibilities that the Maize Project opens up for further exports of capital. For

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example, with production and yields increasing, it might in future become possible for mechanisation of production, which means exports of capital in the form of tractors and other tools of agriculture. Already we have witnessed the rural technology conference in Arusha in August-September 1977 organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the British Ministry of Overseas Development at which all kinds of technology were displayed by the monopolies from irrigation and pumping equipment to maize shellers and cooking ovens using solar energy. Under the title "Rush for new maize sheller" the *Daily News* of 6th September described how a dozen maize shellers brought by the Cereals and Rural Technology Section of the British Tropical Products Institute (TPI) were set upon in wonderment by the peasants and taken away. Dr. Dendy of the TPI was quoted as saying, "Our job is to spread technology"<sup>34</sup>. Tanzania may be opening up to a new East African edition of the Green Revolution.

We have also not gone into the question of future possibilities of exports of maize from Tanzania. Because of low returns to labour and absence of ground rent the cost of production of maize, even with high capital import content, is likely to be lower than say in the United States, and it is therefore possible that Tanzania might be persuaded in the future, in order to earn foreign exchange, to export maize to the United States or Europe. There it is likely to be converted into animal feedstuff rather than food for human consumption. Europe right now suffers from an acute shortage of inputs for animal feedstuffs, and is very vulnerably dependent on soyabeans imports from the USA. Tanzanian maize might, in future, be an answer for European feedstuff producers.

**Third Thesis :** *The food strategy as envisaged by imperialism for Tanzania will intensify, not lessen dependent relationship of Tanzania to imperialism. Also, whatever little autonomy the peasants have had so far in food production would be lost.*

This thesis follows from the previous one. We have already demonstrated how maize production has become much more capital-



intensive, and is likely to become even more so over time. The only argument we have heard that contradicts this thesis is that over time the technology that Tanzania will import for maize production will gradually be indigenised. that Tanzanians will adopt or adapt the technology and learn the skills and will begin to produce their own seeds, their own fertilizers, their own insecticides and perhaps, who knows, even their own tractors. So let us look at this argument a little more closely.

Let us start with the industry that Tanzania already has, the fertilizers factory at Tanga, the Tanzania Fertilizer Company Limited. The technology and know-how is imported from Germany. An agreement was signed with the German transnational, Klockner, in 1968, and the factory started production in 1972. In addition to know-how, Klockner also put in an equity contribution of Tshs. 10 million, and made a further loan of Tshs. 93 million at 6 per cent tied to supply of technology from Klockner. The loan is repayable in Mark, and hence with each re-evaluation of the Mark the \$ cost of the loan has increased. The National Development Corporation made an equity contribution of Tshs. 15 million, and a further Tshs. 60 million was negotiated as short term loan from the National Bank of Commerce. Most of the inputs are imported at very high and *increasing* cost, and as can be seen from the table below of the cost structure, the only local inputs consist of electricity, fresh water and labour-power.

TABLE 6

<i>Total Input</i>	<i>June 1975</i>	<i>Jan-June 1975</i>
Sulphur @ 880.31	1,127,678.00	7,414,946.00
Phosphate @ 655.14	2,992,004.00	16,213,512.00
Potash @ 1,906.45	638,664.00	8,920,523.00
Ammonia @ 3,280.18	1,056,218.00	10,976,754.00
Caustic Soda @ 4,152.71	29,069.00	169,590.00
Kaolin		22,685.00
116,855 Empty Bags @ 3.78	441,712.00	1,974,653.00
<i>Variable Costs</i>	<i>6,285,345.00</i>	<i>45,692,663.00</i>

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Electricity	165,610.00	941,424.00
Fresh Water	53,321.00	275,395.00
Local Spares	48,903.00	133,319.00
Imported Spares	102,801.00	1,101,234.00
Industrial Diesel Oil	34,486.00	249,971.00
Fuel Oil	20,293.00	213,649.00
Gas Oil	16,231.00	56,286.00
Lubricants	10,985.00	47,532.00
Super Petrol	17,785.00	107,607.00
Canteen Subsidy	16,000.00	96,000.00
Services and Supplies	281,848.00	1,842,743.00
<i>Semi Variable Costs</i>	768,263.00	5,065,160.00
Salaries and Wages	966,101.00	5,842,509.00
Depreciation	1,083,333.00	6,499,998.00
Interest actual	1,940,150.00	11,228,479.00
Management Fee	93,750.00	562,500.00
Insurance	50,000.00	300,000.00
<i>Fixed Costs</i>	4,133,334.00	24,433,486.00
<i>Total Costs</i>	11,186,942.00	75,191,309.00

As can be seen from the above table, the major items of cost are chemical, depreciation on machinery, and interest on loan tied to the supply of technology. The figure of Tshs. 5.8 million for salaries and wages is deceptive for it includes not only wages of workers (a smaller portion of the total) but also salaries of the expatriate experts (a larger portion of the total). In a six-month period the only value added locally, by way of inputs (that is excluding the value of labour and surplus value) is less than a million shillings worth of electricity and a quarter million shillings worth of water. Even the empty bags in which the fertilizers are packed are imported.

It is clear that the main purpose of this highly capital-intensive production is to serve as an opening for the export of German

capital. Tenders for fertilizer plants making a simpler range of products from local materials were turned down on the grounds that fertilizers would not be produced rapidly. And up to now no serious effort has been made to use the sulphur from Kilwa and the byproducts of cement as inputs into the Tanga Fertilizers factory. Thus, even for those items of food or crop production such as tobacco and maize for which official figures indicate "local" as the source of the fertilizers (see table 4 above on maize for example), in no sense can the fertilizers be called "local". All these fertilizers belong to finance capital. The return to capital is infinitely more than the return to labour.

Such are the prospects for building an indigenous fertilizers industry in Tanzania. Incidentally, while this chemical-based fertilizers industry is producing inputs for tobacco and now for the World Bank maize, and annual production of 4.13 million tons of manure (3.73 million tons from cows, 143,000 tons from sheep and 250,00 from goats) is either wasted or used as fuel.<sup>35</sup> Finance capital is only interested in pushing its own chemicals, not in manure.

Let us now turn to seed. What is seed? It is a living thing, subject to genetic and other transformations and death. Therefore, the preservation of its genetic characteristics from ecological disturbances and from attacks by virus demands well-defined procedures and control from breeding to farm delivery. Quality seed is an entire technology in itself. A hybrid seed is pure and simple a product of capital. Into every hybrid seed that is weather and virus resistant there is incorporated an enormous amount of research which only the most advanced capitalist countries can carry out.<sup>36</sup>

Susan George informs us that in the United States at least half of all research is done by agribusiness corporations, and that at least half the research being done "in" the third world countries is not necessarily done "for" them. It is done for the monopolies themselves. And monopolies do not sell their technology free, nor do they reveal the products of their paid scientists for free. In fact, the seed technology is so advanced that with highly sophisticated seeds, agribusiness

corporations can practically control the production of food. There are something like 400,000 varieties of wheat alone, and 5,500 new strains of wheat. "Research centres in the poor countries", adds Susans George, "have nothing like the personnel or the physical means to collect, read, classify and distribute available knowledge."<sup>37</sup>

We quote below a passage on the history of maize seed development in East Africa for the benefit not of those who know already, agronomists and scientists, but for the ordinary economists and social scientists who generally have no knowledge about the complex technology that seed is:

"Interest in the nutritional value of East African maize goes back to 1957 when Fowden and Wolfe compared a number of types for the contents of some of their more important aminoacids. They found that an Ulu farmer's stock of Local Yellow had considerably higher lysine and tryptophane than other types examined. Current work in Kenya at Kitale, in Tanzania, at Ukiriguru and Ilonga, and in Zambia at Mount Makulu uses two major single genes, *opaque 2* and *floury 2*, developed by (note this! Y.T.) the Purdue University team (in the United States). These two genes block the final link in the plants chain of chemical reactions, switching some of the protein from zein (nutritionally almost worthless) to lysine and tryptophane (the two aminoacids most needed for improvement of human nutrition). *This new tool* (emphasis added, because that is what it is, a "tool"—Y.T.) is most important in East Africa where maize is a main staple food".<sup>40</sup>

This is obviously an expert's area into which we fear to tread, but we know that for the National Maize project the several seed farms in Tanzania (e.g. at Ilonga Research Centre) can mostly supply the composite type of seeds, whereas the Hybrid types will have to be imported from the Kenya Seed Company, which is a private commercial company, associated with research carried out on maize in the United States.

The important thing about seed is not only that it is a sophisticated technology in itself, but also that its genetic characteristics can be so organised that it can only yield with certain types and quantities of fertilizers and insecticides, thus, tying down its user to certain other kinds of inputs. The hybrid seeds last only for one season and have to be purchased afresh for every new season.

Such is the situation with regards to seed. Much the same is true of pesticides, another research-intensive technology. In the whole world, there are only 30 to 35 research centres for the development of new pesticides: five of these firms are in West Germany, ten or twelve more in the rest of Western Europe, less than ten in the USA, and three to five in Japan. We get this information from Susan George, who adds that most of the third world countries do not have sufficient supplies of basic chemical products to make even the simplest compounds. In 1974-75, the expected cost of developing a single new ingredient was \$ 10 million, up from \$ 4 million in 1967. The industry thus is highly concentrated and monopolized, and there is no hope for new entrants, least of all for a small neo-colony, to enter production on its own.

If this looks like a dismal picture, then we must be excused for presenting the reality of monopoly capitalism in such stark terms. If anybody believes that in the epoch of imperialism, in which the law of concentration and centralisation of capital continues to operate with ever greater force, "national" capitals can arise in the neo-colonies, then he must be harbouring illusions. It is possible, of course, to purchase technology from the monopolies—for a price. It is also possible, in the short run, to copy a particular technology. But sooner or later R & D will catch up, and the old technology will have become outdated. No country that does not have an independent research base of its own can ever hope to compete with the monopolies. Thus, for example, India's present technology is largely based on designs acquired from collaborators ten or twenty years ago. Most of it is outdated, and she is now hounded by the World Bank to modernise her equipment (which India may have to do to avoid worse things to come), and for this new equipment she has to enter into fresh technological agreements with the monopolies

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that are in the forefront of research and development in particular sectors of Industry.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, in getting finance capital to grow food in Tanzania, the country has tied itself hand and foot with the technology of the monopolies. It may be argued : so what ? At least, it will now be possible to feed the hungry and to stave off famine. Possibly, but this is not the point at issue. The point of issue is whether the present food strategy will intensify or lessen Tanzania's dependent relationship with imperialism, and our thesis is that it will intensify this dependent relationship. Furthermore, as we stated earlier, it will undermine whatever little freedom the peasants had in the production of their food. This is inevitable. The peasants will now have to grow food not only to feed the people, but also to generate profits for the monopolies that supply seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, which, as we saw earlier, will now comprise a greater share of the value of the total product than the share that goes to the peasants. In the end, peasants will have paid for the entire capital input. In other words, that capital input is nothing other than the surplus-value produced by the peasants themselves, capitalised by the monopolies, and turned into instruments for the further exploitation of the peasants. This has always been the basis of capitalism, and whoever defines that capitalised surplus-value as "aid" needs to start studying economics all over again. How can capitalised peasant surplus value be called "aid"?

Finally, the Tanzanian case illustrates the way finance capital can directly exploit the peasantry without turning it into a proletariat. The peasant does not get anything more than the value of the reproduction of his labour-power (he might even get less), and therefore what he gets may be regarded as an equivalent of a wage, but the peasant is reproduced as a peasant. He has the illusion of "owning" the plot of land which he cultivates, and therefore he is vulnerable to petty bourgeois ideologies. Similarly the Ujamaa village that is engaged in maize production may be "seen" to be "owning" the land and tools of labour along the lines of "socialist" ownership. This too is an illusion. These kinds of formal ownerships do not

bother finance capital. On the contrary, it helps to keep the peasantry backward (divided and ideologically confused) and above all, it helps to keep the cost of production low. Finance capital is spared from paying a full minimum statutory wage to the peasants which they have would had to if the peasants were to be turned into agricultural proletariat (as in the so-called state farms). Also, equally important, finance capital does not have to pay ground rent (absolute ground rent) for the land that is communally owned. The peasants are thus impoverished and exploited on the basis of their "own" land, and they are left literally frozen in the stagnant social category of the peasantry.

Is it possible that there might be other peasants even more impoverished than the peasants will engage themselves in the production of World Bank maize? Yes, it is possible. These are peasants who might be paying taxes in one form or another (e.g. in the form of high prices of commodities they consume) out of which the Tanzanian state would provide subsidy for fertilizers, etc., for the World Bank farms. In other words, the repayment to the monopolies of the price of inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, seeds) is a charge not only on those peasants directly using these inputs, but also on those *not* using these inputs but generally contributing to the subsidy. To put it differently, *the price of inputs into maize production is so high, and the World Bank knows this only too well, that it is impossible for its cost to be met entirely out of the surplus-value produced by the peasants using these inputs without causing massive social unrest.* Thus the cost must be spread out amongst the entire peasantry generally (since the peasants comprise over 90 per cent of the population). and this is legalised as "subsidy" by the state to the peasants using the inputs of the monopolies !! Such fetishism, such a reversal of the truth so that a tax on the entire peasantry appears now like a "subsidy" for a section of it, while that section itself and the peasantry generally is paying out of their nose for the superprofits of the monopolies, this fetishism is an exercise that only capitalism can indulge with such impunity.

**Fourth Thesis :** *There is nothing "national" about the Tanzanian strategy for self-reliance in food. It is national only in*

*form. Its content, its strategy and its direction is international in essence. The "national" Tanzanian strategy is only part of a larger international strategy of imperialism itself.*

It cannot be otherwise. We must add a qualification nonetheless. In the short term it is quite possible for the government in the "third world" to alleviate immediate crisis through emergency measures, as indeed Tanzania did in 1974/75. But this creates other problems. It could get out of balance the entire set of priorities determined for the neo-colonies by the necessity of capital accumulation in the imperialist countries. For example, in reporting on the decline of 35.8 per cent in cotton production in 1974/75, the Bank of Tanzania explained, "the sharp drop in production is attributed mainly to reduced acreage. Faced with a larger drought related shortfall in food output in 1974, peasants switched large acreage to food crops to guard against the threat of famine in 1975/76. The shift could also be due to the peasants' over-enthusiastic response to Government campaign for self-sufficiency in staple foodstuffs and to the relative attractiveness of maize cultivation following substantial increases in producers price".<sup>40</sup>

In the long run, therefore, imperialism must intervene to reconsider the situation, and if necessary, to reallocate the resources to a different set of production priorities without upsetting the monopolies' demand for raw materials and the neo-colonies' requirements of foreign exchange.

Are we perhaps drawing an unwarranted conclusion generalised from the experience of just one country? We do not think so. We have not studied other similar cases, but Tanzania's experience does not appear to have been an isolated one. It is not accidental that one of the chieftains of finance capital, World Bank's Robert McNamara, should have put food and rural development in "third world" countries as a priority area of the Bank's investment programme at the last meeting of the UNCTAD at Nairobi. The Bank's interest in Tanzania did not emerge out of the blue. It was part of a larger project. Besides Tanzania, McNamara proposed projects in the



following seven countries to his Board of Governors: Kenya, Sudan, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Mali, India and Brazil, and he committed US \$7 billion to agriculture for the 1974-78 period, an 8 fold increase over the commitment made ten years ago (it was \$872 million for the 1964-68 period).

It might be suggested that McNamara was only responding to the outcry made against food shortage in the third world countries at the World Food Conference in November, 1974. But the World Bank is not a charitable organisation. It must be able to give correct leads to the private corporations from whom it borrows funds showing where they might export their capital profitably. In the final analysis it is the law of competition between the monopolies and the law of centralisation and concentration of capital which, in their own anarchic fashion, regulate the flow of capital from one sector of production to another, independently of the will of any one producer. Although monopolies interfere with the pricing of the commodities in the market, and thus also the profitability and short term movement of capital, the long term movement of capital can only be explained by the law of value.

We do not yet know enough of how this law has concretely operated over the last fifteen-twenty years, as for example, between food industries and non-food industries. However, we do know that hitherto the emphasis has been for capital exports to the "third world" countries to go in for the production and extraction of industrial raw materials, including agricultural products such as cotton and coffee as well as metals, minerals and oil. We also know that in more recent years capital exports have also gone in for import-substitution industries in these countries, and lately also for certain export-oriented manufacturing industries, especially in countries like Brazil and India.

But what we are now also witnessing in recent years is the exports of capital into food production and food processing industries, although it seems unlikely that it would surpass exports of capital into commodity production. The demand for raw materials is likely to increase unabated owing to the inherent tendency for the

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organic composition of capital to increase. Nonetheless, food production and processing are becoming profitable enterprises for the monopolies. This may have nothing to do with the need to satisfy the food requirements of the famine-stricken peoples of the third world. It may have more to do, we have seen in the case of the Tanzanian National Maize Project, with the profits that the transnationals can make out of selling their overpriced seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, extension services, managerial skills, etc.

The loudest voice at the World Food Conference in Rome might have been the silent cries of the dying in Sahel and Ethiopia. But only the representatives of the transnationals who stalked the corridors of the conference probably understood the real meaning of the opportunity that the conference provided. They had not come unprepared. They had already mapped out their programme just before the conference in a meeting at Toronto. In what came later to be known as the "Spirit of Toronto", the chieftains of agribusiness transnationals were offering themselves as the ones who had the answers to the world's food problems. Let us listen to some of their mouthpieces. Since we do not have records of the Toronto meeting, we quote from a more recent document of the organiser of the Toronto meeting, the Industry Co-operative Programme (ICP) of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.<sup>41</sup>

Before we quote, however, it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves that the ICP was initiated by former FAO Director-General B.R. Sen (from India) who thought the only way to develop the "underdeveloped" world's agriculture was to link it with the developed world's industry. The ICP's members consist largely of Transnational Corporations such as ICI, Unilever, Masey Ferguson, etc. In addressing the Twelveth Session of the ICP's General Committee, its Chairman, Dr. Luigi Deserti, reviewed the historical role the ICP had played, and then went on to explain its present role :

"On thinking over the evolution of our Programme over the last two years, during which period I had the honour of presiding over it, it seems to me that the Programme has passed

through three successive phases, linked closely to one another, but each one nevertheless representing an interesting progressivity in our way of conceiving Industry's role in development. In the first of these phases our attention was concentrated principally on the financial resources to enable us to accelerate the process of development. The second phase was marked by the search for projects and types of projects aimed at stimulating and increasing the growth of agricultural production in developing countries. Finally, the third phase, the one in which we find ourselves today and which corresponds more closely to the "Spirit of Toronto", to the World Food Conference Resolutions and, I dare to add, to the current orientation of FAO; this phase emphasizes the essential importance of the contribution of industry, the role of which is to activate the transfer of skills in management within the framework of production, processing and marketing of agricultural products, including naturally, the creation of food industries and local infrastructure in developing countries.....The Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference in November 1975, confirmed the importance, for development, of the real capacities of industry and the potential value of the considerations thus far formulated by ICP. FAO's "new dimensions", currently being examined by the Director-General the objective of which is to stimulate action aimed at attaining concrete results of immediate practical usefulness, provides us with an ideal field for the implementation of the principles of common action elaborated between the governments of developing countries and the UN System on the one hand, and the agro-industrial companies on the other."<sup>41</sup>

Dr. Deserti then went on to enumerate the types of activities which the ICP had undertaken in order to facilitate the relationship between third world countries' agriculture and developed capitalist countries industry.

"—Industry's participation in the *ad hoc* Government Consultation on Pesticides in agriculture and in public health—

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- The proposal, by the Pesticides Working Group, at its 13th Session held in New York, last October, to replace the regional seminars by national training courses
- Preparatory work for the creation of a Working Group, on Commodity Marketing and Stabilization
- The creation of a Joint FAO/ICP Task Force on Food Loss Prevention
- The creation of a Sub-Group on Food and Packaging for Emergencies—this is a direct follow-up to the World Food Conference Resolution on this question
- The creation of a Joint FAO/ICP Task Force on Trypanosomiasis and Tsetse Control
- Participation in the Second FAO Expert Consultation on Seed Industry Development
- Participation in the work of the Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment (CGFPI)".<sup>41</sup>

Mr. G. Bula Hoyos, Independent Chairman of the FAO Council, congratulated the representatives of the transnationals sitting there for "the important role you played at the World Food Conference. It does appear," he added, "that the so-called 'Spirit of Toronto' is inspiring industry's willingness to fulfill its promise of more effective participation in the process of development." He went on to say that good intentions were not enough. The only cure was "increased agricultural production in the developing countries themselves". How was this to be achieved ?

"The continuing flow of technical and economic information between industry, FAO and governments...will constitute a valid joint effort to improve existing agro-industries and create new undertakings which can constitute solid and lasting bases for the growing industrial production in the developing countries"<sup>41</sup>

The ICP Sub-Committee on Co-operation and Development (TNCs) reported that "Member Companies of ICP have the know-how and capital and they make investments needed for the increase in food production every day". However, we know from our study of the Tanzanian National Maize Programme what these "investments" mean. The peasants in Tanzania have to pay for every cent of these so-called "investments". In other words, these investments are nothing more than capitalised surplus-value produced by the peasants themselves, who have to pay not only for the monopoly priced inputs but also for the TNC's super-profits. In case the message was not clear to the third world countries, the above sub-committee of the ICP warned them that while the first responsibility the TNC's was to the consumer :

"The second is to maintain the continuity of the enterprise, which is vital to the security of all those working in and for it. This implies that the enterprise should not only pay its way but should also generate a return on investment in order to be able to maintain and expand its operations".<sup>41</sup>

This is clear enough.

Mr. Roy I. Jackson, Deputy Director-General of the FAO, said that although the task of eliminating hunger and malnutrition was a enormous task, there were "some encouraging signs".

"In the Resolutions of the recent meetings—particularly of the World Food Conference and the United Nations Seventh Special Session—industry is clearly depicted as a major thread in the fabric of global interdependence, and hence an important resource for development. While the references to transnational industry were not always friendly, they posed the challenge of how *one of the most ingenious and basically a political institutions of our time* (emphasis added, Y.T.) can contribute to development by sharing its unique technical, management and research resources, and innovative abilities".<sup>41</sup>

In line with these sentiments, the 18th session of the FAO Conference (November 1975), governments agreed that ICP "was in a

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position to harness substantial resources from transnational corporations for the development of agro-allied industries in line with the plans and wishes of the developing countries."

After this, can there be any doubt that the FAO and its various institutions exist primarily to further the interests of the transnational corporations ? And can there be any doubt also that with the enormous resources that the transnationals possess which they can give to or withdraw from the third world countries, they can pretty much seal the fate of any of these countries ? As Dr. Maletnlema of the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre said, "...today one can never tell a UN expert from the transnational", and later still :

"There are gigantic plans for making Africa, and the Third World as a whole, producers of foods for the huge food companies to process and market at attractive profits. And in order not to alarm the Africans, plan are being executed through the United Nations Agencies".<sup>42</sup>

It is in this light that we must understand the recent visit to Tanzania by the Assistant Director-General of FAO, Dr. Samba Cor Sar. In a report entitled "Africa's Food situation bad, says FAO", the *Daily News*<sup>43</sup> reported Dr. Sar as having said that the food situation in Africa was indeed "very bad". "But", he added, "with re-orientation in agriculture, Africa can certainly be self-sufficient in food production". What kind of "re-orientation" he did not say, except for vague hints about the inspiring example that Tanzania had set in agrarian reform and rural development. "We now try and think of Africa as a continent. No balkanisation", Dr. Sar said. Good luck, Dr. Sar ! The tenth FAO regional conference for Africa would be held at Arusha in September, 1978.

The close integration between United Nations agencies and finance capital is further underlined by the whole structure of financing that has cropped up recently in the area of food and agriculture. We know from Lenin that "finance capital" is not what some pedestrians know as money capital or circulating capital, but it is the merger of bank capital with industrial capital which came about as a

result of concentration and centralisation of capital both in the industrial world and in the banking world with the rise of monopoly. Monopoly Banks are no longer simply conduits for passing savings from one sectors of the economy to another. They are capable of carrying out productive investments themselves, and have considerable expertise on specialised forms of investments. They are able to centralise money capital from all nooks and corners of the economy and bring it to productive use i.e. turn it into productive capital. While monopoly banks have turned to productive investments, monopoly industries have set up their own banks. The Chase Manhattan is an obvious case in point.

Now to talk about Arab *finance capital* is meaningless, because it does not exist. All that the Arab countries have from their oil is *money capital*. They do not own means of production (which in today's world means essentially technology) to enable them to put their money capital into productive use. Only the monopolies can do this. There can be no illusion on this score. In other words, it is finance capital, i.e. monopoly capital which puts the Arab money to use to service its own interests. Of course, the Arab Sheikhs can earn more interest on their money, but they still cannot put it to productive use, and have to hand it over back to the monopolies, or else buy real estate in London, New York or Majorca. Arab money capital is not finance capital.

It is for this reason that the well-known triad formula always comes up in any discussion on development capital, i.e. Arab money, Western (meaning capitalist) technology, and African or Asian or Latin American land and labour. The United Nations comes into the picture here as an agency that actualises the triad formula, as indeed we saw, in a small way, in the case of the Tanzanian National Maize Project. What the future holds in store is that 'kind of "co-operation" on a massive scale. One of the institutions that was created at the World Food Conference in November 1974 was the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which might have over US \$ 1 billion a year, largely from OPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. Put the IFAD together with the FAO Bankers Programme (dominated by 15 private monopoly banks

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such as Barclay's, First National City, Bank of America, and the United Dominions Fund), and you have here a massive reservoir of money capital that could be put to productive use in the development of food industries. But in case this creates the impression that with so much "money" around there should really be no problem, we must warn that this money has no meaning, since it exists mainly in the form of figures in bank ledgers, unless it is converted on the one hand into means of production (technology, raw materials) and on the other hand into wage-labour. Once again it is the United Nations Agencies, among others, which helps to bring together capital and labour. Capital will not go into production unless it can accumulate still more capital. Is it a wonder, then, that the United Nations Agencies should become the champions of transnational corporations, for where else can they go to find the "appropriate technology" that would enable capital to meet its polar opposite, labour?

**By Way of Conclusion :**

We shall be assured, no doubt, by all those looking for "practical" solutions to problems for not being "constructive" in our analysis, in that we do not come up with an immediate answer to the question "What is to be Done?" "These third world radicals", one often hears, "can only pose problems, but they have themselves no answer to these problems". In particular, having shown the power of the transnationals, and having shown that the so-called "national strategies" for solving the food problem are really parts of a larger movement of capital itself which operates on a world scale, do we then have nothing to offer by way of fighting the power of the transnationals?

We do, but everything has its time and its place. To open up this issue would be to open up a discussion that would end up in another fifty pages. If the problems are complex enough, their solutions cannot be simple. To simply say that the task before us is to mobilise all the exploited workers and peasants and other strata of the society who are also exploited and oppressed by finance capital in a struggle for democracy and national liberation is really not saying very much. It sounds like oliche. And yet this indeed



is the task before us : struggle for Democracy and the National Liberation from Imperialism. Easily said.

The object, as far as this paper is concerned, in showing the might of the transnationals is to try to destroy any illusions people might have about a "national" bourgeoisie arising in our countries to give a death blow to imperialism. A variation of this suggests "state capitalism" in the third world countries as a means of fighting the power of the transnationals. There are yet others who talk about "controlling the power of the transnationals and harnessing it to better use". All these are formulas for utopianism. Capitalism in its imperialist stage is not about to roll backwards towards creating "national" capitals. Nor can capital serve interests other than those which is in its own nature to serve, namely to accumulate more and more capital out of the unpaid labour-power of workers and peasants. To fight, this capital, the working classes must not allow themselves to lapse into petty bourgeois utopianism. On the other hand they cannot allow themselves to be intimidated by the power of the transnationals. And therefore, while tactically taking the transnationals seriously, the working peoples and all other strata of society which can unite with them must strategically regard transnationals as giants with clay feet which must crumble one day.

#### FOOT NOTES

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26. *Ibid.*, see especially Chapters 44 and 45.
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30. The financing of the Project is from the following sources :
 

	US \$ million	Per cent
Government of Tanzania	4.7	12
USAID	6.4	17
IDA	18.0	47
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDIA)	5.0	13
Farmers	4.0	11
31. *Business Week*, 15 December, 1975 : Article on "US Food Power".
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Miss Harpreet Mahajan : **Anatomy of Imperialism  
in Angola**

Increasingly attention is being focussed on the question of national development of the third world countries. Despite their political liberation, inequalities in social and economic developments continue. The problems and obstacles of transformation of under-developed structures in all developing countries are linked to the phase of colonialism and imperialism. Taking Angola as our focus, it is intended to study the impact of colonial expansion and penetration, and, of late decolonization (in 1975) on its contemporary stage of development.

**I. Portuguese Expansion into Angola : Pre-colonial settlement  
(Till 1880's)**

Following Portuguese navigator Diogo Cao's contact with Kongo Kingdom in west central Africa in 1482, Portugal's King Joao II sent back Cao in 1485 to Kongo to establish better relations. The Kongolese king reciprocated by accepting Christianity and sent a group of Kongolese to Portugal to receive education. He also received Portuguese priests and skilled men to preach Christianity and teach his people. In the following decade Portuguese presented to the Kongolese king gifts including arms, trinkets, clothes and robes. However, initial diplomatic ties based on amicable relationship were undermined as Portuguese traders began to indulge in slave trade. By 1500, about 8,000—10,000 Africans were taken away as slaves from Kongo to work on sugar plantations on the Islands of Sao Tome and Principe and to Portuguese plantations in Brazil.

Portuguese interest moved further to South of Kongo (the present day Angola). Some Portuguese traders began to trade in the

Mbundu region. They introduced maize, cassava, groundnuts, tobacco and knives and hoes to this area by 1550. Till 1560 Portuguese used Mbundu as a source of supply of slaves. But when in 1560 another Christian mission came to preach it met with hostility and resistance. King N'Gola, the African king of the Ndongo Kingdom of Mbundu, was interested in the material goods that the Portuguese could offer and not in Christianity. Fifteen years later 400 Portuguese came to conquer Mbundu. The unfavourable climate and a high mortality rate, due to prevalent tropical fevers, weakened the Portuguese campaign right from the beginning.

In spite of these natural hazards and hostility from the Africans the Portuguese stayed in Luanda trying to conquer the hinterland. Their number increased due to miscegenation. Wherever the Portuguese conquered they imposed a system of subservience in those areas. They, furthermore, extended to vassalage system to the neighbouring African chiefs through bribes or threats. The vassals were also obliged to pay tribute or taxes to the Portuguese in the form of slaves, ivory, use of porters or, later on, in currency.<sup>1</sup>

The Portuguese design to conquer Angola could have been motivated by the reported existence of salt, copper; and especially silver at Cambambe.<sup>2</sup> They did not need Angola for settlement purposes. Furthermore, there was shortage of land in Angola in comparison to Brazil. The unused resources and more fertile land of the latter was more suitable for the Portuguese enterprise.

This was the time when other European powers too had begun to trade with African states. Unlike Portugal they were in a position to offer better cloth and other wares for exchange. Rivalry was intense and led to the Dutch occupation of Luanda in 1641 and holding it for seven years. This was followed by a number of bloody wars from 1648-52. By 1675, the Portuguese successfully pushed out their European rivals and had subdued the major African rulers within 150 miles radius east of Luanda and the lower Kwanza.

In the late 17th century, the Portuguese attempted to conquer the coast of Angola instead of the inlands. These efforts were in

response to the increasing competition from other European powers. Subsequently, the Portuguese were forced to recognize the freedom of trade, especially in slaves, for all European nations, north of the Congo river. This new arrangement adversely affected the Portuguese slave trade with Brazil, from where rum and brandy were imported.

The Portuguese control was once more threatened in 1788-90 in the Mossul war. Napoleon's invasion in 1807-11 and political disputes plus Brazil's independence in 1822 further affected Portuguese expansion in the 19th century. The gradual abolition of slave trade too reduced Portuguese income. Financially, the Portuguese African territories remained a liability, and continued to be a drain on the metropolis. The number of Portuguese migrants to Angola was relatively much less than that to Brazil. The latter was developed and economically prosperous for Portuguese whereas Angola remained economically unproductive except for trade in human beings. Therefore, to colonize Angola, Portugal began to ship out its political exiles and criminals.<sup>3</sup> Many peasants and their families were also pressed to go to Angola. In the beginning women rarely accompanied them.

The attitude of the Portuguese living in Africa is best described in the words of David Livingstone "...Nowhere else in Africa is there so much goodwill between Europeans and natives as here".<sup>4</sup> Miscegenation was common. Irrespective of race and colour, all enjoyed equal rights. By mid 19th century, alongside racial stratification of whites-mulattoes-blacks, socio-economic set of differentiation developed, related to colour. Subgroups existed within each grouping. European officials considered themselves much above the white petty traders and low 'degredados', while the latter felt the same over the blacks and mulattoes. Thus, colour was linked to status symbol.<sup>5</sup>

Following military conquests in 1838, the Portuguese government encouraged coffee and sugar plantations, rum and brandy industry, sisal growing and the 'fuba' industry. It also authorized the establishment of a company for the exploitation of oil. However, labour supply remained a problem for the farms and planta-

tions. Besides the generally sparse population and problems due to climate and disease, any imposition of taxes, such as the African hut tax, led to depopulation of the area. Therefore, to acquire labour, the practise of forced labour was increasingly followed.

The Portuguese further planned to militarily conquer the North Angola through occupation of ports and by levying taxes. Little expansion was made towards South Angola. Their military power declined between 1861-77, and the metropolis failed to send any assistance.

## II. Colonial Penetration and Consolidation (1880's—1920's)

At the Berlin Conference of 1884, Portugal was asked to justify its claim in Africa, and thus, was forced to exercise systematic control and expand its presence in Angola. It was a difficult task as by this time traders from Ovimbundu region had acquired trading acumen and aggressiveness. They forced the Portuguese to find new markets further into Central and Southern Africa. However, Portuguese acquired control of the heart of Ovimbundu country through military conquest in 1902-3 only. The Ovimbundu traders had gained absolute paramountancy in the politics east of Benguela, which collapsed in 1911 following serious famines and end of rubber boom. The Portuguese remained engaged in military operations from 1906 to 1919. And, during this period, from 1890 onwards, more and more racial discrimination was seen in the Portuguese African territories.

An interesting feature of this period is the striking difference between Portuguese colonization and colonization of Africa by other European powers. In general, colonialism introduced Western capitalism to the precapitalist societies of Asia, Africa and America. European owned plantations, settlers' estate, mining sector, trade and foreign investments began to dominate different areas, and control the colonial economy. A linear pattern of growth was witnessed in most colonies together with the building up of railways.

Furthermore, the colonial state apparatus operated to create and ensure a suitable environment. It played an active role in

enacting the labour laws for compulsory labour and in legislating on taxes. During its phase of penetration and then consolidation, according to Rosa Luxemburg, capital pursued the course of immediate possession of important sources of productive forces, such as land, minerals, ores, precious stones etc., the liberation of labour power and its coercive use to the service of capital ; introduction of commodity economy ; and separation of trade from agriculture.<sup>6</sup>

In the Portuguese Angola, this phase was marked by military rule in the beginning and it changed to civil rule only after 1911. The Africans before the advent of the Portuguese operated within their own indigenous economies and had no pressing need to sell their labour power. Therefore, the Portuguese enacted laws making it obligatory for the Africans to work for the White men. Thus, they siphoned off labour from agriculture to the new sectors of commodity production mentioned above.

Portuguese pursued a policy of limited cultural assimilation in their African territories, and proclaimed that they had a "civilizing mission". Both Catholic and Protestant missions worked alongside elementary schools to educate the inhabitants. The Catholic missions operated with the dual aim of educating or 'civilizing' the Africans and to make them loyal Portuguese. The Protestant missions tended to also act as their "friends" for their self-development and self-assertion. A few of them were even actively anti-Portuguese. Later on, to curtail the activities of the anti-Portuguese missions, teaching in Portuguese was made compulsory.

Economically, Portugal could ill-afford to invest in its territories. Portugal's financial position had worsened even while the Brazilian gold was flowing into the country in the 17th century. The Methuen Treaty of 1703 had led to increased dependence of Portugal on Great Britain. Subsequently Portugal had begun to export cloth and wine to Great Britain and imported manufactured goods. Thus, its manufacturing sector was sacrificed for the development of better and larger quantities of wine. Moreover, between 1700 and 1760, the Brazilian gold went continuously to Great Britain and helped the process of industrialization in the latter.<sup>7</sup>



Therefore, Portugal was unable to achieve any significant level of industrialization which was responsible for Portugal's inability to transfer its imperial enterprise to its colonies (unlike the other European powers). It was unable to use the available infrastructure and available cheap labour to establish a complementary role to its metropolitan economic imperatives. Hence the colonies mainly served as an outlet for population pressures within the metropolis. By indulging in crude exploitation of human resources and natural resources (including recourse to force and violence) the Portuguese ossified the historical conditions and maintained the colonial wage structure.<sup>8</sup> That is, they paid the workers wages below the historically determined labour value in the metropolis. Moreover, trade deficit had increased between 1910 and 1930 by 10 to 12%.<sup>9</sup> Transport remained a problem; railroads were under construction. For example, track from Luanda to Ambacca was first laid in 1886 and reached Malange in 1919. Benguela, the British-South African owned railway line reached Congo border by 1928. And, the track from Mossamedes began in 1904 and reached Sa da Bandeira in 1923.<sup>10</sup> The European population, however, rose from 9,177 to 20,000.<sup>11</sup> Thus, financial crises at home affected the Portuguese venture in Africa.

### III. Continued Colonial Expansion and Systematic Organization (1920's-1970's)

This phase covers the interwar period and the post-war period. In general, colonialism and imperialism were at its zenith during the interwar period; with each European power embarking on social and economic reforms. And, in the post-war period, anti-colonial waves began to gather momentum. Thereby, leading to decolonization from 1945 to 1960.

In the interwar period, we find that agricultural productivity increased manifold in the British, French and Belgian African colonies.<sup>12</sup> Agricultural and forestry expansions were greater in British Africa than in French Africa. Similar pattern was seen with regards to foreign investments in Africa; in fact, income per capita in French colonies was £ 3.3 as compared to £ 6.8 for Kenya and Uganda or £ 4.8 for British West Africa.<sup>13</sup>

Besides agricultural expansion, advances in mining took place concomitant with the growth of railways. For example, Elizabethville provided the necessary outlet for mining products like copper, diamond, gold and uranium from Belgian Congo. Copper production rose from 20,000 tons in 1918 to over 1,00,000 tons in 1936 to 2,37,000 tons in 1958. It also became the world's greatest producer of industrial diamonds and one of Africa's largest supplier of hydro-electric power. Similar increase in copper output took place in Zambia—from 6,000 tons in 1930's to 1,20,000 tons in 1935, which accounted for about 70% of its domestic exports.<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, only those "industries" developed in the colonies which were indispensable for the exploitation of natural resources and minerals. For example, those required for pressing of palm oil, shelling of peanuts, sifting of coffee, etc. A proportion of resources was devoted for the development of infrastructure (roads, and railway lines) to enable the colonizers in effectively controlling the process of exchange commodities. Instead, infrastructure for proper irrigation and intensive cultivation together with modern forms of agriculture were neglected.

While in general, these were characteristics of colonialism in its highest stage, we find that Portuguese colonialism differed somewhat—reflected in terms of financial investments, technological developments and the time factor—from its contemporary colonizers. Moreover, unlike the democratic character of governments in other European countries, Portugal had fascist regime at the helm of affairs. Its colonial policies were, therefore, more of an extension of its home policies.

The Portuguese continued the policy of assimilation and integration but had achieved only 0.75% assimilation by 1950 (30,000 out of 4 million African population). While professing and echoing the sentiments of racial equality, the policies of the Portuguese government were founded on inequality. Only in 1961, the Native Statute was repealed and all citizens had equal rights and duties. Catholic missions continued to indoctrinate christian principles in the natives to make them obedient and disciplined but not skilled, independent-

minded or active individuals. According to the 1950 census, the rate of literacy in Angola was 3-4%. However, the number of schools and students increased in the 1960's but the quality of teaching remained poor.

Another striking feature of Portuguese colonialism was that no development plans were undertaken in the interwar period as in other colonized areas of Africa. Increase in income per capita and standard of living of the masses took concrete shape only after 1953 when the First Six-Year National Development Plan was enacted. If we look back, we find that till 1932 Lisbon paid for Angolan deficit. Angola's income was limited upon customs and taxes in 1920's. Following the linking up of the Belgian Congo, a new source of income opened up for Angola in 1929-31. During this period, Angola offered markets for Portuguese goods. In the following years only little progress took place, it was more a period of stagnation. However, in 1940 a major wave of Portuguese migration to Angola occurred following the coffee boom. On the whole, taxes went up, social services and wages went down. The elitist structure of the economy increasingly became more extractive at the expense of the ordinary masses. The economy was stagnant.

To rejuvenate the colonial economy new foreign investments were needed. But Salazar, the Prime Minister of Portugal, was suspicious of foreign investors. And, under his leadership, Portugal had established a monopoly structure—protectionist policies both in Portugal and Angola.<sup>15</sup> When First Development Plan was enacted it was found that very little private Portuguese capital was available for investment. 95% of the total money for the Plan was supplied from the Angolan revenues. Many small companies failed to develop because of the unfavourable credit policies of the banks. It was only after 1966, banks began to give long-term loans.

In such a situation, Portugal was forced to open up both its home markets and its colonies for foreign capital investments. All foreign capital investments in the Portuguese African territories were made through Portugal. No direct investment was allowed. Thus,

Portugal acted as a "rentier" and received a part of the profit earned by the foreigners.

Mining sector was mainly developed by private capital. Portuguese government frequently participated as a minority shareholder and named directors to corporate boards. Iron ore, manganese, oil, diamonds, asphalt rock and salt formed the major mineral production sector Angola in. And, coffee accounted for  $\frac{1}{2}$  of Angola's exports.

Portuguese Africa was mainly an agrarian and rural society despite the growth of urban areas. Crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries formed the primary production sector of the Angolan economy and contributed about 20-25% of the GNP in 1960's. Mining, manufacturing, construction and energy production formed the secondary sector and contributed about 47%. While the Tertiary sector—transport, trade and finances (28%) services (36%) and administration, defence (9%)—contributed nearly 68-72%.<sup>16</sup>

Angola's budget allocations were made for the development of infrastructure rather than its social structures, education, health public welfare were neglected (receiving only 3.2% of the budget in 1964).<sup>17</sup> Labour shortage continued to be a chronic problem. Although the laws of 1928 forbade official recruitment of labour for private companies, it continued unabated. By 1960, it could be classified as follows : (1) correctional labour, (2) obligatory labour, (3) contract labour, (4) voluntary labour, (5) forced cultivation labour, and (6) emigrant or export labour. According to Rene Pelissier, after 1961, "detente in the bush" set in and the number of contract labour reduced.<sup>18</sup>

On the trade front, we find that coffee accounted for 48.1% of exports, diamonds for 17.6%, fish products 5.8%, sisal 4.7% iron ore, timber and maize 2% each, cotton fibre 1.7% and others 16.1%. The imports were largely motor vehicles and parts 10.3%, iron and steel 8.6%, wine etc. 8.0%, textiles 6.5%, foodstuffs 6.2% medicine 2.6% and others 57.8%. Exports to Portugal varied from 15% to 35% and imports from 37%—49%. This was because the Angolan

market consumed the Portuguese wine and textiles which otherwise sell poorly abroad. While the exports to other areas helped to maintain Angola's positive balance of trade. This helped Portugal to correct its own negative balance of trade. USA took up 25% of all Angolan exports and became an important source of imports after Portugal in 1960's.

With the opening up of Portugal and its colonies to other capitalist countries, US capital investments came to dominate. American banks became involved with Portuguese Totta-Alianca etc. British investments had been present from the beginning of 20th century (because of historical links) and can be seen in Benguela Railways and DIAMANG enterprises. German, Danish, Japanese, and Austrians too invested in extractive industries. Various oil companies operated in Cabinda and paid 1,000 million escudos as taxes.<sup>19</sup> The two restrictive laws—the industrial protection law and of foreign investment—were repealed in 1965. The former operated to prevent the development of any important industries, such as textiles in Angola, to prevent competition with its metropolitan manufacturers. The latter did not allow 100% foreign capital participation in the establishment of firms in non-strategic fields or allow them to remit their entire profits abroad. But as a result of the new policy after 1965, we find that between 1967 and 1972 the stock of foreign investments increased by 50%.<sup>20</sup> By 1971, the ratio of foreign investments to GNP was 13. Moreover, we find, that in 1967-68, the percentage investment in various sectors was as follows :

Extractive		Processing		Services	
GDP	INV	GDP	INV	GDP	INV
—	32	—	10	—	58

This shows that the foreign investments dominated the extractive sector of Angolan economy under the colonial rule.

It must be noted that by 1950's when Portugal started systematic development of its colonies, it was apx. 30 years behind other colonizers. Most of the colonized Africa had gained independence by early 1960. Whereas Portuguese Africa was just about to embark

on its developmental policies. Moreover, Angola, like the other ex-colonial parts of Africa, was exploited under colonialism and imperialism for the benefit of the colonizers only. For example, Africa with 53 important metals and mineral resources has been exploited by foreigners as sources of raw material for their home industries, but it is under-developed for the natives of these regions. It has not achieved any significant degree of industrialization.

The result of protection to consumer goods industries in the colonies by the metropolitan parent companies, created excess productive capacity installations which prevented the growth and development of more basic industries.<sup>21</sup> Thus, there developed export-oriented and luxury-consumption goods industries, in which there was no link between its structure of production and the structure of consumption of the population within a colony.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the exchange occurred between agricultural commodities of the colony against the products of the metropolitan industry imported or produced on the spot by European enterprises.<sup>23</sup> The surplus was directed only to the export-oriented agricultural sector. But the annual outflow of funds generally exceeded the inflow, thus, reducing the investment potential of the colony. Thus the dependence of the colony on the metropole for finished products and of the metropole on the colony for raw materials created a dependence cycle.

#### IV The Politics of Decolonization (1960's—70's)

In the post-war period, discontent arising as a result of the process of modernization, technological impact, social change, and, the development of national liberation movements led to disintegration of the colonial empires. However, Portugal, by contrast, suppressed opposition in its African territories and continued to hang on to its African territories till 1970's.

During the 1930's and 1940's the Angolans voiced their grievances through the LNA (Liga Nacional Africana), *Gremio Africano* and ANANGOLA. LNA, an 'assimilado' association, primarily functioned as social and economic association of the urban Angolan

masses. It was officially sponsored under the chairmanship of the Governor-General in 1929. Between 1935 and 1955 it increasingly established contact with Angolan masses throughout the country. Older : vs : younger leadership confrontations increased. And, during 1950's conflicts on the question of direct political participation of the urban masses led to the development of militant clandestine nationalist groups in Angola. Also, as LNA developed broader mass base, its leadership was replaced by acceptable (to the rulers) and nominated administrative committees.<sup>24</sup>

In 1950's we see, waves of African nationalism were spreading throughout the continent. Salazar sent PIDE the secret police modelled on the pattern of German Gestapo—to Angola, in order to check the growth of nascent Angolan nationalism. When we study the character of the Angolan national liberation movements we encounter numerous problems. It is difficult to apply class analysis to Africa in general, as regional, tribal and ethnic characters blur the social reality. Moreover, clear cut class divisions are difficult to find. Added to this was the competition between the educated, semi-educated urban population and the uneducated rural black peasantry and labour. Interaction between these factors crystallized into following three major streams of nationalism in Angola by late 1960's. (1) Luanda-Mbundu based MPLA which had predominantly urban following and elite leadership; (2) Bakongo based FNLA with rural and peasant orientation; and, (3) Ovimbundu Chokwe based UNITA, also with rural and peasant orientation.<sup>25</sup>

A glance at the history of the three parties shows that FNLA, and MPLA had links with various other political groups of 1956-57. UPA first developed in 1957 in Leopoldville amongst a small group of Angolan Bakongos. Its leadership was later on taken up by Roberto Holden. UPA joined PDA, another Bakongo group, to form FNLA in 1962. It also had supporters from Chokwe and Ovimbundu region in the early 60's when Savambi left FNLA to join MPLA, and shortly afterwards formed UNITA in 1965-66. Under Roberto Holden, FNLA gained arms assistance from Algerian FLN in 1961, and, later on, from USA. In early 60's OAU recognised it as the sole representative of the Angolan masses.



MPLA developed in 1956 in Luanda and remained underground till 1959 when its leadership went to marxists Andrade and de Cruz. They remained unsuccessful in their attempts to form a common front with UPA, because of the latter's refusal. In 1961, MPLA moved its offices to Leopoldville and Agostinho Neto joined the party. By 1968, MPLA had established itself as a revolutionary and a rival nationalist party to FNLA. Its efforts to educate the masses were reflected in the functioning of schools, and functional committees in the villages of the liberated zones.

Angolan nationalism was highly fragmented. All the three liberation groups—MPLA, FNLA and UNITA had the common objective of driving out the Portuguese yet none united. Each party further included numerous smaller groups. Neto in 1970 observed that although they were (MPLA) all united to fight against Portuguese colonialism and there was one organizational structure, there was not one ideological position.<sup>26</sup> Yet, some regional groups continued separately. Such as, FLEC remained a separatist movement, demanding separation of Cabinda from rest of Angola.

An important feature of Portuguese colonialism was that the national liberation movements were illegal within the country. (LNA had become a government controlled forum.) Therefore, the three parties—MPLA, FNLA and UNITA developed from the neighbouring regions of Angola, in Congo, Zaire and Zambia respectively. Only UNITA tried to increase its clandestine activity within the Angolan borders; especially as the Zambian government expelled J. Savimbi from their country following UNITA's attack on Benguela Railway lines which provided Zambia an outlet for its copper. UNITA had some Chinese trained guerillas. But mostly it practiced old, out-of-date mass attack operations, the masses were drugged and then led by a witch-doctor. Although UNITA claimed to be active in Mexico, Cuando-Cubango, Luanda, Bie, Malange and even Huambo districts, it does seem doubtful that it had a large following as it was simultaneously competing with MPLA & FNLA in the same regions. Moreover, it appears that UNITA had established some links with the Portuguese command.<sup>27</sup>



Nevertheless, all three parties received foreign aid and arms equipment, Thus involving foreign powers in a local conflict. MPLA received major assistance from USSR, FNLA from USA and at one point from China too, and UNITA received help from China at the beginning and later on from USA till senate ruled otherwise. Britain and France too gave modest amounts of aid.<sup>28</sup>

Systematic operation by the Portuguese forces against UPA and MPLA had begun in May 1961.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, Portuguese government had embarked on reformist policies in the '60s. Within the existing structures, Angolan economic expanded. Resettlement programmes were undertaken with the aim of creating favourable conditions for the Portuguese for long-term maintenance of the colonies. Moreover, it was intended as a counter-measure to break relations between the insurgent groups and the civilian population.<sup>30</sup> These programmes broke down the traditional structures and their mode of life. People began to take refuge in towns. The administration failed to integrate them in the modern sectors. Thus, a chaotic situation developed which led to conflict and strife but was favourable to the national insurgencies.

Moreover, as a member of NATO, the Western Defence Alliance, Portugal received NATO equipment which it in turn used to crush liberation movements in the colonies. The financial returns from USA and France for the use of Azores base helped its strained budget. Furthermore, it relied on the presence of its NATO allies in the United Nations when the Angolan issue became internationalized and Portugal's colonial policies were condemned. It even began to look for economic assistance from its NATO allies, which were its important source of military hardware.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, we see, that on the one hand the western powers supplied arms to Portugal and on the other, assisted the national liberation movements in Angola. A look at the pattern of 'debate on Angola' at the United Nations highlights a similar pattern of support;<sup>32</sup> it reflects the policy dilemma especially of the USA & UK.

Following riots in 1961 in Luanda (Angola), the Security Council met to consider the Angolan situation, at the request of the

Afro-Asian countries. A resolution was moved urging Portugal to introduce necessary reforms in order to help the Angolans in exercising their right to self-determination, supported by the USA. This change of US attitude from restraint on colonial questions to a more active support for the latter, was criticized by Portugal and viewed "with gravest apprehension". At times USA & UK abstained to avoid giving offense to either parties concerned.

Again, USA supported the resolution which called on Portugal to desist from repressive measures and hoped for a more peaceful solution. In 1962 Poland and Bulgaria recommended sanctions against Portugal. Once more the right of Angolan people to achieve independence was reaffirmed and Portugal was asked to take necessary measures to introduce political, social and economic reforms, (supported by USA but opposed by France). At this time, USA and its Western allies feared the development of a United African military command which might have decided to intervene in Angola. On the other hand, no sanctions were taken against Portugal on the sale and supply of arms and related equipment. Its NATO allies did not wish to take such a harsh measure against one of their members to avoid further breaking up of the Alliance. Therefore, USA & UK maintained that they were against any violent solutions and believed in persuasion. Portugal continued to receive military equipment and arms and only gave some verbal assurance about not using it in Africa which, of course, was merely a formality and conveniently overlooked in reality.

In Portugal, Caetano had taken over after Salazar in 1968. But the colonial policies of Salazar continued unchanged. By this time, it must be noted that USA & UK did not wish to antagonize the African regimes. Therefore, they extended support to liberation groups which accepted their ideas on the question of liberation of Portuguese territories. Their dilemma was how best to maintain a balance between their supportive role to Portugal and also to win over the future leaders of Angola.

In Angola, Portugal continued to fight a losing battle for thirteen years. The long and losing battle led to frustration amongst

the military groups and confrontation between the conscripted and the non-commissioned officers who were promoted and sent to Angola. Consequently, there emerged Armed Forces Movement (AFM) in Portugal. In the final stages its leadership was taken over by the Deputy Chief-of-Staff Spínola. In his book entitled "Portugal and the Future" he suggested liberalization of the Portuguese internal policies and a neo-colonial solution for Portuguese African territories. Events finally culminated in a bloodless coup by the AFM on the 25th April 1974 in Portugal. The "3-D Program" of AFM; democratization, decolonization and development—which had united the AFM before the coup led to its split soon afterwards. The new government in Portugal (after the coup) was a coalition of moderates and radicals—of Socialists, Communists and AFM. In the subsequent months, Portugal experienced struggle for power amongst its various factions. Spínola wanted to stay in Africa for as long as possible with gradual devolution of power and creation of a Portuguese federation within which Portugal would continue to benefit from the surplus earning of its former colonies.

However, with the replacement of Spínola by Costa Gomes as the President, Portugal proceeded to conduct talks with the nationalists in its African territories. Portugal and the three main political parties signed an accord to form a Transitional Government in January 1975 to prepare for full independence in November 1975. Transitional period witnessed bitter civil war. When the Portuguese High Commissioner folded his flag to depart for Lisbon, he left Angola in a state of civil war where all the forces were contending for power.

## V. Independence and the Contemporary Scene

In the civil war each party was trying to gain supremacy over the other. During this period increased amounts of foreign arms aid was received by all three. MPLA fought the forces of FNLA in the North and UNITA in the South. South African forces too entered Angolan borders justifying their action by reference to their economic interests in the Calueque-Ruacana Hydro-Electric scheme.

The conflict further escalated as Cuban troops came to aid the MPLA. MPLA increasingly began to gain power and finally formed the official government of Angola. The FNLA and UNITA have not yet given up completely. War is still on in certain parts of Angola. Hence it is faced with the problems of national integration.

MPLA, moreover, faced problems on the economic front. Angolan economy had been disrupted by the prolonged liberation war followed by civil war. Coffee production had fallen by 65%, as a number of owners had fled the country abandoning their plantations. Gulf Oil Company too had closed its plant. Thus, affecting the oil production. Similarly, the diamond industry suffered. In the face of crumbling economy, lack of trained personnel and capital, the Government found itself unable to take strong measures of change. It adopted mixed economy approach. The business is now state organized, co-operative based, and in private hands. Similarly, coffee plantations abandoned by the Europeans, particularly by the Portuguese have passed into the hands of the State. Co-operative farms are being encouraged for small farmers. Those Portuguese plantation owners who stayed back still own private coffee plantations.

Most of the agriculture and related industries have been nationalized. To control the production, manufacture and distribution of oil, the government is creating an over-all government-run board. Although, it is dependent on foreign companies for oil technology, it now owns over 55% shares. It has also nationalized its banks.

It has signed a friendship treaty with USSR and is looking forward to close cooperation from her. USSR has also opened its coffee markets to Angola. While the Cuban personnel have been retained by MPLA government. Its relations with West too have been normalized to an extent since it has promised that Angola will not allow the establishment of any military bases on its soil.

Basically, coffee is the main foreign exchange earner for Angola. Oil is its second important source of revenue. A few industries

related to food processing, production of beverages and tobacco, soap, textiles have developed since 1960. Paper manufacturing and cement industries too had developed by late 1960's. Aluminium industry and a bus-assembly plant too were planned. Most of these enterprises had been controlled by foreigners.

Angola's underdevelopment under the Portuguese colonialism has created dilemmas for the new government and is an obstacle for the development of Angola. Its underdeveloped structures are the manifestation of colonialism and spatial inequalities reflect the character of Portuguese colonialism in particular. Lack of capital for the development of industries, modern technology and poly-cultural agricultural economies have greatly hindered the task of the new nation. Therefore, while it has gained political independence it has yet to overcome its economic dependence.

The basic problem that confronts Angola is that despite the nationalization of economic and the trading sectors, it remains linked to the international economic system with one crop yield and almost no change in the marketing of its products. In such a situation can it ever lessen or reduce its dependence on the dominant foreign power's. On the other hand, its dependence on developed countries for import of technology and assistance thwarts its efforts of becoming self-reliant. As has been discussed above, in the ex-colony it is the extractive industries or sectors that are most developed and controlled by foreign capital.

In the present phase, the multinational firms bring both technical know-how, expertise and finances to the underdeveloped regions, but at the same time they repatriate large profits to their metropolises. Thus, the newly liberated countries find themselves enslaved by the dialectics of colonialism—seen in the symbiotic relation between the State and foreign capital, technology, and transnational companies on the one hand, and between the State and the various forms of aid or assistance in building the nation, on the other.

As mentioned in the beginning, Portugal became dependent on Britain and, thus, failed to make a revolution of its own. Its inability

to develop like its contemporaries has affected its present relations with its ex-colonies. It has no capital to invest or aid to extend, and, therefore, the ex-colonies have to look elsewhere for their needs. It is apparent from the above analysis that colonialism laid the foundations of underdevelopment of Angola. Therefore, today, even after it has gained political independence, it continues to remain dependent on the developed world for foreign investments, aid—economic, military and technological assistance, training of administrative and military personnel, and for the higher education of its masses. Thus, we see that the problems of national development are directly related to the degree of underdevelopment during its colonial rule.

### FOOTNOTES

1. Wheeler and Pelissier, *Angola* (London, 1971), pp. 36-7. Also see, David Birmingham, "The African Response to Early Portuguese Activities in Angola", in Chilcote, ed., *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies* (London, 1972), ch. I.
2. Birmingham, *ibid.*, Ch. I.
3. James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (London, 1959), p. 80 ff; Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, *Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: The End of an Era* (Paris, 1974), p. 32, Quotes that in the last quarter of the 19th century, the colony was still short of "centres of permanent civilized (i.e. White) population".
4. *Missionary Travels & Researches in South Africa* (New York, 1858), p. 390-400; Also see, Hammond, "Race Attitudes and Policies in Portuguese Africa in the 19th & 20th centuries", *Race*, 9 (2) Oct. 1967, p. 206-7.
5. Wheeler & Pelissier, n. 1. p. 43-5, 73.
6. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (London, 1963) p. 369.
7. See, S. Sideri, *Trade and Power* (Rotterdam, 1970); H.E.S. Fisher, *The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770* (London, 1971).
8. Jay O'Brien, "Portugal and Africa: A Dying Imperialism", *Monthly Review* (New York), vol. 26, no. 1, May 1974.
9. James Duffy, n. 3, p. 264.
10. Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 1, p. 6.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
12. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara* (London, 1938), pp. 906-909. For example, the output of Gold Coast cocoa crop in 1935-36 was 285, 351 tons, nearly  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the world supply.

Similarly in the French Africa at Ivory Coast, the coffee production rose from 1,327 tons in 1932 to 10,079 tons in 1937 and 28,360 tons in 1941.

13. S.H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa* (OUP, 1938), p. 170.
  14. Ibid. p. 251.
  15. Wheeler & Pelissier, n. 1, p. 142.
  16. Irene S. Van Dongen, "Agriculture and Other Primary Production", in Abshire & Samuels, ed., *Portuguese Africa* (London, 1969), pp. 254.
  17. WHO, *3rd Report on World Health Situation* (19th World Assembly, A 19 B and b/6, April 7, 1967), Part II, Mimeo., Review by Country and Territory, pp. 1-3.
  18. Wheeler & Pelissier, n. 1, p. 226-7.
  19. See, *Objective Justice* (New York), January-February 1974, "Foreign Economic Exploitation in Angola"; William Minter, "Imperial Network and External Dependency: Implications for the Angolan Liberation Struggle", *Africa Today* (Denver), vol. 21, no. 1, Winter 1974, pp. 28-31; Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Foreign Economic Involvement in Angola and Mozambique", *The African Review* (Dar-es-Salaam), vol. 4, no. 2, 1974, pp. 299-314.
  20. Based on statistical data in Helge Huecm, "The Extent & Type of Direct Foreign Investment in Africa," in Widstrand, ed., *Multinational Firms in Africa* (Dakar, 1975), p. 83-89.
  21. Gavin Williams, "The social stratification of a Neocolonial Economy: Western Nigeria" in C. Allen & R.W. Johnson, ed., *African Perspectives* (London, 1970), p. 229-32.
  22. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment & Dependence in Black Africa—Origins & Contemporary Forms" *Journal of Modern African Studies* (London), vol. 10, no. 4, Dec. 1972, p. 521.
  23. Ibid.
  24. Wheeler & Pelissier, n. 1. p. 145; Patricia McGowan Pinheir, "Politics of a Revolt", in *Angola: A Symposium* (London, 1962), p. 106.
  25. See, John Marcum. *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. I, (USA, 1969) for details.
  26. Quoted in Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm* (Penguin 1975), p. 326.
  27. cf. Davidson, Slovo & Wilkinson, *Southern Africa* (Penguin, 1976), p. 53, 97-8.
  28. *Patriot*, 11 September 1974 quotes that Front writes China supplied FNLA arms worth 450 tons military equipment.
- US assistance to FNLA and UNITA had increased to \$ 32 million by 1975. In 1975, Senate voted against aid to UNITA but allowed \$ 3,00,000 worth aid for FNLA. See *The Times* (London) 6 June 1976; *The Observer* (London) 11 January 1976; Marcum, "Lessons of Angola", *Foreign Affairs* (USA) vol. 54, no. 3, April 1976, p. 414.

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According to American estimates, Soviet output was about \$ 300 million in the last 11 months alone. It included shipment of Antonov-22 transport planes disgorging tons of sophisticated arms, including T-54 and T-34 tanks and 122mm rockets. See, Marcum, *ibid*, p. 417.

29. For accounts of confrontation between Portuguese authorities and nationalists, see, Marcum, n. 25 ; Davidson, n. 26 ; George Martelli, "Conflict in Portuguese Africa" in Abshire & Samuels, ed., *Portuguese Africa* (London, 1969).

30. See, Ferreira, "The Present Role of the Portuguese Resettlement Policy", *Africa Today*, vol. 21, no. 1, Winter 1974, pp. 47-55 ; G.J. Bender, "The Limits of Counter Insurgency : An African Case", *Comparative Politics* (New York), vol. 4, no. 3, April 1972, pp. 331-60.

31. For accounts of military supply, see, Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", *Africa Report* (New York), vol. 15, no. 5, May 1970, pp. 10-11 ; Marcum, no. 24, pp. 181-9 ; Hearings before the 93rd US Congress, *The Complex of US—Portuguese Relations : Before and After the Coup* (Washington, 1974), 2nd session, 14 March 8, 9 and 22 October 1974, pp. 1-33.

32. George Martelli, "The Issues Internationalized", in Abshire & Samuels, ed., *Portuguese Africa* (London, 1969), pp. 380-5, on debate over Angola at the UN.



Dr Padma Srinivasan :

## A Concept of the State—Africa

The geographical conditions peculiar to the continent of Africa have lead, through centuries of time, to a development of the State which is unique and strikingly different from anything we have known in Eurasia. The phenomenon is new—like almost everything else that has ever come out of Africa. Pliny's famous maxim is still true as we discover the new concept that must take its rightful place in our Eurocentric political philosophy.

In analysing or describing African political phenomena, an Africanist has to make do with terms that belong to other climes. The words 'state' or 'government' or 'feudalism', for instance, carry different shades of meaning appropriate to a European ethos. They cannot be emptied out first before being filled with meanings suitable to the African environment. It is not easy to invent new terms. Hence the Africanist feels keenly the need for a new terminology. '

The African environment that shaped the strange history and culture of its peoples also created its unique polities. The continent is so vast that its peoples are dwarfed by the immense scenery. It is full of contrasts, terrible beauties and inhospitable wastes. The stretches favoured by nature are a wild bush with long dry seasons of scorching heat and sudden torrential rains that wash the precious soil away. Nature has been so inclement that man has had to struggle continuously to survive. African culture is the result of the endless interplay of challenge and response between nature and man. The people of Africa had to struggle to create the psychological security, unity and general benefits of political governance in a land which largely allowed only nomadic herding or a shifting, subsistence agriculture along with a little hunting and gathering. Vast cultivated fields had to be abandoned and villages had to be moved every few

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decades. Nearly a million square miles of territory are covered by the rain forest. Other areas are made uninhabitable by endemic diseases. In the teeth of such anti-political conditions, the peoples of Africa took up the challenge.

A custom was needed that would act as a binding force upon the group. It had to be powerful enough to withstand all pressures from without. The ethnic group needed a binding force because it often contained large numbers of aliens, who came in as brides through marriage, as captives from war or as refugees, from famine. Kinship did not bind all the members of the community, as Shapera<sup>1</sup> has shown. It is precisely because the element of Kinship was often absent and could never be depended upon as a cementing factor at all times for all sections that the powerful *fiction* of blood-brotherhood, through initiation, had to be 'invented'. And it had to be renewed for every generation or age-set to allow for continuity. The ethnic group had to be welded into a viable political unit in the absence of the emotional attachment groups in other lands developed towards the *patria*—the land of the fathers which gave meaning and identity to their lives. To say this is not to imply that this absence was consciously felt. Yet the unconscious need seems to have driven the peoples of Africa to 'invent' the mysterious rites of initiation which became the basis of their polities.

The young had to be educated in a uniform and systematic way to take up adult responsibilities. Every member had to be appraised of the duties of his station, of what he could expect of what they would expect of him. He had to be taught to live by the light of the ideals of his people—ideals that had been upheld by his ancestors. He was not to be selfish and narrow and live for himself alone. As a South African Bantu proverb puts it: "A man is a man, because of other men". He had to be taught to honour the ancestors of his tribe as well as those of his family. For, in honouring them he honoured the ethical and moral ideals they had lived by. He, himself, would some day take his place, after death, among them. His life did not end with his death. The harsh rites of circumcision and clitoridectomy accomplished all this and more when sets of young people of the same age

were taken from their parents and sent away for a year to school in the bush, where they learned self-help and civic virtues under experienced tutors. Physical pain, endured without a whimper, in the company of his peers made a man of the tenderest boy. Lambert<sup>2</sup> has shown how Kikuyu initiation camps were testing grounds of skill, courage, intelligence and leadership qualities. What was essentially a training for citizenship and the responsibilities of adult life was also, incidentally, a lesson in sex education. After the ceremonies the young initiate was received by his people and by his proud parents as a responsible adult. He would now be reckoned with; his voice would now be heard, perhaps in the council. More than all, he was in a position to enjoy and share in that noble political partnership which exists among the dead and the living and the unborn.

Initiation provided the legal and psychological foundations to a society that was forced by the environment to move frequently. The fact that initiation is *au fond* political is revealed in a critical incident among the Kikuyu. The 'crisis' was brought about by the colonial power's high-handedness after the 1914-18 war.<sup>3</sup> The government forced sixteen-year old youths to pay tax after the war. Paying tax was a political matter. It was unthinkable for Africans that the uncircumcized should take part in politics by paying tax. Nine years had to elapse between one set of initiates and another. But the government did not want to wait. It preferred to regard this as a ruse for avoiding tax. Eventually the elders agreed to make the interval six years. Initiation alone could confer full political rights on the young and make citizens of them.

Initiation ceremonies, songs and dances welded the various age-sets and generations together into a state that could exist on a psychological, if not a territorial base. The state came into existence as a powerful, spiritual phenomenon even though a fixed, clearly demarcated and permanently occupied territory was often absent. The state was all there in its essentials as

- (i) an organization in law and morality,
- (ii) a union of human beings co-operating for the good life,  
and

- (iii) a spiritual partnership of generations past, present and future.

One cannot, at this point, help speculating about the state of affairs that prevailed before the African state evolved in the dim past. In the absence of such careful social engineering—all the more remarkable because it was a product of unconscious centuries—one wonders whether a Hobbesian condition of universal conflict, a veritable *bellum omnium contra omnes*, was not the common lot of men. The phenomenon of the African State must give us pause and make us realize the depths of Hobbes' insight into political realities. For he makes the factor of *survival* basic to the existence of political entities. We are tempted to stretch our imaginations back to the obscure period before the beginnings of social control through initiation rituals, i.e. before the forging of the African state. Did such a period of intense, in-tribe conflict ever exist in African history?

Looking beyond Africa's self-regulating societies, the question arises: 'How did these peoples, with their flair for politics, keep order at the inter-tribe level?' Apparently they did. Of course, they could not prevent war, but they managed to keep its scale down. Basil Davidson<sup>4</sup> says that the "notion that Africa was continually engulfed in great tribal wars is false." He cites the case of the Zande, who were the subject of painstaking study over several years by E.E. Evans-Pritchard. They lived in the grass-lands between the watershed of the Nile and the rivers of the northern Congo. They were notorious for their military aggressiveness. Yet their warfare was carefully arranged so that there would be a minimal loss of life on both sides. They did not encircle the enemy completely but left a gap in the rear for them to withdraw. Victory consisted in the withdrawal of the enemy and this was aimed at. Again, fighting, usually began at about 4 O'clock in the afternoon so that the losing side could escape under cover of darkness. Even the Zande did not believe in slaughter for its own sake. Wars were instruments of policy, undertaken for a number of purposes like punishing a neighbour for a real or imagined wrong, robbing him of his grain, cattle or marriageable girls. Care was taken that wars were no bloodier than

necessary. Other African peoples considered war as something best avoided; and above all the Tallensi of northern Ghana considered them sinful.

The peoples of Africa have responded almost similarly in coming to terms with their environments and in the process they have revealed a genius for social and political organization. If the unconscious processes of social thought could forge unity against all odds within the ethnic community, why did they not achieve a higher unity at the supra-tribal level? This is one of the *ifs* of African history which might have stemmed the European onslaughts and prevented their slave-raiding operations. It was a response which could not perhaps come in the absence of a challenge at that level—and when the challenge (from Europe) did come, it was too swift to be met. If such supra-tribal unities had indeed been created, modern Pan-Africanists would have had many hints to help them. The environment, as much as the lack of challenge, was responsible for making the supratribal organizations impossible, except for a few marginal exceptions as in West Africa. Lack of mobility, isolation and poor technology also perpetuated the existence of small groups.

While the environment prevented the rise of the territorial state, it also forced political development to proceed along sociological lines, with the result that, sociologically, the African people were the highest developed in the world. By contrast, the peoples of Europe and Asia are, even today, underdeveloped. Davidson's comment on the Nuer<sup>5</sup> is true of all African peoples. He says that though they were "technically at a primitive level of life" they were "organizationally at a point that is nothing but primitive". Yet to most people, even today, Africa is a backward, primitive and underdeveloped continent. Malcolm MacDonald,<sup>6</sup> after musing about the stupendous achievements of Western man in the fields of art and science said: "Yet we humans have almost continuously made a muddle of the most elementary, the most crucial and in some ways the most urgent problem which we have to face—how to live peacefully and co-operatively together among ourselves. Unless we can now move fairly rapidly towards a right solution to that problem, our progress in some other directions may prevent us ever discovering it...May the

young generation...learn in time the understanding and love for their followmen which is needed." Africa had discovered just this secret of peaceful and co-operative social living. Socially and politically Africa is the most highly developed continent in the world. The apparent simplicity of African life has led many observers into concluding that the people live with no rules at all, and that politics is minimal among them. But such people look at Africa through European spectacles. Politics, in Africa, has always been, in the words of Bertrand de Jouvenel, "an activity that builds, consolidates and keeps in being aggregates of men." The true solidarity of any state lies in the solidarity of the social organization more than in the political infra-structure. The greater the social organization the less the sophistication of governmental trappings and dependence on force.

In its most pristine form the State is acephalous, a—territorial and a—governmental. Among the pygmies of the Ituri Forest in the Congo Colin Turnbull's *Forest People*?—we do not discern the State, as such. The Bambuti, as the pygmies are called, are not organizationally bound either to one another or to their ancestors in any way. We do not see, among them the familiar African sense of the living past with political loyalties to the dead and the unborn. Religion, in any conventional sense of that term, with its attendant superstitions and rituals, is conspicuous by its absence. There is no ancestor worship and no initiation. Yet the little group holds together. Why? The answer to this gives us a hint as to the basic nature of all polity. What keeps the Bambuti together is the sheer need for survival. Harking back to Hobbes we see that all that concerns the survival of the group is political. The group, acting as a whole for the security, survival, protection and maintenance of its members, gives us a dynamic concept of the State. Survival is *the* thing. The wayward individual may be brought back to the fold by sheer persuasion (as among the Bambuti), force may never be needed; hence no legal authority or chief may be necessary. It is survival alone that forms the bed-rock, of the State and not land or force, coercion or authority. The forest is great, friendly and all-loving; it is the Nourisher and the Provider. It is a benign presence

and almost seems to regulate the minds and hearts of its little people. The need for survival is basic to the little group, as it is for the State; but it is not the survival of one individual at the expense of another. It is the survival of all. This is what gives the state its moral basis. Therefore can no man's hand be raised against his fellowmen, when the survival of all is the moral imperative. Not only did force not create the State, but it is the least important aspect of the State. "The State came into existence to make life possible"—this is still the fullest definition of the State. In its origins we see its true nature. All the activities of the tribal state or the modern state reflect, directly or indirectly, the need for group survival, and are therefore political.

Given the African environment and the need for shifting agriculture and pastoral-nomadism, the State developed independently of Land as a prime factor. There was also another feature of the environment that affected political development. This was the vastness of the continent; the fact that land was plentiful. The bush stretches away in all directions as far as the eye can see and he who dared to tame it by the toil of his hands was its master. The land on which the polity lived and from which to draw its sustenance, was an important factor in the people's lives; but it was not the focus of their political loyalty *in the same sense* as it was in land-hungry Europe. It was not the basis of ethnic nationalism in old Africa.<sup>8</sup> It was, indeed, the land of the fathers, and dearly loved because of the first ancestor who had led the group to the spot. The land belonged to the people as a birth-right and to this extent it was a powerful political factor. But at this point the emphasis shifts away from Europe and becomes confused for any theory of the State from a European angle. The founding fathers, rather than the land, were the main-focus of emotion. They were the group's eternal protectors and not the land itself. The land was their precious gift to their children. It was a part of the eternal order of things established by the ancestors and by God. It was plentiful—and it was this very fact that weakened its value as the basis of an emerging state. Most tribes moved into virgin lands and settled down without having to wrest it from another tribe

by force. The right to an area came because of primary occupation and not because of consequent.<sup>9</sup> *Because land was plentiful, a body of exclusive rights to it never arose; nor did the notion of exclusive state boundaries develop. Land never became a primary focus of loyalty.*

In Africa, it was the *People* who became the prime factor in the formation of the State. Human individuals, contained within themselves, the highest political value. People were few, mortality was high, fertility was valued and was paid for with bride-wealth. Children were wealth. Slaves were valued and honoured especially by the chief. The relative importance of *People* to *Land* is well expressed by a proverb of the Baganda—"Omwami tafuga ttaka; afuga bantu". (A chief does not rule land; he rules people.) Another African proverb says: "A chief is a chief by the people". Dyson-Hudson<sup>10</sup> writes: "For Karimojong, social groups are generally conceived as conferring identity on territory, rather than deriving identity from it." This is also true of other areas, for they are named after the people occupying them—as for instance, Unyamwezi (the land of the Wanyamwezi); Ugogo (the land of the Wagogo); or Uganda (the land of the Baganda) Usukuma is an exception; it means 'the land to the north' and this descriptive name has been given to the inhabitants who lived to the north of the Wanyamwezi. It is very unusual for a people to be named after the land on which they live. When one African meets another he asks: 'From which people do you come?' By contrast, when one Indian meets another, he asks: 'From which place have you come?'

Human values, in Africa, ranked above all else—Land was valuable, not in itself, but because it sustained the people. Land was a universal reality, an eternal verity that belonged to all generations, past, present and future. A Nigerian chief told the West African Lands Committee in 1912: "I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living, and countless numbers are unborn." The very notion that it can be bought and sold and used to bolster up one's prestige and power over one's neighbours is alien to African philosophy. Landholding in Africa "tends to be merely the territorial aspect of political relations and



groupings, not a distinct and predominantly economic relationship in itself, "writes Lloyd Fallers."<sup>11</sup> As land was far from scarce, landlords and tenants were exceedingly rare in traditional Africa. But Fallers warns that the case must not be overstated for there are a few exceptions like the Kikuyu of Kenya who seemed to have regarded land as a commodity. Subsequent research has shown that this is not true. Godfrey Muriuki<sup>12</sup> has shown conclusively that the Kikuyu did not regard land as a commodity to be bought and sold. He gives an interesting description of the subtle, symbiotic relationship that developed between the original Athi (as the Wandorobo are called) hunters and the in-coming Kikuyu pastoral-agriculturists. Transactions involving land began to take place, but they were far from being the cold, commercial, impersonal transactions we know of in the modern world. The psychological atmosphere in which they took place is wholly alien to the modern mind. Both peoples 'adopted' each other and took oaths to be like brothers in all matters. The Athi who 'sold' their land maintained friendly relations with the buyers. These land transactions were made only after elaborate proceedings, which made them resemble marriage proceedings rather than economic negotiations. It was certainly not a process which reveals a commercial attitude to land as a commodity which can be lightly bought and sold. Muriuki shows that "the principle of outright sale was so circumscribed as to make it impracticable unless there were other extenuating circumstances. It is in fact true to say that until the introduction of European influences and ideas, outright sales of land were unknown between the Kikuyu themselves, the more so since any industrious person could have obtained his own land at the frontier, lack of land being unknown in those days. Thus, under customary law, there were no sales of land in perpetuity." The Kikuyu concept of Land was not substantially different from that of the rest of Africa. There is no evidence to show that they regarded it as an economic commodity. The fact of land being the territorial aspect of political relationships rather than an economic relationship strengthens a general observation of Fallers about the primary of politics in pristine Africa, where "political structures dominate and enclose economic ones."

Political power in Africa was created by the interaction of two factors—the People and the Land. It was only when a large piece of land was acted upon by a group that it became a sustainer of life and an economic asset. Land not thus acted upon may have been plentiful but it was useless as a source of politico-economic power. This fact is also true of other countries ; but it is especially so in Africa. The first men to clear the bush were honoured by the chiefs and made village headmen. Their descendants enjoyed their elite status for many generations. They were often among the titled elite around the throne. The amount of land brought under the hoe—and no more—was valuable. There was no sense in a king adding more and more land to his 'kingdom' in Africa. He was not a sovereign over land only. He was a sovereign over people plus land. Both factors inter-acted. If a king wished to appoint a subordinate chief for local administration, he would grant him an area of populated land and it was understood that he would care for his inhabitants and support himself through their tribute. Thus, local administration, as in the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro (Uganda) for example, was tied to a land benefice. The sub-chief, in his turn would give tribute to the King. This land benefice shows the interaction of land and people in Africa. The limited technology of the hoe, the lack of the wheel, animal traction and artificial irrigation set limits to the area of bush that could be tamed. Thus, land as a factor in political development suffered variability at the hands of another factor—the People. What was the use of a vast, wild bush without enough people to clear it and transform it into green farms? And people were few and precious. A chief's greatness was judged by the number of followers he had, exactly as a man's personal prestige was measured by the number of his wives. In both cases the same politico-economic factors operate. More wives would mean more work done on the farms, more prosperity and more personal wealth (i.e. wealth in persons) when children were born. A wealthy man would enjoy immense political power and could get very close to the King. People were highly valued and all chiefs dreaded the thought that any of their people would abandon them. They dared not say or do anything that might displease their followers. They had to be wary in their use of power. Consultation

was the pre-condition of all political decisions. *Thus the African environment was responsible for the sturdy, democratic traditions of the people.* The elders would sit under a tree and debate till they agreed.

If a large group of people decided to abandon their king and strike out on their own, there would be a substantial reduction of the cultivable area and a subsequent reduction of the source of the King's power. For his power sprang from his people—they worked the land of the earth. The ever-present bush that stretched away unendingly to the horizon was a big curb on the King's power. It was a permanent call to secession, which he was powerless to prevent. This tendency is revealed in the political structures of many African peoples as segmentation. Indeed, segmentation, if not secession, is a marked feature of African political development. The segmentation of a chiefly lineage resulted in a proliferation of chiefdoms.<sup>13</sup> The Ahur of north-western Uganda, for instance, are a multi-chiefdom society, with the structure of a power pyramid. The founder chiefdom forms the apex. Not all segmented political systems are neat pyramids. There is so much competition for political power between the subordinate and the super-ordinate segments that the apex often disappears. This is true of the peoples of Western Tanzania like the Kimbu. Many polities present segmentation in their social structures but not in their political structures. A State must not be thought segmentary simply because it has segmentary lineages. Segmentation in the political structure may or may not coincide with the segmentation in the lineage structure. There is a partial identity of the two among the peoples of Western Tanzania such as the Nyamwezi, Sukuma, Kimbu, Konongo and Galla. Immigration from alien groups has sometimes led to segmentation. The need for safety from invaders has at times led to segmentation. Thus, even a sparsely populated chiefdom may split into many political units and disperse through the surrounding country to counteract an influx of aliens. In the African bush it has sometimes turned out that division was strength. A multiplication of the centres of power helped the sparse group to exploit the environment more effectively and justifying its claims to occupation. But

scattering in the safety of a wild thicket was equally effective when slave raiders came, as the Makonde peoples of the Newala Plateau in Tanzania have known for decades.<sup>14</sup> The scattering of the homesteads made it difficult for the Ngoni raiders to get at more than one family at a time.

The fact that land was virtually unlimited did not minimize the incidence of warfare among the tribes of Africa. Man's natural political ambitions, his instincts for self-aggrandizement and aggression found full expression vis-a-vis neighbouring groups. They were directed not at their land but at their live-stock. This is especially true of all pastoral peoples who are inveterate cattle thieves. "The Masai", Kirby tells us<sup>15</sup> "have a theological justification for this, as they believe that in the beginning, when Engai created the world, he gave all the cattle to the Masai, therefore any cattle now owned by others must have been at some time stolen from the Masai and it is perfectly proper to take these errant animals back into custody. The much more prosaic sociological reason for the incessant cattle raiding is the necessity for a young man to accumulate a sufficient herd of cattle with which to buy wives when he becomes an elder."

Pastoralism has had a profound effect upon the political development of the peoples of East Africa. In Rwanda a strange 'caste' system developed with the tall Tutsi pastoralists at the top, the stocky Hutu in the middle and the pygmoid Twa at the base of the social structure. Tutsi literature which sings of the glories of their longhorned cattle is also explicit about the ideological premise of the fundamental inequality of man. In a moment of inspiration the Tutsi poet sang: "You cow, who save me the shame and fatigue of the hoe." A critical fact was that cattle, more than anything else, was wealth and all the cattle in Rwanda were owned by the Tutsi. It was a system of property ownership by which the Tutsi were able to clamp down their rule for 400 years over the rest of the population—Hutu (85%) and Twa (5%). The only way in which the Hutu could get access to the cattle was through a complicated system of clientship by which each individual Hutu was bound to a Tutsi lord. The Tutsi lord would grant him the use of a few animals,

beside general protection, in return for which he laboured in field and farm. A sort of bovine feudalism developed through the centuries. Some early observers thought that Tutsi overlordship was based on coercion. Had this been the case, the system would not have been so stable. The French anthropologist, J.J. Maquet<sup>16</sup> has analyzed perceptively the underlying system of beliefs and values that have lent stability to the political system. As Rwanda had a centralized authority structure it would be quite wrong to use the words 'feudal' or 'feudalism' which are so full of medieval European connotations. Rwanda presents an altogether unique type of polity in which three entirely different tribes managed to co-exist in a sort of symbiosis. The Tutsi aristocrats were given a special education. Had they heard of Plato's Guardians, they would have heartily identified themselves with them. There was great political sophistication in the administrative structure. The royal court presided over many chiefly hierarchies, each of which was in charge of a different aspect of the subjects obligations. There were even two chiefs with the same territorial jurisdiction ; one of them was in charge of food revenues and the other in charge of taxes on livestock. This helped to create the necessary tensions among chiefs which would prevent them from coalescing against their king, or *mwami*. This was essential in a country like Rwanda, where the mountainous terrain was a standing temptation to rebellion and secession. It was the nature of the environment—the grasslands of the East African Rift Valley—which determined the development of the Rwandan State.

If land could not be grabbed, in Africa, the people could be. Aggression and the urge to power were often directed against the persons of neighbouring peoples, giving rise to the phenomenon of slavery. A mild form of 'slavery', vastly different from anything the European nations perpetrated in Africa, had always been a part of the African political scene. So different was it, that it deserves to be known by some other name ; and here too, the Africanist is at a loss for terms. 'Slavery' in Africa was an aspect of political relationships and not economic relationships. Slaves were not commodities that were bought or sold. Nor were they prized especially as instruments of production for marketable wealth. They were not objects

of economic exploitation. This could not happen, given the primitive state of the technology where all men worked for the general wealth. The only elite was the political, but its patterns of consumption were on a par with those of the common people. 'Slaves' were not humiliated or set apart from the people. Most of them belonged to the ruling lineage and were absorbed into it after a couple of generations. They were so indistinguishable a part of the royal household that one could not tell a slave child from a young 'prince'. Among the Wanyamwezi<sup>17</sup> the most important men around the chief, or *Ntemi* were the slaves. They were called the *banyikulu* and they were the royal bodyguard and the ritual officers of the State. As they were not eligible for the office of chiefship, the chief had nothing to fear from them. They formed a buffer all around him and enhanced the safety and glory of his royal person. They were responsible for burying a dead chief and installing a new one. The political structures in Unyamwezi had neat, built-in systems of checks and balances. There were three sets of distinct but complementary sets of persons. Firstly, the secular duties of administration and warfare were in the hands of the headmen, most of whom were patrilineal descendants of the chief. Secondly, the chief himself held a basically ritual office and succeeded according to matrilineal rules. Thirdly, the security and continuity of the chiefship was entrusted to a group of men, the *banyikulu*, who could never aspire to the chiefship themselves. In Unyamwezi the numerous slaves of the chiefs were called the *basese* (*sing : nsese*). Their descendants often claimed membership of the ruling family of the chiefdom. In the Busongo chiefdom, such a man became a chief. When others of the royal clan complained he said that he only knew the royal family as his kinsfolk and if they were not his kin they should point out where his kin were. They were of course unable to do this and his right to the throne could not be challenged.

African society was largely egalitarian because of the subsistence economy. Wealth was largely perishable in form and consisted of products like vegetables, grains, meat or livestock. Human beings were more important politically than economically. Slaves could not add to their owner's wealth because of the low level of technology

and the perishable nature of food. But by their presence they brought glory to the ruling lineage to which they were attached. The coming of the Arabs touched off rapid socio-political change for they introduced imperishable wealth through trade. In return they demanded ivory, skins, forest products and slaves. This transformed the nature of 'slavery' from a basically political to a largely economic institution. What had been merely incidental to prestigious politics now changed beyond recognition; though it still bore the same name. Human beings were soon to be caught up helplessly in the ensuing struggle for economic gain and political power. Imperishable wealth like cloth, beads, liquor, and especially guns upset the delicate balance of power among the tribal states of Africa.. Abrahams clearly shows the effects on political development in Unyamwezi of the Arab intrusions by about 1850. The chiefs were not slow to realize that storable wealth was an aid to political power. They intensified their trading and raiding operations. Chiefships which were at once ritualistic and matrilineal became more secular and patrilineal. Intense power struggles ensued between them and their greater headmen. More and more guns were acquired in return for more and more slaves and powerful armies came into being. All was set for the coming of Mirambo, whom Stanley called the Napoleon of Central Africa. Thus, non-perishable goods made the coming of social and political change quick and dramatic. The coming of the Arabs and then the Europeans set up a disequilibrium on the continent. The delicate adjustments that the peoples of Africa had made with their environment was upset. They had endeavoured to turn the numerical weaknesses of the Human Factor into spiritual strengths ; in spite of shifting agriculture and pastoralism they had forged the abiding unity of the Popular State.

In Africa, perhaps more than anywhere else, we see the influence of ecology upon political development. In the lands of the Niger bend great empires—Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Kanem-Bornu—rose and fell. They were based on horse-power and upon the ancient trans-Saharan trade. Their fabulous riches and splendour dims the tales of the Arabian nights. In analysing the influence of technology upon political development in Africa, Jack Goody<sup>18</sup> shows

the part played by the horse in the growth of these West African Kingdoms. But this technology could not penetrate south, for the horse could not survive in the rain-forests or in the tsetse-ridden areas. Thus, the environment hampered progress. The state takes on different traits in the lands of the Niger-bend, in the rain-forests of the Congo, in the grasslands of the Cameroons or the pastures of the Rift Valley, in fertile Buganda and in the hot, dry savannahs that border the deserts. Yet Bantu political philosophy is everywhere largely uniform. The basic emphasis was on the people rather than the land even in the great states and empires. The focus of political loyalty in the great kingdoms became the king himself and not the land or *patria*. But this did not always make the king authoritarian. In West Africa, for instance, the Stool of the chief contained the soul of the nation. The king sat on the stool, i.e. he was supported by the people. They were the source of his power. If he was found unsatisfactory he would be de-stooled. There was a very clear distinction in practice, which embodied theory, between the State and the Government. The ultimate focus was still people and not territory. Though there was conspicuous political development in the kingdoms, it should not blind us to the fact that the popular state had been nurtured in the quiet villages of the African bush.

With the coming of the Europeans African political history took a step in a new direction. It was indeed a historic step, never to be retraced. For the first time, African states were to be based squarely on well-demarcated territories. Early colonial administrators looked around and found nothing they could call a 'State'. At times, when they put their first question : "Who is in charge here?" they found either no chief, or only one chief with 'divine' glory and no political authority, or, worst of all, too many chiefs. Eventually they realized that to strengthen their foothold they had to create the 'State' as they knew it. Where the Europeans already had economic control and influence, they had to consolidate their *de facto* position politically by means of a formal treaty ; they had to assert, above all, the 'legitimacy' of the new political order. In their search for legitimacy they incorporated traditional authorities into the apparatus of colonial government. In their haste to consolidate their political



power, they used existing political institutions and structures to build upon. Acephalous societies posed a problem and offered no base to work upon. So, 'chiefs' were invented and imposed upon peoples like the Kikuyu of Kenya or the Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. In a mood of cynical protest against the idiocy of white oppression, African people often put up the village idiot as a candidate for the chiefship and continued to revere their own leader. Colonial governors managed to impart a semblance of legitimacy and continuity to their rule. But time was to show the yawning gulf between everything European and everything African.

The nature of the modern European state is fundamentally different from that of the African State. The prime focus of the former is the preciousness of the land while the foundation of the latter is the preciousness of humanity. The former is based upon coercion and the state monopoly of force while the latter is based upon coercion and the diffusion of authority. In the colonial period came the centralization of political power which had far-reaching consequences both for traditional polities and for African customary law. The white governments made an effort, above all else, to establish the legitimacy of the new political order. They therefore began to deny every other group and individual the right to use violence in the pursuit of private interest.<sup>19</sup> A new dimension was added, now, for the first time in African history, to the concept of governmental authority. The State now had a monopoly of force and it could be used ably by the colonial authority. Thus, *public* violence took precedence over private violence. While public violence was supposed to embody the common interest, all other violence was private and illegitimate. The new state not only had the monopoly of 'legitimate' force, but it justified its claims to this monopoly by the further use of force. This concept was wholly new in the African setting and clashed directly with African law. African law was essentially restitutive in nature and hardly ever involved capital punishment.<sup>20</sup> Every case was decided by the elders in the presence of Kinsmen. Long, patient hearings bear out the truth of the remark that Africans have a genius for litigation. At the inter-tribal level, the Europeans forbade feuds and raiding. European rule was not a mere change in

government somewhere up in the higher centres of power. It was profound in its impact upon the mind of Africa. In the social and cultural disturbances it set up it was quite different from anything Africa had ever known.

The Europeans have left, but the disturbances they set up in the quiet tenor of African life will never calm down. The territorial states drawn up by Bismarck and the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 are yet to be consolidated as viable entities. The development of the territorially based African State has only just begun. The old African States were forged out of the solidarity of the tribe and built into the minds and hearts of its men and women. The modern ones are still geographical expressions with a medley of tribes. Modern African leaders are in a hurry to strengthen the new structures with a little of old Africa's philosophical cement.

### FOOTNOTES

1. Shapera, I. : *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*. London C.A. Watts and Co., 1956.

Shapera's findings have conclusively established the fact that Kinship was not the only factor that bound tribal groups together. The most important of the other factors is territoriality. Several brilliant scholars—among them Ginsberg, Seagle, Durkheim, Hobhouse, Vinogradoff, Hartland, Davy, R.M. MacIver, Teggart and Maine—laboured under the misconception that Kinship was the only factor that bound primitive groups. It was not the sole factor; it did not cover all members of a primitive community and it occurred in varying degrees in groups. Maine, Durkheim and the others erred in making a dichotomy between primitive societies, based, according to them, on Kinship, and civilized societies, based on territoriality. Shapera says that "they are mistaken in regarding Kinship and local contiguity as irreconcilable and mutually-exclusive determinants of 'Common Political Action'." For the tribe, among Bantu and Hottentots, "is not a single Kinship group, but a heterogeneous collection of such groups, all occupying one territory under the rule of the same chief." (P. 33). Kinship unites only a few people, a small part of a group. It "often tends to divide a community instead of uniting it". The fragmented, acephalous Kikuyu are an extreme example of the divisive effects of Kinship, aggravated by the nature of the terrain, which is broken by ridges. In spite of age-set organizations, a common historical memory and political culture, they failed to form a state, thanks to ecology.

2. Lambert, H.E. : *Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions*. OUP, London, 1956, 1965. pp. 100-106.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
4. Davidson, Basil: *African Kingdoms*, Time-Life International 1967. p. 64.
5. Davidson, Basil: *Which Way Africa?* Penguin Books, Third edition, 1971, p. 27.
6. MacDonald, Malcolm: *Thoughts on the Human Family*. Longman for the University of Essex. 1970, p. 19.
7. Turnbull, Colin: *The Forest People*. Simon and Schuster, New York. 1968.
8. Shapera, I.: *Op. Cit.*

Shapera's authoritative findings on the relative importance of territoriality and Kinship in African polities does not disprove the main thesis of this paper. In his endeavour to show that the strong emphasis on kinship as the *sole* factor in the solidarity of tribal units, in the writings of Maine, Durkheim and a host of other scholars, is wrong, Shapera highlights the importance of territoriality in Hottentot and Bantu polities. While conceding that, because of its plenitude, land was not always demarcated very sharply, and "tribal boundaries were at first fairly vague" (P. 13) he points out the dangers of generalization about all primitive tribes, (as R.M. MacIver does), for even hunters like the Bergdama and Bushmen may have very sharply defined territories. (P. 11) Again, the factor of territoriality becomes important when the political unit consists of a large number of kinship groups; in which case kinship would be a divisive factor, rather than a cohesive one. "Every community has a recognized territory, which normally only its own members may inhabit and exploit for subsistence; what Maine termed 'local contiguity' is therefore always one of the bonds uniting them." (P. 33) So far, we have seen that Shapera has redressed the balance from Kinship to territoriality. And it almost appears to contradict the main thesis of this paper—that *People* rather than *Land*—is the basis of the African State. But Shapera goes a step further and redresses the balance in favour of allegiance to the chief. He tells us (P. 28) that "people identify themselves politically as subjects of such-and-such a chief, and not, as we do, as citizens of such-and-such a country. 'Ke Mokwena Waga Sechele', a man will say, 'I am a Kwena belonging to (Chief) Sechele, nor will he ever use some such phrase as 'I am a Zululander' or 'Civis romanus sum'." "Among Sotho, again, chief is often addressed ceremonially by the personification of the tribal name, as Mokwena, Mo Nywato, etc. He also habitually refers to himself and is referred to by some such title as *Koosi Ya Ba Hurutshe*, 'chief of the Hurutshe people', not, be it noted, as *Kgosi Ya Le Hurutshe*, 'chief of Hurutshe land'. Hence, we may conclude that land was not the basis of ethnic nationalism and did not become like the *patria* of Europe. This is true in spite of the fact that the peoples of Africa had a deep reverence for it as the land of their fathers and in spite of the fact that, at a time of public danger, chief Moshesh (of the

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Southern Sotho) ended a public exhortation to his men, with the cry ; "Let us die for our country !" (Shepera, P. 14).

9. This is also noted by Gunter Wagner of the tribes he studied. "The Abaluyia of Kavirondo", in *African Worlds*. Published for the International African Institute, OUP 1954 Ed. by Daryll Forde. p. 36.

10. Dyson-Hudson, Neville : "Factors Inhibiting change in an African Pastoral Society ; The Karimojong of North-eastern Uganda." In John Middleton (Ed.) *Black Africa*, Macmillan London, 1970, p. 52.

11. Fallers, Lloyd, *Inequality ; Social Stratification Reconsidered*. Chicago and London : The University of Chicago Press, 1973, p. 67.

12. Kirby, C.P. *East Africa*. Ernest Benn Ltd ; London, 1968, p. 58.

13. Shorter, Aylward, *East African Societies*. London and Boston. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 42.

14. Liebenow, J. Gus. *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania : The Case of the Makonde*. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1971. p. 28-29.

15. Kirby, C.P. *East Africa*. Ernest Benn Ltd. London, 1968, p. 63.

16. Maquet, J.J. : *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda*. OUP, 1961.

17. Abrahams, R.G. : *The Political Organization of Unyamwezi*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1967.

18. Goody, Jack : *Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa*. Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press. London, Ibadan, Accra, 1971.

19. Worseley, Peter : *The Third World*. London, 1967. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 35.

20. For an authoritative discussion of this aspect of traditional law as against modern law see Sheleff, Leon Shaskolsky. "From Restitutive Law to Repressive Law : Durkheim's The Division of Labour in Society re-visited", in *Archives : European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, 1975. No. 1, p. 16.

D.S. Palmer and C.D. Palmer : **Political Participation  
Under Military Rule**

Military rule and political participation are usually considered in the literature to be fundamentally incompatible—when the military rules, citizens do not participate. In practice, however, wide variations occur: between formal and “informal” participation, between elite and mass participation, and the various forms of participation which are beyond the limits of state control. The military in power may act to repress participation, or it may serve as the handmaiden of an oligarchy or a tribe; but it may even, at times, be the actual organizer of political participation of various kinds.

The tension between military rule and citizen participation is real enough, however; in many cases one reason the military takes over power is to keep certain groups from doing certain things. Military regimes deal with this almost inevitable issue of political participation in a number of ways; the following continuum illustrates the major alternative modes.

1. *Repression.* The military preceives citizen participation as pernicious and works to undercut it on an individual and collective basis by intimidation, jailing, deportation, torture, and killing.

2. *Cooptation.* The military preceives citizen participation as necessary, but also believes that it must be maintained in a subordinate position where it will pose no challenge to the regime. Rulers will work to gain popular support by various inducements—monetary, employment, symbolic—which permit the military to avoid organizing the populace. This mode is known as military populism, if the institution is operating in power by and large as a unit; or as personalism or caudillism if it is not.

3. *Laissez Faire*. The military is indifferent to citizen participation as long as it stays within its own spheres of competence and concern. This mode would be likely in those cases of military takeover in economic or international crisis, for example, when the major problems are not perceived to revolve around political institutions; or when the military assumes power with the specific intention of turning government back to civilians shortly.

4. *"Non-Political" Institution Building*. The military sees itself as a political organizer, but fears citizen involvement in national politics and therefore tries to build "non-political" organizations; e.g. at the local level, such as cooperatives, work centers, and neighbourhood associations, which involve routine day-to-day concerns of the population.

5. *Political Institution Building*. The military sees itself as a political organizer for involvement of the citizen in the political system at all levels, and tries to build organizations such as parties, associations, unions, etc. to get citizens into the system or to get them in a particular way.

Within the institution building modes we can speak of *conservative* institution building, or organizing to protect the system from a perceived threat. Such actions often result when the state of the national political system is viewed within the context of national security issues. These are political components of the "security equals development" doctrine.

We can also refer to *radical* institution building, or the attempt to open up the system to new groups and to give them access through formal structures set or encouraged by the military regime. These actions may stem from a military establishment which is deeply steeped in socialist or Marxist ideology, or one which was closely allied with certain progressive civilian elements at key moments in the nation's history.

Even in those modes toward the more "progressive" end of the continuum, when the military in power has a strong sense of its organizational mission in the wider society, it will usually try to

impose its will. The structures of citizen participation will be organized from above, and the parameters within which participation is to take place will be set from the centre. Thus, even though military government and citizen participation are not necessarily incompatible, the tension between them remains. Problems abound, especially when the implementation process produces something different from the originally intended results, as is its wont. Nevertheless, at least toward this end of the continuum the military does citizen participation more as an opportunity than as an obstacle.

### **An Analytical Construct**

Many studies carried out on the military in politics indicate that military regimes are generally no more successful than their civilian counterparts in implementing reform, and often less so.<sup>1</sup> Put another way, military regimes may want to carry out reforms, but are often unable to do so. Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which the military does see itself as a reforming or even as a revolutionary institution. Our particular concern is in sorting out these circumstances for Africa and Latin America, with special reference to citizen participation initiatives.

Various hypotheses have been derived regarding the likelihood that the military, as rulers, will implement social, economic, and political reforms.<sup>2</sup> Many of these propositions relate to the level of institutionalization of the military, on the one hand, and to the level of institutionalization of civil structures in the wider society, on the other. The degree to which civilian organizations are embedded in society, in turn, depends in large part on the level of awareness and activity by citizens within that society; in other words, social mobilization levels.

By military institutionalization we refer to the relative capacity and unity of the armed forces of a nation. Ways to measure comparative levels of such institutionalization are quite difficult, but might include such items as military budget per officer, levels of training required for officers, and the degree of common social origins of officers.<sup>3</sup> Civilian institutionalization measurements are also tricky, but could include years of operation, generational leader-

ship changes, major organizational subunits, membership, training requirements, and budget.<sup>4</sup> Social mobilization, as citizen national awareness levels, includes such elements as speaking the national language, urbanization, non agricultural occupation, literacy and education levels, per capita income, and voting.<sup>5</sup>

The situations most conducive to reform by military governments, it is argued, are those in which the military is highly organized and the wider society is at extremely low levels of organization/involvement and awareness. As society becomes more aware, as well as organized and involved relative to the military, military rule, when it occurs, becomes more and more conservative on its policies and objectives. In other words, it is not just social mobilization levels, but these in terms of civilian institutionalization levels which set the likely type of government and policy outcome at different levels of military institutionalization.

Our particular concern for citizen participation under military rule relates closely to this discussion. In spite of Huntington's conclusion that "militaries shrink from the role of political organizer",<sup>6</sup> reformist military regimes often do foster citizen participation of one form or another, while non-reformist militaries usually inhibit it. Societies with low levels of organization and social mobilization are receptive to reformist military rulers' initiatives regarding participation; those with high levels are not. The likely result in each case is a function of the relationship between levels of military institutionalization, on the one hand, and levels of societal organization *viz-a-viz* mobilization, on the other. The accompanying table illustrates the major patterns.

The table suggests both the likely government types at each level of relationship and the likely policy outcome under military rule. At the lowest level of military institutionalization the policy outcome of military rule is more related to the perceptions and predispositions of the individual leader(s), and is likely to be personalistic. Reform is possible under such circumstances, especially if civilian institutionalization/mobilization is also low when leadership is so disposed. At such levels, the first analytical cut should be made on leadership.



# Political Participation Under Military Rule

TABLE I

LIKELY GOVERNMENT TYPE AND LIKELY POLICY  
OUTCOME UNDER MILITARY RULE

CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONALIZATION/MOBILIZATION

LEVELS OF

M I  
I N  
L S  
I T  
T I  
A T  
R U  
Y  
I I  
O N  
A  
L I  
I Z  
A  
T T  
I I  
O N

	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
Low	Civilian Personalism Military Personalism	Civilian Populism	Civilian Institutionalism
Medium	Civilian Personalism Military Populism	Civilian Populism	Civilian Institutionalism
High	Civilian Personalism Military Institutionalism	Civilian Populism	Civilian Institutionalism
	REFORMIST REVOLUTIONARY (Institution Building)	CONSERVATIVE	REACTIONARY (Repression)

At medium levels of military institutionalization, policies are more likely to be populist in nature, or cooptive, particularly with lower levels of civilian institutionalization/mobilization. When the military is well institutionalized compared to civilian organizations and social mobilization, political institution building is more likely. At higher levels of civilian institutionalization/mobilization, the military is less likely to intervene. When it does, however, whatever the level of military institutionalization, higher levels of violence and repression may be anticipated.

Clearly other considerations also affect the likelihood that military governments will have the interest and be able to carry out reforms, particularly those relating to political participation initiatives; e.g., economic resource availability, the social, political, and economic context immediately preceeding the military government, and levels of dependency. In our judgment, however, much of the explanation is to be found in the relationship between levels of citizen organization/mobilization and military institutionalization.

#### **Cross Continental Comparisons : Preliminary Observations**

African and Latin American realities are different in a number of ways. Some of these differences have an important bearing on the nature of military governments and their likely policy regarding citizen participation.

Because most of Latin America has been independent since the early 1800's, levels of civilian institutionalization, social mobilization, and military institutionalization are on the whole much higher there than in Africa. This would suggest that military rule in Latin America would tend to be more conservative, all things being equal, than that in Africa. Furthermore, perceptions and actions of individual military leaders would loom more important in the African context because of these lower levels of institutionalization, and should be examined more closely to predict the likely direction of military rule there.<sup>7</sup>

In the military establishments of some Latin American countries, however, in part because they are relatively well institutionalized,

zed, there has evolved over time, largely through training, a new *raison d'être* of their existence within their societies. The new national security objectives of such militaries as the Peruvian, Brazilian, Guatemalan, Honduran, and Ecuadorean now revolve more around national development goals—social, political, and economic—than around traditional national defence objectives. Therefore, recent military rule in several Latin American countries has been characterized by intense institutionalized military efforts to reform the nation—including building organizations for political participation by the populace. The military government of Peru, for example, has placed emphasis on building an infrastructure of local level organizations such as cooperatives and industrial communities, while Brazil's military regime has emphasized the creation of a new national political party system and national political structures.<sup>8</sup>

Given the relative complexity of Latin societies, however, such reforms tend to be conservative rather than radical; that is to say, they are designed to protect society rather than transform it. The nature of the origins of the reform impulse from within the military establishment—as part of national security doctrine—reinforces the conservative tendency.

In Africa lower levels of military institutionalization are partially offset by lower levels of social institutionalization, as well as by the relatively recent emergence of most African countries as independent nations. This has important implications for Africa not found in Latin America. First, most African nations became independent during the ascendancy of socialism as a world ideology. Although initially most leaders of newly independent militias maintained a colonial perspective, as the first decade of independence wore on many adopted national goals framed in socialist rhetoric and ideology.

For Latin America, on the other hand, independence occurred by and large when classical liberalism was the ascendent world revolutionary ideology. Socialist ideologies have been introduced into the Latin American nations over the past century, and have varying degrees of legitimacy. However, such ideological currents—especially the marxist variants—generally have been viewed by elites,

including the military, as challenges to the long standing existing system, rather than as legitimate guidelines for the construction of a new society, as in several African states.

Secondly, in a number of African states military and civilian elements worked or fought together to get rid of the colonial masters, and these ties are still within their first generation. Some alliances were formed which make the military a force for promoting the emergence of civilian institutions rather than a force for repressing them, as in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Thus one result of military rule in some African states is the attempt to build new national political organizations for new elements of the population—a genuinely radical rather than a conservative form of institution-building. A variant on this theme are the cases of Somalia and Ethiopia, where newly radicalized militaries have formed single mass parties of the revolution which citizens are required to join.

The lower levels of cohesion and capacity of most African military establishments is illustrated by the “creeping coup” phenomenon. In a number of countries a common pattern of presidential succession has been for generals to replace civilians, colonels to replace generals, lieutenants and captains to replace colonels, and even, in the case of Sierra Leone, sargent majors replacing lieutenants.

Furthermore, coups themselves usually require less planning in Africa, and can often be carried out with a relatively small number of officers and men. In most Latin American countries very elaborate preparations are normally required within the armed forces before undertaking a coup. Close coordination and multiple advance arrangements among the services are usually essential to the coup's subsequent success, and often take months to work out. When coups finally do occur, they are increasingly carried out in the names of the armed forces as institutions rather than by individuals, ranks, or specific branches. Extraordinary efforts are usually made before and after the coup to maintain military unity, even though important cleavages often remain and may well surface sooner or later. The difficulties recent military regimes in Ecuador and

Honduras have experienced, for example, in carrying out reformist programmes, including citizen participation initiatives, may be attributed in large measure to such within-military cleavages.<sup>9</sup>

In both Latin America and Africa popular resistance to a military coup is generally quite low and quite brief, but the reasons differ on each continent. In many African countries, if those carrying out the coup have the place, the airport, and the radio station, there is not much left for the opposition to rally around. Other military elements and civilians soon go along because they see no alternative. Legitimation of the coup process in Africa, therefore, occurs thus far only by frequency of occurrence.

In Latin America, however, the coup is not only a long standing tradition but is also often formally legitimated by specific constitutional provisions which permit armed forces involvement in the political process to restore order. It is left to the military itself to make that determination. Thus the armed forces in many Latin American countries, endowed with formal responsibility for protecting the constitutional order, are empowered to break that order to save it, and often do so.

Military rule is common to both Latin America and Africa. Over the past decade, for example, there have been an average of two successful military coups a year in Latin America, and slightly over four per year in Africa. As of 1977 there are some twelve military regimes in Latin America (of 26 independent states) and eighteen in sub-saharan Africa (of 46 independent states). Latin America shifted in the 1960s from a pattern of civilian predominance with periodic short-term military governments, to long-term military rule. By the 1980's it is now expected that many Latin American militaries will have turned power back to civilians. The pattern in Africa is much more varied, with some military regimes, such as in Uganda, the Congo, and the Central African Republic, giving every indication of staying in power indefinitely, while others, such as Ghana and Nigeria, have announced plans to restore civilian control.

In Latin America military rule runs the gamut of governmental types. Nicaragua, Paragua, and Haiti have long-term institutional

rule; Brazil, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, long-term institutional rule; Panama, Honduras, Ecuador, and El Salvador fall somewhere in between. The leaders of the three personalist dictatorships in Latin America have chosen to engage in rather systematic repression and stifling of citizen participation, even though levels of civilian institutionalization and social mobilization are relatively low by Latin American standards. Among those countries with institutionalized military rule, both Brazil and Peru have engaged in serious efforts to build new forms of political participation. In Brazil's case, such initiatives have been accompanied by considerable repression; in Peru's case, by relatively little. In Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, however, military regimes see the problem of government as one of controlling excessively high prior levels of civilian institutionalization and social mobilization. Institutionalized repression is, therefore, high, and is believed necessary before considering seriously any kind of popular participation initiative, new or old.

In all of the remaining countries except El Salvador, military governments have attempted, often through a series of populist devices, to increase opportunities for citizen participation. Some of the measures include agricultural cooperatives and the extension of government programmes, often to areas hitherto outside effective national control. In Ecuador and Honduras the success of these endeavours has been tempered by the lack of a well institutionalized and unified military establishment; in Panama, by economic crises and preoccupation with the Panama Canal issue. In El Salvador, where the military has been in power since a massive peasant rebellion in 1932-1933 was brutally repressed, the regime remains opposed to any initiatives which will increase citizen involvement.

In Africa a similar diversity of military regime types prevails. Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, and the Central African Republic have long-term personalist dictatorships; Nigeria is perhaps the best example of long-term institutionalized military rule, although both Togo and Chad appear to qualify; the others fall somewhere in between.

Where the military rules as an institution, there appears to be more predictability and much less repression; though in Nigeria this

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occurs after a civil war (1967-1970) in which hundreds of thousands died. The military does not attempt to control all levers of power, and retains its command structure and routinized promotions and performance criteria. Considerable stress is placed on economic development, and civilian political institutions are left more or less to their own devices as long as they do not challenge the military itself. The repression in the African personalist military dictatorships makes their Latin American counterparts pale by comparison. It is estimated, for example, that in Uganda and Burundi alone over 300,000 have been slaughtered under official sanction. Military officers in power in these countries have actively encouraged ethnic hatred, in part to maintain their own positions.

Among the not easily classifiable military governments of Africa, there are a number of factionalized militaries ruling equally factionalized societies, such as in Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey (Benin), and the Malagasy Republic. Here the cleavages have prevented any meaningful societal programme, economic development, or political stability, and repression is high. Another variation are the cases of military establishments in power who have attempted to overcome their own internal cleavages, establish legitimacy, and change dramatically their societies through a revolutionary marxist ideological orientation. Somalia and Ethiopia are examples of such military governments ; Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, while having much the same orientation with strong military backing, are presently under civilian rule. Such "marxist military" examples are absent in the Latin American context, with the partial exception of Cuba.

Those reformist militaries in Latin America which have embarked with greater or lesser success on citizen participation initiatives fit best the conservative institution-building mode ; those in Africa, the radical mode. In Latin America the two countries where such initiatives have been most actively proposed and carried out are Brazil and Peru. In Africa, the military governments of Ethiopia and Somalia have been among those most concerned with reforms and participation.<sup>19</sup> The accompanying table (Table II) provides some

basic comparative information on population, social mobilization levels, and the military.

The militaries of Brazil and Peru, in displays of apparent armed forces unity, took over political power with little bloodshed in 1964 and 1968 from reformist civilian administrations which had become discredited ; the Peruvian, for not pushing reforms hard enough ; the Brazilian, for pushing reforms too hard. Once in power, however, both declared their intention of carrying out nationalist "revolutions" to develop the capacities of their resources and their people, and of staying in power as long as it proved necessary to insure the

TABLE II

**Population, Social Mobilization and Size of Military**

	<i>Population</i> (Millions)	<i>Social Mobilization</i>			<i>Size of Military</i>	
		Urb. GNP/ Cap	Literacy		Military Expenditures GNP (1973)	Armed Forces 1000 People
		(%)	(\$) (1975)	(%)	%	
Brazil	100	59.5	790	67	2.14	4.08
Peru	15	57.0	650	61	2.84	5.10
Somalia	3	28.3	90	20	6.35 (1972)	8.42
Ethiopia	28	11.2	90	7	2.40	1.83

Information on Militaries from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973*. Washington ; USGPO, 1974.

Information on Social Mobilization from World Bank, *Atlas*, Washington, 1976 ; The Environmental Fund, *World Population Estimates*, Washington, 1975 ; Department of State, *Background Notes* (Brazil, Ethiopia, Peru, Somalia), Washington : USGPO, 1975-76.

irreversibility of the changes. In both cases, however, the national development doctrines on which the legitimating rhetoric of the new governments were based had evolved over a ten to fifteen period



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within the higher military studies centers of the two countries as part of intensive advanced courses on the bases of national security.

In the Brazilian case the immediate threat in 1964 was perceived to be the infiltration of some civilian political institutions with marxists and other radicals ; in response many organizations were outlawed and thousands of prominent Brazilians lost their political rights for varying lengths of time. Draconian (for Brazil at least) counterinsurgency operations were undertaken to physically eradicate those radicals who chose in the late 1960's to try to undermine the region with urban terrorist tactics. In due course a new political structure was established to replace its predecessor, including a new congress with limited powers, an official government party (ARENA), and an "official" opposition party (MDB), with periodic open elections. The military retained control of all key power centers, including the presidency, but made provisions to eventually turn the entire creation back to the civilians.

The development doctrine also included major provisions for economic expansion to overcome various deficiencies which were keeping Brazil from becoming the great power leaders felt was and is the country's destiny. State influence, ownership and control expanded dramatically, even as private investment, domestic and international, grew just as rapidly. Annual growth rates of 8-10% became the norm. An assumption of the regime was that a good part of this growth would improve the welfare of the masses, one which has proven largely unrealized even after thirteen years in power.

Nevertheless, the political and economic reforms enacted by the Brazilian regime appear to have accomplished many of the military's original goals : to increase the power of the country by increasing the economic power of the state and by channeling participation into organizations which would not pose a subversive threat to the stability of the system. While the ultimate test comes when the military actually turns political power back to the civilians, to date the conservative institution-building objectives seem

largely realized, even though civilian structures, whenever permitted, regularly show signs of their own independence.

In the Peruvian, case, the major problems seemed to revolve around the sluggishness of the existing political system in addressing the development needs of the country. Unlike Brazil, a real threat to the system from marxist groups had never really existed, so the main threat of the Peruvian military's security doctrine of reformist development was directed at avoiding any potential threat from that quarter in the future. Repression was minimal ; unions and political parties continued to function. Without their bases in congress and the executive, however, they were expected to wither away in time. The regime worked to establish a substitute structure of participation based largely on workplace, and decreed a series of responses between 1969 and 1974 to accomplish this end. A significant agrarian reform turned land over in various cooperative type units ; a new industrial law established industrial communities to share decision-making and profits in the factory, and other measures similarly combining political and economic reform objectives affected most sectors of the economy. Several hundred thousand workers were touched by the reforms and many benefited from them. Such local level participation was gradually to be incorporated into national aggregating units, organized by economic sector along corporatist lines. Some such entities did not become operational ; others, as in agriculture and industry, came under the control of workers who used them in ways not anticipated or even desired by the regime.

As in Brazil, Peru's development doctrine was predicted on rapid economic growth, and for a time the country's diverse resource base permitted fairly good results. The state expanded rapidly into new areas of marketing and production, and in only eight years economic capacity more than doubled. However, increasing dependence on foreign loans and credits, and a failure of certain anticipated resources, such as oil or domestic investors, to yield the massive revenues expected, severely eroded the reforms as well as the legitimacy of the military government itself. A consolidating coup took place in 1975, and plans to return power to civilians were accelerated.

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Nevertheless, the initiatives in both the political and economic arenas were substantial, and many were probably sustained long enough to retain their viability in the future. It is fair to say that the civilians who take over power in 1980 will inherit a far different state than the one they gave up in 1968. A new system has not been erected in place of the old, but sufficient changes were introduced to increase alternatives for a substantial minority of the population.

In sharp contrast to the Latin American cases, in the African countries of Somalia and Ethiopia the military has decided to modernize the society according to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. These "marxist modernizers" have indeed emerged as a new type of military reformers.

In Somalia, corruption had been widespread for many years and the 1969 elections indicated that the most blatant methods for buying and selling votes had been employed. When a dissident policeman shot the President of Somalia in October 1969, the stage was set for a military takeover, which occurred a week later with the arrest of the civilian politician. With consolidation in 1970 as the Somali Democratic Republic, a number of self-help schemes were begun which were designed to improve the quality of rural life by abolishing tribalism and following socialist goals. Considerable infighting within the regime and the severe drought of 1971-74 delayed the formation of a new revolutionary marxist party until 1976, but the movement toward the left was steady and discernible from the beginning. The main ideology of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) was "scientific socialism," and key members were marxist ideologists. The SSRP was to become a "vanguard" movement to form political cadres capable of carrying out the revolution, activate the process of economic development, and liberate and unify all Somali peoples wherever they were found. Some 15,000 SSRP cadres were to spread out into every district and village to make the revolution an actuality.

Observers have commented on the effective job done by the new government in resettling over 100,000 nomads stricken by the drought and in the promotion of local self-help schemes which have involved

the masses in constructive activities. In addition new schools and new roads were built, literacy has risen substantially, and the government is placing increased emphasis on social mobilization. Equal rights for women, "compatible with our socialist principles," have been pushed since 1975. The government has nationalized the oil-marketing companies and banks and land, but not petty trading. Agricultural production is up and progress is being made.

At the same time, Somalia has a long way to go. It remains one of the poorest countries in the world. And the strong Somali State Security System has shown no reluctance to use violence or arbitrary imprisonment to "defend the revolution." In addition, Ethiopian and Somali aims in the area are incompatible, irrespective of the current similarities in their ideologies. Somalia wants control of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the more than 500,00 Somalis who live there, while Ethiopia is bound and determined to hold onto both. War has resulted, sharply reducing the leaders' capacity to implement domestic programmes. Not only the Somalis in Ethiopia, but also in Kenya and in Djibuti are to be gathered in; thus the provisional boundaries must be altered. This overriding concern, far more than the type of ideology the Somalis espouse at a given moment in time, is paramount.

Thus marxism, like Islam before it, is likely to be tempered by the fact of Somali nationalism. Currently "scientific socialism," which means one thing to communists and non-communists elsewhere, is translated by the Somalis as "livestock sharing which is based on knowledge." How much of the Somali revolution will ultimately be laid to Marxism and how much will simply be labeled "modernization" remains to be seen. For the moment, however, Somalia continues to chart its own course for the future, one based on a diverse heritage and a strong sense of nationhood.

Ironically, it is the centuries-old enemy of Somalia, Ethiopia, which alone of the neighbouring countries has also begun to pursue a marxist course in its politics. A number of factors made Ethiopia ripe for some kind of radical adjustments. The long term Emperor, Haile Selassie (1930-1974), gradually lost touch with reality as

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drought, a simmering revolt in Eritrea, and massive forced migration to urban areas strained a traditional conservative political system beyond its limits. In this setting, a "creeping *coup*" developed over the course of several years, ultimately bringing to power young army officers who were determined to make a marxist revolution and to totally transform the country. Unlike Somalia, where the revolutionary activity came as a surprise to most observers, Ethiopia had long been considered ripe for violent social upheaval. The autocratic Emperor was committed to the continuation of a feudal system which sharply divided the society into those who owned land and those who did not, those who were prominent in the Coptic Ethiopian Orthodox Church and those who were not. In many provinces revolts against the central authority simmered and liberation movements abounded.

The army leaders' ruling group, called the *Dergue* (Amharic for "committee"), engaged in an internal power struggle as it moved to take over the country. In November 1974, 60 top military officials and civilians were massacred. The *Dergue* continued to be wracked by internal divisions, but the leadership put forth a series of proclamations announcing "Ethiopian Socialism." Calling for social and economic equality, the *Dergue* nationalized all major industries. In March 1975, it confiscated all land and called for its redistribution, "abolished" the monarchy, and "cancelled" royalty. Later in the year the *Dergue* moved to consolidate its control by purging large numbers of intellectuals, students, workers, and rightists. Several thousand people were killed during these waves alone. In 1976 Ethiopian rulers shifted further to the left and accepted marxism as the primary ideological guidepost for the maturing revolution. The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was officially formed, and its programme called for the "total eradication of feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism," and declared itself to be totally Marxist-Leninist in approach."

Nevertheless there remains widespread opposition to both the *Dergue* and the revolution. In Eritrea alone, there are three distinct groups struggling to free the province from Ethiopian rule. In addition, there is the right-wing, and traditional leadership, united

under an umbrella organization called Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), who oppose the *Dergue*. Although EDU remains a moderate alternative to the *Dergue*, its calls for democratic elections and peace talks seem overtaken by events.

The *Dergue* is also opposed by the urban-based Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (ERPP), which opposed the monarchy even before there was a *Dergue* and argues that the *Dergue* has not gone far enough and thereby has "betrayed" the revolution. Urban guerrilla warfare waged by students, workers and disaffected intellectuals on behalf of the ERPP has led to large-scale killings in retaliation by the *Dergue*. Yet, despite the opposition and the turmoil, the civil war and the impending international conflicts, the Marxist modernizers in Ethiopia continue to carry out their revolution. The revolution has become their *raison d'être* and the legitimizing ingredient in their repression of all those who would replace them.

Thus far, the marxist modernizers have carried the revolution into a number of key structures : the ruling class, the system of land tenure, important sectors of the economy and critical social mobilization. With regard to the ruling class, the *Dergue* have simply decapitated the old order. Thousands have been executed and virtually the entire royal family is dead or in exile. However, a massive land reform programme has not gone smoothly. Early peasant enthusiasm cooled and many former landowners in the more traditional areas armed their peasants against governmental intrusion. Because the government was unable to send out trained cadres, the land reform act, initially at least, led to great waste, confusion and violent societal upheaval. In addition, the *Dergue's* leaders have adopted a marxist programme for the economy, with nationalization of key industries and banks and even severe limits on private ownership of small business.

The government is trying to maintain its power and the impetus of the revolution by massive social mobilization. By mid-1977, fully 100,000 Ethiopians had been marshalled into a People's Militia. Armed with Soviet weapons and destined for use against the various secessionist groups, the Militia also serves as a social conduit for the

ideals and goals of the revolution, which are imparted along with military training.

Thus, it remains to be seen just how far the marxist modernizers will be able to carry the revolution in contemporary Ethiopia. There is no mass party as yet and the revolutionary leadership is beset on all sides by a host of enemies. In fact, it is by no means certain that Ethiopia will continue to exist as an integral whole. The revolution may stave off disintegration or hasten it.

### Conclusions

At the level of rhetorical flourishes one notices numerous similarities among many African and Latin American military regimes in their use of elements of socialist ideology. For many such governments on both continents this is a convenient legitimating device. To the degree that application of this ideology might occur, however, theory would suggest greater likelihood in Africa due to lower levels of institutionalization and social mobilization. To date in practice, nevertheless, the implementation process is very much in flux and very reversible even in those most ostensibly marxist countries of Ethiopia and Somalia. In Latin America, closer examination of the rhetoric suggests more the themes of nationalism and development than socialism or marxism. Applications, particularly in Brazil and Peru, have been dramatic in two major areas : in the rapid expansion of the state as an economic and commercial actor, and in the provision of some infrastructure of party in Brazil and cooperative, community, and association in Peru for popular participation. In both cases there is less likelihood of reversal than in Ethiopia and Somalia, even though some conservatizing adjustments are being made at this time.

Besides having more time to observe the implementation process develop in Brazil and Peru, one can also observe that relatively higher levels of citizen awareness (social mobilization) in both countries makes the citizen more capable of absorbing these kinds of government initiatives and of perceiving the advantages of the arrangements to themselves irrespective of government objectives. While this relatively higher level of awareness creates tension within the

authoritarian setting, when combined with the militaries' reformist impulses and actions the result is an increase in alternatives for at least a portion of the citizenry of both countries.

Low social mobilization permits in principle the more complete imposition of a political organization such as party or cooperative by higher authorities. In practice, however, these institutions of participation require reasonable awareness by the participants of national issues and concerns if they are to function as something more than a device by which national leaders simply manipulate the population. And some degree of autonomous operation is required if the structures created are to become genuinely participatory entities within the system. People who have a bit more education, a bit more experience, and a bit more of a stake in the national system are more able to take immediate advantage of central government participation initiatives. They may then use them in ways the central government never intended. But in so doing they help accomplish the stated goals of the regime : to bring people into the system in ways that will not tear society apart.

To get these initiatives from the military in the first place fairly substantial military cohesion and unity is usually required. In the Latin American context national development doctrines simultaneously foster greater unity within the military even as they provide a rationale for the necessity and desirability of initiating citizen participation entities. While the leader of a fragmented military establishment might be able to use his charisma to accomplish the same goals, this situation is much less stable and much more likely to be overtaken by events. Part of the tenuousness of the radical marxist experiments in some African settings is precisely due to the fragmentation within the governing establishment, whether military with civilian support (Ethiopia and Somalia) or civilian with military backing (Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau). Furthermore, both Somalia and Ethiopia are fighting wars which require traditional military forces and activities and leave precious little left over for the arduous process of building participation structures.

Marxist ideology, while out of the question in virtually all Latin American countries, could conceivably unify the military and



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serve to build a participatory society in some African states. Though there are reasons to doubt "military marxism's" staying power in Africa, the task would be made considerably easier and more likely to succeed eventually if many of those countries now involved were at peace rather than on a full war footing. In any case, the implementation process has not been underway long enough in any of the African radical military regimes to permit conclusive evaluation.

Military regimes in Africa and Latin America are generally more likely to repress or coopt citizen participation organizations and institutions than to try to build them. In those few cases where institution building is taking or has taken place under military auspices, the ideology is as important as actual implementation because it increases legitimacy with the population and helps unify the military.

The stimulus for reformist orientations regarding citizen participation in the Latin American context seems due primarily to intra-military dynamics, especially training, which have and are contributing to a redefinition of the traditional role of the military in more modern and more progressive terms. So far some degree of success in institution-building for citizen participation may be noted in Peru and Brazil, and there have been similar initiatives under military auspices in several other Latin American countries, though less successful.

Given the long history of a close military role in Latin American politics, however, one can predict with reasonable confidence that the military will return to the political arena in the future. With the intra-military changes now occurring, one can further venture that there will be other and perhaps more successful reformist military governments in Latin America in the future, especially in those countries with relatively low levels of citizen institutionalization in relation to social mobilization,

In Africa the situation is still too much in flux. Most societies and most militaries remain very fragmented. Socialist and marxist ideology could help to unify both in some cases. But the implementation process is complex enough under any circumstances, and requi-

res even more when a complete socialist or marxist transformation is envisioned—from resources, to trained people, to strong and effective government—that any prediction along these lines in the African context is hazardous at best.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World", *American Political Science Review*, 70 : 4, December, 1976, 1078-1097. Also Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, 64:4, December, 1970, pp. 1131-1148.

2. Among major works are Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale, 1968; Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968; Edward Feit, *The Armed Bureaucrats*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973; and Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, North Scituate: Duxbury, 1974.

3. c.f. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics*, 27 : 1, October, 1974, p. 129.

4. c.f. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 : 3, April 1965, pp. 386-430.

5. c.f. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55 : 3, September, 1961, pp. 493-514.

6. *Political Order in Changing Societies*: p. 243.

7. Within the contexts of Latin America and Africa, relative differences between civilian institutionalization/mobilization and military institutionalization can produce "regional" varieties of populism or personalism. The point is that even where this occurs, Latin American populism or personalism will likely be more complex and sophisticated than the African varieties because it must operate in more complex societies. One possible exception in the African context would be Nigeria.

8. On Peru, see, for example, Kevin Middlebrook and David Scott Palmer, *Military Government and Political Development: Lessons From Peru*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 5, 01-054, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975; Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule*, Princeton: Princeton, 1975; and David Chaplin, ed., *Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution*, New Brunswick: Transaction, 1976. On Brazil, see, for example, Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton: Princeton, 1971 and Riordan Roett, ed., *Brazil in the 1970's* Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977.

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9. For detail on the Ecuador experience, with specific comparisons to Peru, see John Samuel Fitch, "Radical Military Regimes in Latin America: Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in Peru and Ecuador," working paper presented to the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

10. On Somalia, see David Laitin, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14:3, September, 1976, 463, and Mayamed (Muhammad) Siyad Barre, *My Country and My People*, Mogadiscio: Government Printer, N.D. On Ethiopia, see Edmund Murray, *Kulubi*, New York: Crown, 1973; Andrew Jaffe, "Haile Selassie's Remarkable Reign," *African Report*, May, 1971, 16-18; John Markakis, "Social Formation and Political Adaptation in Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11:3, September, 1973, 365; Marina Ottaway, "Social Classes and Corporate Interests in the Ethiopian Revolution," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14:3, September, 1976, 469-486; Paul Brietzke, "Land Reform in Revolutionary Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14:4, December, 1976, 637-660; John Harbeson, "Ethiopia: Whither the Revolution," *Africa Report*, July-August, 1976, 50; and William Lee, "Ethiopia: A Review of the Dergue," *Africa Report*, March-April, 1977, pp. 7-11.

Dr. Vijay Gupta : **India and Africa**  
A QUARTERLY CHRONICLE  
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**Mr Vajpayee Meets Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers**

The situation in West Asia and Southern Africa dominated the discussions at the extra ordinary meeting of the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries held on the eve of the current session of the UN General Assembly at New York. The Minister for External Affairs, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, attended the meeting which was the first conclave of the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries since the Colombo summit. Addressing the meeting, Mr Vajpayee said that while India welcomed the recent moves towards finding a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties concerned, it considered that there should be further intensification of efforts by the international community to promote the early convening of the Geneva Conference to resolve the critical situation in West Asia in a realistic and principled manner. Israel, he said, should vacate the territories under its illegal occupation and withdraw to pre-1967 conflict borders, thereby complying with UN resolutions.

At the UN headquarters, Mr Vajpayee had the opportunity of meeting over 50 Foreign Ministers individually and many others on social occasions. He discussed the situation in Southern Africa with Mr Mkapa, Foreign Minister of Tanzania. The Zambian Foreign Minister, Dr. S.G. Mwale, told Mr Vajpayee during his discussions that his country welcomed the appointment of Lieutenant General Prem Chand of India as UN Special Representative to assist Zimbabwe's transition to independence and majority rule.

**India Takes Initiative Against Apartheid**

The historic arms embargo resolution passed unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November against the racist Pretoria

regime, in its operative part, is virtually a reproduction of a consensus draft proposed by India in the last week of October. This was acknowledged by Panama and Mauritius in their speeches in the Council following the passage of the resolution. The consensus Indian draft was put forward for the acceptance of Council members after three of the African resolutions proposing a mandatory arms embargo and a cut off of financial assistance and credits to South Africa and ending all nuclear cooperation were vetoed by the USA, UK and France. The Indian consensus draft confined itself to mandatory arms embargo on which there was general agreement and left out actions in the economic front because of differences between western and African positions.

Earlier, India's permanent representative at the United Nations, Mr Rikhi Jaipal, had denounced on 28 October the apartheid regime of South Africa as "a vicious maverick among the nation states of modern times". Speaking at the Security Council, in which he occupied the Presidential chair during October, Mr Jaipal said that judged by the values of Western and other civilisations, South African Government was a serious embarrassment to the entire Christian world and "an enemy of everything that is fine and noble in man".

Mr Jaipal said that Pretoria's recent repressive measures were an evidence of its determination to consolidate its position and to proceed with the further implementation of its obnoxious apartheid policy. This is an open challenge to United Nations and to the value which we are carefully practising for mankind's future based on justice, equality and peace.

Referring to the current popular uprising against the ruling racist clique in Pretoria, Mr Jaipal said that after waiting for generations in the belief that the international community would be able to bring about a political change, the South African people had now apparently lost hopes of a peaceful settlement. They had only two choices : either to resort to armed action or hope for mandatory action by Security Council. Mr Jaipal further said "we are dealing with a situation in which a minority of 14 per cent of the white population is determined to keep 86 per cent of the territory and rule over

some 20 million Africans and others and relegate them to separate development in 14 per cent of useless land".

Continuing, Mr Jaipal said that the apartheid and related policies could not be regarded as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the minority regime. Its actions had incensed the entire international community and endangered peace and security. Arms embargo against Pretoria must be made mandatory. There is at the moment favourable constellation of circumstances and personalities for such action by the Security Council. At the same time, Mr Jaipal said, "we should begin the process of legislative and other action for the progressive imposition of economic sanctions in the months to come". He believed that mandatory sanctions by the Council would bring South Africa to its senses "sooner or later".

#### **India for Law Against Racism**

The historic step taken by the Security Council last month imposing mandatory arms embargo against South Africa has been widely welcomed by many delegations at the United Nations. The next step should be to impose mandatory economic sanctions. Besides, international law, both substantive and procedural, must be evolved to punish those who perpetrate these crimes. UN should support, if not set up, a truly judicial, non-political forum to try individuals guilty of practising racism.

These suggestions were made by Mr N.A. Palkhivala, Indian Ambassador to the US, when he spoke in the UN during the debate on apartheid on 16 November. He also pointed that the present law enforced in civilised societies presented the ludicrous spectacle of trying and punishing those who caused an injury to an individual, but not those who devastated or snuffed out the lives of a race or a whole segment of a nation. An entirely new branch of law must be developed to bring home personal responsibility to those guilty of such gigantic crimes. Nothing would concentrate the mind of the international community so wonderfully on racism as an international trial.

#### **India Demands Liquidation of Colonialism**

India has expressed the hope that colonialism would soon be liquidated from 30-odd countries and territories where it still exist.

Addressing the UN Assembly last week during the debate on the question of implementation of the declaration of independence to colonial countries, Mr J. D. Sethi, a member of the Indian delegation, said that India looked forward to the day when the item concerning colonialism would no longer be on the agenda of the Assembly, as a result of the complete decolonisation of all the remaining non self-governing territories.

Referring to countries where colonial rule still persisted, Mr Sethi focussed attention on Rhodesia and Namibia. In Rhodesia, he said, a group of armed men, bent upon maintaining their own life style, usurped power from Britain and made off, as it were, with a colony of over 200,000 square kilometres and a population of six million. In Namibia, the racist Pretoria regime was in illegal occupation. There was also the case of South Africa itself and other areas like Transkei where there were spurious forms of independence. He said the Security Council must hasten the independence of these areas by strict enforcement of mandatory sanctions. The U. N. General Assembly voted 134-0 with nine abstentions on 7 December to adopt a resolution urging the independence of the world's colonies.

#### **I.C.A. Festival of African Films**

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Samarendra Kundu inaugurated a six-day festival of African films on 3 December at New Delhi. Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Senegal, Somalia and Zambia participated in the festival. The festival was organized by Indian Centre for Africa.

#### **Direct Telephone Link with Africa**

Bangalore has been linked to 46 countries in Europe, North and South America, Africa, West Asia and Far East by telephone, with the opening of a new service at Trunk Exchange where international calls can be put through directly. This was become possible with the extension of the satellite communication facility to Bangalore.

#### **Extension of Pact with ARE**

The meeting of the principal coordinators under the Tripartite Agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt, India and



Yugoslavia was held in New Delhi from 3 to 6 October. The Indian delegation for the meeting was led by Dr P.C. Alexander, Commerce Secretary. The leader of the Egyptian delegation was Mr Youssef Salah Eldin Abbady, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Yugoslavian delegation was led by Mr Ranko Radulovic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade.

The Trade Expansion and Economic Cooperation Agreement, referred to as the Tripartite Agreement, came into force in 1968 in pursuance of the decision reached earlier at a meeting between the Presidents of Egypt and Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of India. The Agreement, initially valid for a period of five years upto 31 March 1973, was extended upto 31 March 1978. When it came first into existence in 1968, the Agreement reflected the pioneering initiative of the three non-aligned developing countries to give an economic content to their hopes and aspirations. In a sense, it was a precursor of all subsequent efforts undertaken by the developing countries to better their economic position in the forum of the non-aligned Conference, GATT, UNCTAD, Bangkok Agreement etc.

The Principal Coordinators' meeting prepared the ground for the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Tripartite Countries to be held in New Delhi early next year to consider, among others, the renewal of the Tripartite Agreement beyond 31 March 1978. The Principal Coordinators agreed to recommend that the agreement be extended beyond 31 March 1978 for a further period of five years. It was agreed that there were substantial possibilities for tripartite cooperation, particularly in fields of manufacture and supply of engines, components and spares for tractors, consumer and shipping electronics and manufacture of passenger coaches. Experts from the three countries would take steps to work out the details of these projects shortly. The possibility of a tripartite agreement on cooperation in Science and Technology was also considered. In the field of financial cooperation it was agreed that there would be an intensification of contacts between the banks and financial institutions in the three countries. In the field of shipping and tourism also more wide-ranging contacts, would be pursued and the three countries would take early steps to conclude bilateral shipping agreements between



themselves. It was also felt that the three countries were well placed to undertake joint turnkey projects in fields like fertilizers and civil construction in the countries in Gulf Area and elsewhere.

### **Indo-Egyptian Trade in Free Foreign Exchange**

India and Arab Republic of Egypt have decided that all trade between the two countries will now be entirely on the basis of payments in free foreign exchange. Till the end of 1976, India and Egypt used to have bilateral trade arrangements providing for exports of specified items from one country to the other up to specified values. This system of bilateral trade arrangements will not be operative hereafter. The new Trade Agreements which will replace the Agreement of 1953 will be initially valid for a period of five years. These decisions were taken in the week-long trade talks between India and Egypt, which concluded in New Delhi on 13 October. The Indian delegation for the talks was led by Dr P. C. Alexander, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, and the Egyptian delegation was led by Mr Yousef Salah Eldin Abbady, Under Secretary, Egyptian Ministry of Trade. During the talks the two delegations reviewed the flow of trade between India and Egypt and expressed their desire to further encourage, expand and diversify the trade.

Egypt has been one of India's important trading partners. India's exports to that country steadily grew in the last few years. As against exports valued at about Rs. 150 million in 1973-74, India's exports to Egypt in 1975-76 amounted to as much as Rs. 1000 million but slightly declined to Rs. 910 million in 1976-77. The major items which India has been exporting to Egypt include iron and steel, machinery—both electrical and non-electrical—manufacturers of metals, transport equipment, jute manufacturers, tea and sugar. In recent years, in addition to traditional items like tea, spices and tobacco, there has been a growth in the exports of non-traditional and manufactured goods, particularly engineering items, chemicals and iron and steel. During 1976-77, exports of iron and steel to Egypt amounted to as much as Rs. 320 million.

With its ambitious development programme, Egypt holds out considerable possibilities for further development of Indo-Egyptian trade, especially in the field of plant and equipments, other engineering items like electric fans, sewing machines, trucks, buses, tractors, textile machinery and oil engines, and textiles including ready-made garments.

India's imports from Egypt have fluctuated to some extent and in 1976-77 stood at Rs. 210 million, showing a slight increase over the level of Rs. 180 million in the previous year. The main item India has been importing from Egypt in the past is cotton. During 1976-77, some quantities of crude oil were also imported. Egypt may also shortly be in a position to offer to India rock phosphate. Rice has also figured in India's imports from Egypt in the past.

#### **Algeria and ARE seek Indian Expertise**

India is to exchange delegations of experts with Algeria and Egypt to study bilateral cooperation in the fields of housing and public works. The Union Minister of Works and Housing, Mr Sikander Bakht, who was talking to newsmen on his return from a 17-day goodwill tour of five Arab countries pointed out in New Delhi on 7 October that this will be a major step towards expanding India's commercial and economic relations with them.

Mr Sikander Bakht visited the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt and Algeria as a special emissary of the Prime Minister, to reaffirm India's warm friendship and support to these countries. Mr Sikander Bakht carried letters from Mr Desai for the Heads of these States.

Mr Sikander Bakht said he found genuine friendship and respect for India in all the countries he visited. There is extraordinary keenness in these countries to extend cooperation with India in the economic and technical fields. They want to utilise Indian expertise on a wide range of subjects like housing, highways, railways and ports and aerodrome. He said Indian ambassadors in these countries would hold discussions there and identify subjects in which India could extend its cooperation.

Mr Bakht who had detailed talks with his counterparts in these countries explained to the Arab leaders the changes which have taken place in India since the Lok Sabha elections. He also told them of the continuing nature of India's foreign policy, particularly its support to the Arab cause.

#### **Kenya to buy Capital Goods worth Rs. 20 million**

Kenya will import capital goods worth rupees 20 million from India.

A FICCI delegation headed by Mr K.N. Modi, Chairman, Foreign Trade Sub-Committee of FICCI visited some African countries. The delegation found that there exists a vast scope for venture in the fields of petro-chemicals, synthetics, fibres, fertilizers, pesticides, steel re-rolling mini-steel plants, paper and pulp machine tool workshops agricultural implements, sheet glass, wire, drawing plants and a variety of engineering products and agro-based industries.

The delegation felt that as those African countries are following forward looking policies to diversify their economies Indian technology and expertise is ideally suited to their needs both in regard to setting up of import substitution and export-oriented enterprises. As India ranks third amongst availability of technical and skilled man-power, there could be a great asset in establishing the joint ventures and supply of manpower. The delegation also studied the possibility of setting up joint business councils between FICCI and the national commercial organization of these nations to exchange business informations.

Among other things the delegation stressed the need to develop direct trade connections so that the trade was conducted on two-way basis and not through the Western European Countries. It is widely recognized in Africa that India is a great supplier of capital equipment and machinery on competitive basis.

#### **Kenya Order for Bottling Plant Bagged**

The Projects and Equipment Corporation has achieved a breakthrough in the export of bottling technology in Africa region in the

face of stiff competition from other countries. A contract for a turnkey project in Kenya has just been signed and a number of similar orders are expected to be received from African and West Asian countries. The order received from Kenya, valued Rs. 50 lakh, covers supply of equipment and spares as well as erection and commissioning of the plant which will bottle soft drinks. It will have the capacity of bottling 4500 bottles of 10 ounces each per hour. The PEC associates in this turnkey job is Mohan Ortmann and Herbert Ltd of New Delhi.

According to informed sources, the Kenya order is likely to be the first of a chain of bottling plants to be set up not only in Kenya but also in other East African Countries.

#### **Libyan Industrial Delegation to Visit India**

A protocol outlining new areas of cooperation in the industrial field between the two countries was signed during the visit to Libya of Mr. George Fernandes, the Minister for Industry. In Libya, Mr Fernandes had discussions with President Col. Moammar Gaddafi and the Libyan Minister of Industry, Trade and Electricity and officials of the Libyan railways. During the discussions Libyan representatives expressed great satisfaction over the performance of Indian companies presently engaged in the construction of the Tripoli-West thermal power station. The project is being executed by the Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL).

The National Industrial Development Corporation Limited, an Engineering and Management Consultancy Firm, have signed a contract with the Industrial Research Centre, Libya for preparing Regional Industrial Planning Studies for the Misuratha-Sirthe and Fezzan-Al-Jufra regions for a fee of Rs. 2,500,000. It will also prepare feasibility studies for six to eight industries at fees ranging from 200,000 to 600,000 per study. The whole job is to be completed within a period of 21 months.

The Government of Libya have selected the National Industrial Development Corporation, an undertaking under the Ministry of Industry, for preparation of regional industrial development planning

studies of two regions in Libya. The fee for the first phase of this assignment is Rs. 2.20 million.

Libya has awarded a Rs. 140 million contract for building roads in that country to the Indian Roads Construction Corporation. The contract was signed in Tripoli recently by Lt. Gen. B.N. Das, Chairman of the Indian Roads Construction Corporation, and Mr. Abdal Kader Jibani, Director General of Roads, Government of Libya.

#### **Indian-Mauritius Education Ministers Meet**

Education Minister of Mauritius Mr Jagat Singh discussed with Indian Minister of Education Dr P.C. Chunder, the issue of the admission of students in the Indian Universities from the island, on 3 October. There are about 500 students from Mauritius in Delhi University alone this year, as against about 250 last year.

#### **Rhodesian Aggression on Moambique Condemned**

The Rhodesian aggression in the territory of Mozambique on 23 and 24 November, which resulted in the massacre of several hundred civilians, including women and children, has been condemned by the Government of India. In a statement issued in New Delhi on 1 December, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee described the action of the Rhodesian Government as "most serious" and "dastardly". Expressing heartfelt sympathies for the innocent victims of the mass killing and destruction, Mr Vajpayee said that the Government of India was convinced that the indefatigable will of the freedom fighters will prevail and soon bring an end to the illegal Smith regime, leading to independence for the people of Zimbabwe and the establishment of majority rule there.

#### **India demand Tight Sanctions Against Rhodesia**

At the United Nations, a member of the Indian delegation, Mr H.V. Kamath, called for a tightening of the existing sanctions against the illegal Smith regime, and enlarging them to include supplies of petroleum and petroleum products. Addressing the decolonisation committee of the General Assembly on 1 December he said that the

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international community, particularly the western nations, should force South Africa, which was playing truant and keeping up oil supplies to Rhodesia, to halt them or in case of default he warned of similar action against itself. He expressed strong scepticism on Mr Iran Smith's reported offer of majority rule on the basis of one man one vote, pointing to his exclusion of the patriotic front from constitutional arrangements. Elections held under the auspices of the Smith regime, he felt, would not be fair or free.

#### **Assistance in Civil Aviation to Nigeria**

India has promised Nigeria all possible assistance in civil aviation matters. The Nigerian Civil Aviation Minister Prof Ossigbu on a visit to India said on 10 October that his country wanted Indian experts to train its airlines personnel both in India and Nigeria. Nigeria also wanted the services of a senior airlines manager to take over as controller of the domestic services.

#### **Nigerian Admiral in India**

Rear Admiral M.A. Adekanwa, Chief of Naval Staff of Nigeria paid a seven-day visit to India from 3 December. He called on the President, the Defence Minister, and other dignitaries, besides, visiting the Naval establishments at Bombay and Cochin.

#### **India Supports SWAPO Demand**

India has extended full support at the UN to the demand of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) for the "complete and unconditional withdrawal" of all South African troops from Namibian territory before electoral processes are set in motion preceding independence. Speaking in the General Assembly on 20 October, Mr H.V. Kamath, a member of the Indian delegation, said that free and fair elections were impossible in the hostile presence of South African forces. The SWAPO demand for the withdrawal of troops of the racist minority regime should receive the support of the entire international community. The demand, he said, was fully in accord with U.N. resolutions on Namibia.

#### **National Help to SWAPO**

A consignment of blankets and medicines donated to the Namibian Liberation Movement, SWAPO, was presented by the

Indian High Commissioner to Zambia, Mr Natwar Singh, to the President of the SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma at Lusaka on 28 November.

### **ICA Observes Solidarity Day**

At New Delhi, the Indian Centre for Africa of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and the African National Congress of South Africa observed the day of solidarity with the Political Prisoners of South Africa on 11 October.

### **India to Help Explore Oil in Tanzania**

Indian collaboration with Tanzania in the exploration of oil is being extended to cover the setting up of a lubricants blending plant and an ammonia plant to make use of gas found on the Songo-Songo island. This was announced after the visit to India of the Tanzanian Minister for Water, Energy and Minerals, Mr Al Noor Kassum in October. Mr Al Noor Kassum had wide-ranging discussion in Delhi with his counterparts in the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Energy, and Departments of Irrigation and Mines. The discussions pertained to Indian assistance for various projects in Tanzania including exploration for oil and gas, thermal power generation, development of coal mines and establishment of salt refineries in Tanzania.

India has agreed to send teams of experts to prepare feasibility reports for the establishment of the proposed ammonia plant and the lube blending unit. Besides, a team of geologists and geophysicists is likely to visit Tanzania by January next year so that necessary data for the proposed seismic survey there is collected by the end of 1978. It has been agreed that the ONGC will undertake drilling of the second well on the Tanzanian Songo-Songo island where the presence of gas in commercial quantities has been established. During his discussions with the Petroleum Minister Mr H.N. Bahuguna, Mr Kassum expressed his keen interest to hire an oil rig from India with the option to purchase it later. He also said that Tanzania was interested in putting up a plant for manufacturing containers.

Mr Fouad Mbazaa, Minister for Youth and Sports, Tunisia, visited India from 31 October to 6 November. He had discussion

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with the Education Minister. He also met officials of the Sports Goods Export Council.

### **Indo-Ugandan Cooperation**

The Minister for power and Industry of Uganda, Brig. D. Sabuni, said in New Delhi on 16 November that there was scope for strengthening cooperation between India and Uganda. Brig. Sabuni called on the Prime Minister, Mr Morarji Desai, and had discussions with the Commerce Minister, Mr Mohan Dharia, and the Industries Minister, Mr George Fernandes. In his talk he mentioned to Mr Dharia the terms the Ugandan Government was offering for investments in Uganda. Uganda has passed a law which would protect foreign investments and allow them to be repatriated.

Various industrial projects on which India and Uganda can collaborate were identified when Brigadier Sabuni met Mr George Fernandes. The projects related to development in Uganda of small-scale and cottage industries, establishment of machine tool complexes, textile mills, sugarcane plants, edible oil processing plants, steel industries, power generation plants and transmission line projects.

There is wide-ranging cooperation between India and Uganda. A jute factory is being set up there as a joint venture. Uganda has ordered 1,500 buses and lorries from India. India's exports to Uganda during 1976-77 were worth Rs. 25.7 million as compared to Rs. 20.5 million in 1975-76. The main items of exports comprise of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, raw jute and jute manufactures, non-electric machinery, transport equipment, motor vehicles, railway rolling stock, iron and steel, cotton textiles and metal manufactures.

### **Stress on Increased Indo-Zambian Cooperation**

Trade matters of mutual interest were discussed between India and Zambia, when the visiting Zambian Minister of Commerce, Mr James Mapoma, called on the Minister of State for Commerce, Mr Arif Beg, on 24 October in New Delhi. Both leaders stressed the need for participation of India and Zambia in various joint collaborations and further development of trade relationship. They also



envisaged increased cooperation between the two countries in the fields of science, technology and cultural activities.

India has already entered into agreements with Zambia on economic, technical and cultural cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of science and technology. The two countries have also signed a protocol on bilateral cooperation and are shortly to sign the draft of a trade agreement. The Industrial Development Bank of India have also agreed to offer a credit of Rs. 100 million on easy terms to Zambia, with repayment period from 7 to 10 years.

The total trade turnover between India and Zambia during 1976-77 was of the order of Rs. 501.1 million. India imports mainly copper, zinc and lead from Zambia and exports primarily engineering goods.

## Book Review

Bjorn Beckman: *Organising the Farmers : Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana*. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1976 pp. 284 maps 2, diagrams 3, tables 4, notes, bibliography and glossary etc.

The present study broadly deals with the economic and political strategy in Ghana during Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) regime lead by Mr Nkrumah. It lays emphasis on the cocoa sector of Ghana's agriculture which plays a vital role in the political economy of the country. The cocoa trade contributed from 57 per cent of the value of Ghana's export in 1957 to 67 per cent in 1965. It also accounted for one third of the total agricultural production. The cocoa trade, which was previously in the foreign hands was brought under public monopoly through the United Ghana Farmer's Council. The changed structure of the organisation of this trade led to a triangular tussle over the distribution of income between the producer, state and the

middlemen who particularly felt deprived of all the income because they faced total elimination. The focus of the study has been maintained on the management of cocoa production and trade through the farmers' organisation which in turn became the vehicle for extending the party's influence over the cocoa farming community. The study systematically proceeds to examine the Ghanaian experience in the process of decolonisation and national development during Nkrumah's period. The first Chapter of the book may, generally be termed as an overview of the literature pertaining to the process of decolonisation in Ghana. It gives an idea of how other scholars viewed this experience of decolonisation. The present author has laid stress only

on the class character of the regime and its strategy for national development. Attempt has been made to bring out the main features of cocoa economy in Ghana. Its role in the total economy, the organisation of production and the development over time has also been traced. The author has discussed the organisation of the cocoa trade by the Cocoa Marketing Board and also the organisation of local cocoa trade, which assumed a crucial place in the political economy of the country. According to Robert Szereszewski, 'historically the present economic structure of Ghana started to evolve when the natural resources of the forest belt began to be exploited and exported by Ghanian and foreign enterprise. Capital started accumulate around the cocoa, mining and timber industries, and strong migratory movements of labour, both internal and external, followed. Urbanisation, the development of new services and the provision of social and economic infrastructure were largely, restricted to the areas of favourable natural resources and to the

coastal centres which were the seats of administration and points of contact with the outer world'. No doubt, the economy as a whole showed signs of prosperity but it also, at the same time, created regional disparity and the gap widened between the poorer northern Savannah and rich forest region of south. An unique feature of cocoa industry of Ghana has been that it developed as a result of the initiative of local entrepreneur farmers and historically, foreign owned plantations had no role in it. But the trade, on the other hand, was mostly handled by the foreign firms almost upto the second World War. Cocoa Marketing Board attained firm footing after the war while most of the attempts of the farmers, to organise themselves before, had failed.

Chapter-III discusses the origin and development of the United Ghana Farmers' Council in 1953 as a political and commercial organisation 'in the tradition of farmer-trader organisation'. It was, no doubt, a CPP sponsored organisation which depended for its financial and adminis-

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trative control on the government and received from it loans and subsidies. In 1957, it was recognised as a national organisation representing the farmers of the country. Chapter IV examines the way, the monopoly of cocoa trade functioned. The process of the monopolising the cocoa trade started with the elimination of the European firms for which the local farmers and traders worked together unitedly. Since most of the farmers acted as traders and traders were farm owners, they combined in attaining the elimination of foreign firms. The Farmers' Council succeeded in eliminating the foreign firms as well as a large number of middlemen acting as brokers. This logically meant a redistribution of profits of cocoa trade amongst the farming community. The aspirations of the farming community to get larger share of profits increased but in place of middlemen, 'a class of bureaucratic middlemen established themselves, exploiting the producers, both by claiming an increasing share of surplus as its own official entitlement and by tolerating widespread

private profiteering among its members at the expense of producers. Thus, the functionaries at various levels claimed large share of the stagnating cocoa income through their remuneration etc. and a very small share percolated to farmers by way of commission. Slowly the resentment amongst the farmers built up. Beyond the dishonesty of individuals in the bureaucratic set up, the organisational weaknesses of the system also came to the surface.

Chapter-VI is devoted to discuss the political control of the Farmers' Council and the participation of the individuals as such. It examines the *modus operandi* in the organisation of the council, representation of farmers and internal and external control. While the control was affected by highly centralised bureaucracy, the representation of farmers was plagued by party politics, communal allegiance and socio-economic divisions. There were innumerable cleavages within the cocoa community. Consequently the Council failed, 'to move gradually to-

wards democratisation of its mass base'.

The role of the cocoa in the public economy has been examined in chapter seven. According to the observation of the author 'the CPP State largely based—directly or indirectly—on the surplus appropriated from the cocoa economy'. Thus, it was quite natural that the government sought control over the farmers through the Council. The corrupt bureaucracy, the influential minority of farmer co-operators, big farmers and farmer-traders, coupled with the falling prices of cocoa during sixties made the economy crumble down with it CPP was also devastated through a military *coup*.

The author has made use of a huge source material, mostly first hand, in writing this book. It makes an interesting and informative reading but the readers' intellectual barometer starts raising when he wades through the sweeping generalisations made by the author. One clearly observes that at various places the statements lack objecti-

vity and subjective generalisation have been resorted to. If one thinks and analyses, he would find some truth in the statement of Mr. Danquah, former General Secretary of UGFC. He maintains that "We were a human organisation, and by all means the human element in the whole system created some short comings here and there, but we had machinery to check them. It was also true that the council was an integral wing of the disbanded Convention Peoples Party, but this did not in any way create contradictions between our political affiliation and our effort to fight for the welfare of the farmers. The two cases cited by the author (Beckman) to prove his case, namely, the voluntary contributions to the Second Development Plan, and the compulsory savings, were used by the Council to forestall the plan of the Ministry of Finance to reduce the cocoa price to level which would have been much lower than what we received after this action of the Council...After the 1966 *coup* it was discovered that

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salaries of our staff were much lower than those of the Cocoa Marketing Board and even now, after having made efforts to increase the salaries of the Produce Buying Agency Ltd. staff, the salaries level is still below that of the Cocoa Marketing Board".

This reveals that objective reality lies somewhere in between. Corruption has taken

root in many of the developing nations after they attained independence. This might be true in case of Ghana also. A more balanced analysis would have been possible, had the author been a bit more dispassionate. Beautiful get up of the book has been marred by spelling mistakes which have crept in due to the oversight of the proof readers.

M.H. Qureshi.

R.R. Ramchandani. *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*. United Asia Publications, Bombay, 1976. pp. 318.

The book is a comprehensive and systematic account of the role of the Asian—mainly Indian—enterprise in Uganda since the early colonial times till 1972 i.e. a decade after the Independence of the country and the time of total expulsion of the community from Uganda by President Idi Amin Dada. The study traces the causes of the Asians' predominance and their remarkable achievements in the Ugandan economic life within the framework of the British colonial policy. The analysis is qualitative as well as quantitative. It is an outcome of

original research based mainly on Indian and Ugandan archival records and the author's tour of Uganda. Dr. Ramchandani's work fills an important gap in the literature on Asians in East Africa in general and Uganda in particular. It is a pioneering work in as much as it deals primarily, though not exclusively, with economic denominators. It is refreshingly different from the historical narratives of political events and sociological studies of a general nature which have appeared in the past.

The book is divided into

eleven chapters beginning with a discussion of the nature of the backward pre-colonial economy and early Indian enterprise in East Africa and Uganda. The dependent nature of the economy is analysed with reference to fluctuations in world prices of Ugandan primary commodity exports. It traces the existence of Asian trade links and also the establishment of settlements by the community prior to the advent of European colonisation of the coast. The imperial British government not only looked benevolently upon Indian enterprise in East Africa but also regarded its presence with a great deal of enthusiasm with the two-fold objectives of opening up the interior and of enlarging the exchange economy. The second chapter analyses the trends and pattern of Asian immigration and push and pull factors encouraging it. It throws light on political complexities and economic needs, as viewed by the British, of the territories in general and Uganda in particular. By 1914 the Indian community had occupied front position in the development process e.g. it

exercised complete control over the distributive trade through the ubiquitous institution of "duka". Its presence permeated every sphere of economic activity e.g. an overwhelmingly large proportion of total intermediate level jobs in the public sector was held by the Asians. With a view to promoting European settlements several severe disabilities were imposed on the Indian settlers and later unrestricted immigration of the community was virtually banned despite substantial increase in economic opportunities and unequivocal acknowledgement of the Asian contribution to Ugandan economic development. By early 1950's Africans emerged as a major political factor in the country and Government efforts were mainly directed at tightening and effectively enforcing the existing restrictive immigration laws.

On the basis of a sectoral analysis in the third chapter, the predominant role of the Asians in trade and commerce is examined. It is this area of economic activity where the African found himself at a great disadvantage, vis-a-vis

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the Asian trader, due to a large number of handicaps. Development of cotton industry—the prime mover of the Ugandan economy, Asians' pivotal role in its marketing, processing and export operations and an examination of colonial economic policy in the context of the industry form the subject matter of the next chapter. In pursuance of its policy of encouraging and safeguarding British commercial interests the colonial government regulated cotton industry on monopsonistic lines in the teeth of opposition from the Asian middlemen and the African cotton growers who demanded a free market as in the wake of a system of controls and buying associations the producers were paid unduly low prices. The restrictive government policy was largely responsible for excluding the Africans from cotton ginning, buying and transporting operations. Asians came in for scathing criticism as middlemen exploiters for their malpractices in buying cotton from the peasant farmers. Widespread and systematic cheating in buying cotton resulted in a great deal of ill-

feelings against the Asian community and racial overtones were added to a strictly economic evil." The malpractices and illicit profits made by the ginners and their agents were mainly a result of the vested monopoly created in the industry through the government's cotton policy" (p. 137). As a sequel to the Buganda riots in 1949 the period 1950-62 was marked by vigorous government activity with the objective of African participation in the rationalisation of the industry leading to the elimination of non-African interest from it. These measures did not augur well for the Asians and served as a fore-warning in sectors of economic activity where African participation and economic advancement was considered an urgent political necessity.

The discussion in the fifth chapter centres around the importance of the Asian enterprise in the manufacturing sector—a field a activity regarded by Asians, as subsidiary to trading. A handful of big European and Asian firms engaged in manufacturing, small and large scale,



along with trading, merchandising, transporting and even estate planting and surprisingly enough the production was well-diversified and completely internally financed. Consumer goods like sugar, soap, soft-drinks, bricks and tiles, vegetable oils etc. were some of the major products. A sizeable number of bakeries, hulleries and flour mills were also run by the immigrant community. In fact, prior to the establishment of the Uganda Development Corporation in 1952, the Asian investment was one of the most significant elements in Uganda's industrial development. Later on, the Indian firms not only ventured into steel works, breweries and cotton textiles but also pioneered sugar manufacturing. Manufacturing sector was almost free from racial tension as African participation was either duly secured through co-operatives or the Asians did not have a dominant position. Asian community's entrepreneurial activity, drive, command over financial resources and general commercial acumen were invaluable assets in the country's economic development and it could not be regarded as a

factor inhibiting African progress even in the small scale industry sector.

Asian role in the agricultural sector of the economy is discussed in the next chapter, with special reference to estate cultivation of cash crops like cotton, coffee, sugarcane, tea and sisal as hardly any Asian was engaged in peasant agriculture—a situation adduced by Africans as an evidence of lack of Asian commitment to and absence of the community's deep roots in the country. The criticism, besides being far-fetched, is entirely unfounded as the system of grant of lease or sale of land to non-Africans was extremely cumbersome and severely discouraged land alienation. Despite restrictive measures Asian plantations registered a phenomenal growth and as early as 1938 the Asians planted 60 per cent of the total acreage and they further accounted for about-two-thirds of the total production and value to African growers from the cultivation of such crops by 1963. In fact, European planters failed in Uganda whereas Asians succeeded—a circumstance,

dramatically different from other African countries where the former had a virtual monopoly of estate cultivation. The "outgrower" schemes were launched on lands adjoining Asian plantations but the schemes did not prove economically viable due to the peasant's total dependence on the resources of the plantation company for all factor inputs except labour. On the eve of Independence the possibility of racial antagonism developing around this sector was rather remote. Chapter seven is devoted to a discussion of urban development and the Asian role in it. Growth of Ugandan towns was an outcome of colonial security and administrative requirements and new towns were mostly developed by the Government, the European and the Asian communities. Government town planning schemes were marked by racially discriminatory and segregationist residential plans. It was the Asian who was being discriminated against as there was no African urban middle class. Asian resentment against the policy succeeded in the idea being dropped but the segre-

gationist philosophy survived on the pretext of sanitary necessity. Just as the colonial government's residential segregationist policy did not let an African urban middle class rise similarly its "concentration policy" precluded any possibility of ruralisation of even a small section of the Asian community.

In the area of manpower resources, discussed in the eighth chapter, the Asians supplied intermediate and high level work-force. As a matter of fact, even in its early days, the Protectorate government tapped Indian manpower resources for all types of subordinate and skilled jobs. Asians could be employed at much lower wages in comparison with the Europeans and the Africans were not yet trained for these positions. The entire period before the Second World War was marked by the non-existence of any educational training programme, worth the name, for Africans. Thus no efforts were made to train the indigenous people to meet the increasing manpower requirements of the growing economy. Wide wage-differen-

tials existed amongst the Asian and African workers engaged in jobs of similar description and the two groups of workers were governed by separate civil service boards. Europeans occupied the top, Asians the middle and Africans the bottom rungs of the economic ladder. Education and training facilities for Africans were rapidly multiplied and Ugandanisation of trade and commerce and civil services made rapid strides after 1952. The author observes that "In essence it was a question of the racial friction between the black and brown which ran through the entire economic and social fabric of the society." (p. 229)

The roots of racial rift in Uganda lay in the racially demarcated socio-economic structure nurtured by the colonial government policies. An examination of occupational distribution since 1921 through 1959 and the distribution of national income in 1963 reveal Asian ascendancy as a commercial class and non-Africans (Europeans and Asians), constituting only 1.4 per cent of the total population, receiving 19 and 26 per cent of the GDP in 1954 and

1963 respectively. The per capita Asian income in 1963 (£ 288 p.a.) was 24 times that of African per capita income. Disparities in wages, ownership of property and resultant distinct differences in the standards of living mixed with political awakening, patriotic fervour and the African's misplaced impressions about Asian's rigid social attitudes fanned the fire of racial hatred and animosity. Overlapping of competitive element between the two races and non-complementarity of the Asians' skill and talent with the other factor inputs, like African labour, precipitated the troubled situation. Chapter nine is concluded with the observation that political compulsions, in an unsettled political climate and not economic considerations, determined government decisions.

Despite the findings of the Government's perspective manpower planning exercise conducted in 1966 contra indicating the feasibility of Ugandanisation of all posts before 1981 the Africans still fervently believed in the total removal of Asians from the economic scene of Uganda. Between

1966-70 the Government's pronouncements, moves and measures, dealt with in the penultimate chapter, speeded up Ugandanisation to the utter disregard and eventual detriment of Asian economic interests resulting in large scale exodus of Asians from the country.

In a military coup Major General Amin ousted President Obote in January 1971 and at the time of assuming the reins of power President Amin promised a large role for the private sector—both domestic and foreign. Despite his efforts at rejuvenating the sagging economy, it stagnated, cost of living kept on rising relentlessly and discontentment

raised its ugly head amongst the ranks of the armed forces adding momentum to an already fast deteriorating politico-economic situation. In the face of mounting difficulties of holding Uganda together and for ensuring his own survival, Amin declared "operation expulsion" branding the Asians akin to Hitler's Jews. Thus, within three months in 1972 came to a grimly tragic end the centuries-old historic Asian enterprise in Uganda.

It is a thoroughly readable book of immense value to the Africanists and also to all those interested in Africa.

Satish C. Mehta

Fatima Meer. *The Sociology and Politics of Self-Destruction : Race and Suicide in South Africa*. Routledge & Kegan Paul (London), 1976

Race and Suicide by Fatima Meer is an intensive, statistically rich study of social conditions and relationships based on the hypothesis that these are associated with suicide patterns in Durban over two periods of time. These periods of time include the surge of momentous political

campaigns in the struggle for national liberation from white supremacist domination. The Passive Resistance Campaign of 1946; the Defiance Campaign of 1952; the Congress of the People and the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955; the Treason Trial of 1956 and the launching of

Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1961 were concentrated political campaigns in a continuing struggle by the oppressed people of South Africa. These constitute for Fatima Meer events of heightened social cohesion for the black community and provide the opportunity to test the theory of the sociologist Emile Durkheim that suicide is a phenomenon of "anomie" loosely translated as the individual disruption in social integration.

Is the rate of suicide amongst Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites related to political campaigns in the way that suicide rates dropped in Europe during the Second World War? Durban is the laboratory; the African, Coloured, Indian and White suicides the participants; and the campaigns the experimental conditions for this study which employs data collection of sociological phenomena of each of the groups. The answer is that the frustration suicide rate in Durban does not bear out Durkheim's theory. Despite the vast amount of social data collected, she had stopped there, the study at least would have

identified that fact that suicide is not purely a sociological phenomenon though aspects of social life clearly will have an influence on medical and other social-psychological aspects of existence.

Not having stopped at this point the author proceeds to construct anecdotal accounts based on inference from interviews with relatives, where possible, suicide notes and from information that she has gleaned from inquest records. The information is liberally interpreted in terms of suicide being an act of aggression, sometimes an act of vengeance against the individual's primary social contacts, at other times aggression inwardly directed and in these circumstances displaced from the true sources of frustration on to the self.

These *ad hoc* accounts make plausible reading, but they carry with them the inherent danger of appearing causative when in fact the phenomenon of suicide is a complex issue probably associated with biochemical, social, psychological and psychiatric factors. One instance in the author's

interpretation which illustrate this reviewer's scepticism of her generalisations is in the account of an Indian girl working as a domestic for an Indian family. The author says that Indian families tend to treat their domestic help as part of the family and that the workers might regard their employers as substitute families (p. 151). My own experience as an Indian visiting Durban, a vivid politicising event for me, was to see that Indian employers of Indian domestic help did not differ in their operation of the master-servant relationship in spite of similar racial origin. Mrs. Meer's own account soon reveals the contradictory nature of her original tenet when the employer, however benevolent, became aware of the possible "harmful" influence of this working girl's personal conduct on her own petty bourgeois moves for her family.

There is a need for sociological-ethnographical study of the peoples who constitute the South African community. The inhuman compound existence of the African migrant workers and the break-down

of social customs obtaining in rural society even in relation to customary social drinking described by the author is interesting. The changes in mores consequent on the indentured Indian labourers becoming proletarianised in Natal is of sociological significance. What actually is the transition process of the Coloured people in Durban with the hardening of apartheid—the Job Reservation Act and the Population Registration Act? Do white people kill themselves when they no longer feel masters?

Race and Suicide in South Africa is interspersed with ethnic characteristics and cultural traits but hardly elucidates the tragedy of suicide. The book will be a disappointment to anyone expecting insight into either of these questions. It is particularly weak in that, though there is an abundance of tabulated data on various social aspects, it is lacking in information; e.g. about psychiatric services for blacks, the existence and adequacy of disability allowances or medical services to the "incurably ill" (e.g. tuberculosis) amongst blacks which she cites as sta-

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ted causes for suicide by black bread winners.

In general, the study suffers from the malaise of bourgeois sociology in that its methodology is based on a static concept of society—collection of data—rather than that social process is a dialectical phenomenon within which data collection is part of scientific methodology. The individual is not a constituent element of society but stands outside of society and on

whom social processes operate.

As a black sociologist teaching in a South African university, the author of this book is a woman's leader and a black consciousness exponent, and is in a position to influence ideology in the social sciences. Though one senses aspects of national consciousness in the midst of work that aims to be scientifically neutral its weakness is its unqualified basic acceptance of bourgeois tenets of human life.

**Soobramanium**

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